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Abstract 
 
UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT COMPENSATION: A COMPLEX EXAMINATION OF ITS 
DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES 
 
By Sheila Kathleen Keener 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy at 
Virginia Commonwealth University.  
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2019 
 
Major Director: Dr. Sven Kepes, Professor of Management, Department of Management and 
Entrepreneurship  
 
This dissertation examined the controversy surrounding the high levels of compensation paid to 
university presidents. To do this, the first half of this dissertation includes a systematic review of 
the existing literature regarding the relation between university performance and university 
president compensation in nonprofit universities. The second half of this dissertation attempts to 
replicate the findings from the systematic review with more current data. Several gaps identified 
in the literature, including the effects of analyzing specific compensation components, the effect 
of university president compensation on subsequent university performance, potential nonlinear 
relations, and how relations between university performance and university president 
compensation change over time, are examined as well. Specific hypotheses and research 
questions are derived from compensation and motivation theories used in the for-profit context 
as well as findings from both the for-profit and nonprofit executive compensation literature. 
Results indicated that university performance had a weak effect on compensation in private 
universities and no effect in public universities. Findings suggested that there may be differences 
in this effect depending on the component of compensation examined. Compensation appears to 
have a negative or nil effect on subsequent university performance. Evidence of differential 
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effects over time were not observed. Although some nonlinear effects were detected, they did not 
take the form expected. Potential reasons for these findings, as well as their implications for 
research and practice, are discussed.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Problem Statement 
 The compensation of university1 presidents has been an increasingly controversial topic 
over the past several years (Dillon, 2004; Ginsberg, 2011; Glater, 2007; Krupnick & Marcus, 
2015; Stripling & Fuller, 2011). During this time, total public funding per full-time equivalent 
student for colleges and universities has steadily decreased (Mitchell, Leachman, Masterson, & 
Waxman, 2018; Woodhouse, 2015). To make up for the lack of funding, universities have opted 
to raise tuition (American Association of University Professors, 2017). This has resulted in 
higher net costs of attending college and, therefore, increased student loan debt (Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, 2013; Seltzer, 2017). Yet, although reduced funding has negatively impacted 
students, the compensation of university presidents has continued to rise (Bauman, Davis, Myers, 
& O'Leary, 2017). This has led many to speculate about whether the presidents are being 
overcompensated (Dillon, 2004; Krupnick & Marcus, 2015; Saul, 2017; Stripling & Fuller, 
2011). 
 The situation in academia is similar to that of executive compensation as a whole. 
Adjusting for inflation, the pay of CEOs from the 350 largest U. S. firms grew by 937% between 
1978 and 2016 (Mishel & Schieder, 2017). Just as in academia, the rising compensation of 
executives has led many people to believe that executives are overpaid (Kiatpongsan & Norton, 
2014; Walsh, 2008, 2009). However, there are also many who suggest that university presidents 
and CEOs are not overpaid and that their high levels of compensation are necessary to attract 
high-quality individuals as well as to incentivize their future performance (Agarwal, 1981; 
Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Kaplan, 2008a, 2008b; Vroom, 1964; Worstall, 2014). This 
 
1 The terms “university” and “college” are used interchangeably; thus, university president compensation refers not 
only to the compensation of presidents employed at universities, but also to presidents employed at colleges.  
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suggests that current levels of pay may be justified if they result in comparable future 
performance increases. Others have argued that high levels of pay are acceptable if they are 
commensurate with past organizational performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). If future pay is 
contingent on performance, it is reasoned that university presidents and other executives will be 
motivated to perform at high levels. These arguments suggest that the rising pay of university 
presidents and other chief executives can be justified, beneficial, and, because of the increases in 
motivation resulting from the performance-compensation linkage, may lead to future high 
performance.  
Unfortunately, although executive compensation research has flourished over the past 
several decades (Agarwal, 1981; Devers, Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder, 2007; Gomez-Mejia & 
Wiseman, 1997; Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000; van Essen, Otten, & Carberry, 
2015), our current understanding of the extent to which executive compensation and 
organizational performance are actually related is incomplete. This is particularly true within the 
context of academia where there has been a relative dearth of research exploring how president 
compensation and university performance are related and almost no research examining the 
complexities and nuances of these relations. The lack of research in the nonprofit educational 
context is particularly problematic because there are important differences between the for-profit 
context typically studied by executive compensation researchers and the nonprofit educational 
context. Thus, the extent to which even the limited knowledge gained from for-profit context 
generalizes to the nonprofit educational context is largely unknown. 
Specifically, agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the dominant theory used in the 
for-profit executive compensation literature, includes assumptions and suggestions that may not 
be upheld in the nonprofit educational context. For instance, agency theory assumes that 
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executives are self-interested and will attempt to shirk their duties if steps are not taken to align 
their interests with the ones of the owners of the organization (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
However, some have argued that university presidents are not self-interested, but rather, they are 
intrinsically motivated to perform to the best of their ability due to their commitment to the goals 
of their organization (Handy & Katz, 1998; see also, Bai, 2014). If true, it would not be 
necessary to provide performance incentives to university presidents and there would be no 
relation expected between university president compensation and university performance.  
However, even if university presidents are self-interested and it is necessary to take steps 
to align their interests to the performance of their universities, it may be, practically, very 
difficult to do so. This is because performance is defined differently in for-profit contexts and 
nonprofit educational contexts and the control mechanisms available to university Boards of 
Visitors/Trustees/Regents (hereafter the term “Board” is used to refer to Boards in general as 
well as specific Boards) are different than those available to Boards of for-profit organizations 
(e.g., universities do not have stock options). These substantive differences between the for-
profit and nonprofit educational contexts make it necessary to thoroughly study the extent to 
which theories from the for-profit literature generalize to the nonprofit educational context.  
Thus, the objective of this dissertation is to explore similarities and differences between 
the for-profit context and the nonprofit educational context to gain a better understanding of the 
nature of the relation between university president compensation and university performance. In 
so doing, this dissertation will fill many of the gaps that currently exist within the literature 
regarding university president compensation and university performance. Filling these gaps will 
shed light on the controversy surrounding the pay of university presidents and help to determine 
whether their high average levels of pay are justified.  
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The first step in attempting to fill existing gaps within the literature is to determine the 
current state of our cumulative knowledge of the relation between executive compensation and 
organizational performance in both the for-profit and nonprofit educational contexts. The first 
way in which this dissertation aims to address the controversy surrounding president 
compensation is to conduct a systematic review of the existing literature on the relation between 
university performance and subsequent university president compensation. After providing a 
thorough review of the existing literature, this dissertation will also examine a series of open 
questions in the literature. First, although there has been a substantial amount of research aimed 
at determining the effect that financial organizational performance has on future pay in the for-
profit context (e.g., Tosi et al., 2000), there has been relatively little research that attempts to 
explore the effect of university president compensation on future performance. Given that 
different theories support both the link between performance and future pay (e.g., agency theory; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and pay and future performance (e.g., expectancy theory; Vroom, 
1964), it is important to test both sets of relations. 
Second, because relatively few studies have examined the relation between executive 
compensation and organizational performance, researchers have also failed to integrate findings 
and theories across literature areas. Thus, little is known about the potential reciprocal effects 
that pay and performance may have on each other (Devers et al., 2007) and how these relations 
evolve over time. Third, the existing studies assessing the relation between performance and pay 
have been overly simplistic. For instance, few studies have examined the potential that nonlinear 
effects exist between these two variables due to, for instance, the diminishing marginal utility of 
compensation (i.e., additional increases in pay do not result in similar increases in motivation 
after a given point; see Aaron, Harris, McDowell, & Cline, 2014 for an exception).  
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Considering the nonprofit educational context, the same set of questions exist. In fact, 
although there have been a handful of studies that have assessed the impact of university 
performance on pay (e.g., Bai, 2014; Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Cheng, 2014; Ehrenberg, 
Cheslock, & Epifantseva, 2001), only three studies have assessed the impact of president 
compensation on future university performance (Hunt, Tandberg, & Park, 2019; Parsons & 
Reitenga, 2014; Tang, Tang, & Tang, 2004). Consequently, there has also been no attempt to 
integrate the various theories which suggest that the relation between pay and performance may 
go in either direction (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Vroom, 1964). Also, there has been no 
consideration of potential reciprocal relations involving these two variables. Additionally, there 
are no studies in the nonprofit educational context that have examined potential nonlinear effects 
between president compensation and university performance.  
These unanswered questions, present in both academia and the broader literature of 
executive compensation, highlight the limitations of our current understanding of the relation 
between executive compensation and organizational performance and could have significant 
practical implications. Thus, another goal of this dissertation is to gain a better understanding of 
the potentially complex relation between university president compensation and university 
performance over time. Given that these same gaps exist in the larger for-profit executive 
compensation literature, the findings of this study may also provide a starting point for future 
for-profit executive compensation research.  
In sum, this dissertation will address several open questions, grouped into two 
overarching gaps, in the university president compensation and university performance literature. 
In so doing, this dissertation not only aims to shed light on the continuing controversy 
surrounding the growing levels of president pay in universities, it may also help to address this 
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controversy as it exists in the broader area of executive compensation, which has many of the 
same open questions. Specifically, I explore the following research questions aimed to address 
the open questions noted previously. 
Gap 1: Systematic review of university performance and university president 
compensation studies 
Research question 1: What impact, if any, does university performance have on president 
compensation? 
Gap 2: A comprehensive assessment of the complexities in the relation between 
university president compensation and university performance  
Research question 2a: Does university performance predict future university president 
compensation?  
Research question 2b: Is there a reciprocal relation between university president 
compensation and university performance? 
Research question 2c: How does the link between university performance and university 
president compensation change over time? 
Research question 2d: Is the relationship between university performance and university 
president compensation linear? 
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CHAPTER 2 
 Is Pay Influenced by Past Performance? A Systematic Review of the Antecedents of 
University President Pay 
 The rising levels of compensation paid to university presidents has received increasing 
attention and scrutiny over the past several years from both the popular press (Dillon, 2004; 
Sonnenberg, 2017; Stripling & Fuller, 2011) and researchers (Bai, 2014; Bartlett & Sorokina, 
2005; Cheng, 2014; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014). While public funding for universities has 
decreased, the compensation of university presidents has continued to rise (Bauman et al., 2017; 
Woodhouse, 2015). Considering that average costs to attend college increased by 57% between 
2007 and 2017 (Boyington, 2017) and student loan debt increased by 250% during a similar time 
period (2004 and 2014; Martin, 2017), many have claimed that university presidents are being 
paid too much (Dillon, 2004; Krupnick & Marcus, 2015; Saul, 2017; Stripling & Fuller, 2011). 
For instance, Richard Vedder, the director of the Center for College Affordability and 
Productivity at Ohio University stated, “Schools are resisting changes [to reduce the cost of 
attending college], but they’re going ahead and continuing to make these large payments to 
university presidents, and I think it’s the height of irresponsibility” (cf. Binkley, 2016, para. 8). 
However, many Boards and presidents have argued that the compensation of university 
presidents is based on the requirements of the job as well as the performance of the president, 
and, therefore, is quite reasonable. For instance, referring to Arizona State University’s 
President, Michael Crow (the highest paid public university president in 2017), Board of Regents 
Vice Chairman, Bill Ridenour said, “Crow is an entrepreneur, a visionary and a leader […] My 
thoughts are you can’t pay Dr. Crow enough” (cf. Ryman, 2017, paras 9-10). This suggests that 
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some Boards do not feel as though presidents are overcompensated, but rather that their high 
salaries and benefits are reflective of the value they add to the university.  
Yet, in spite of the claim by many that presidents are fairly and reasonably compensated 
and that their high level of compensation reflects the value that they add to universities (e.g., 
Cotton, 2012; Roediger, 2005), there is very little convincing evidence to support such claims. 
For instance, the evidence suggesting that the actual performance of the university factors into 
the level of president compensation is mixed. Results of one study indicated that president total 
compensation was positively related to performance variables such as student SAT scores (Tang, 
Tang, & Tang, 2000). In contrast, another study found that there was no statistically significant 
relation between university president compensation and SAT scores (or any other performance 
variable that was used; Cheng, 2014). Still another study showed that, although some measures 
of performance were related to president compensation, the results depended on whether the 
president was employed at a top-tier university (Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005). Specifically, Bartlett 
and Sorokina (2005) found that SAT scores were only positively related to university president 
compensation in top-tier universities, yet SAT scores had no effect on compensation at tier 2, 3, 
or 4 universities. Mixed results have been reported for several other performance variables as 
well, including endowment (Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Huang & Chen, 2013; Parsons & 
Reitenga, 2014; Pati & Lee, 2016), alumni giving rate (Langbert, 2006; Langbert & Fox, 2013; 
Sorokina, 2003), and retention rate (Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Cheng, 2014; Langbert, 2006). 
These mixed results make it difficult to determine what, if any, effect university performance has 
on president compensation.  
If university president compensation is determined by the actual performance of the 
university, the notion that university presidents are compensated appropriately is more credible. 
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Conversely, if the compensation of university presidents is not responsive to university 
performance, the concern that presidents are overcompensated would have more credence. This 
study aims to help settle this controversy. To do this, I conduct a systematic review of primary 
studies that have examined determinants of university president compensation, including various 
dimensions of university performance (e.g., financial performance, academic performance, 
university selectivity). In so doing, this study will be able to identify the factors which influence 
university president compensation and the extent to which they do so.  
The results of this study, by providing an overall assessment of the current literature on 
the relation between university performance, and other potential determinants, on president 
compensation, will help to address the continuing controversy regarding the appropriateness of 
the high levels of president compensation. Thus, the findings of this study could have a 
significant impact on compensation policies at universities. For instance, if the results indicate 
that president compensation is not related to university performance, Boards may want to 
consider ending the practice of providing large compensation increases to university presidents. 
Furthermore, the decision by some states to limit the amount of a president’s compensation that 
can come from public funds would be supported (e.g., Fla. Stat., 2017). If, however, evidence 
suggests that presidents are paid commensurate with the performance of the university, state 
policies which limit the amount of money that university presidents can be paid should be 
eliminated because the high levels of compensation paid to university presidents is money well-
spent.  
Background 
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Executive Compensation 
 The broader field of executive compensation can be used to gain insight into university 
president compensation as the field of executive compensation faces many of the same 
controversies and attempts to answer many of the same questions that exist regarding university 
president pay. For instance, adjusting for inflation, CEO compensation grew by up to 937% 
between 1978 and 2016 and the median compensation of CEO from the 350 largest organizations 
in the U. S. was $15.6 million dollars in 2016 (Mishel & Schieder, 2017). Although average 
CEO compensation has dropped slightly since its peak in 2000, it is still an average of 270.5 
times the compensation of the average worker (Mishel & Schieder, 2017). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, 74% Americans believe that CEOs are overpaid compared to average workers 
(Miller, 2016) while 75% of CEOs and directors of Fortune 500 companies feel that CEOs are 
fairly compensated.  
Consequently, there has been extensive investigation of the determinants of CEO 
compensation (e.g., Devers et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Tosi et al., 2000; van 
Essen et al., 2015). Two narrative reviews highlight that firm performance has been the most 
frequently studied variable in relation with executive compensation (Devers et al., 2007; Gomez-
Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). However, both reviews also highlight other variables that have been 
examined as predictors of executive compensation. For instance, in addition to organizational 
performance, variables such as CEO behavior, firm size, CEO personal characteristics, CEO role 
responsibilities, governance influences/failures and equity considerations have been examined. 
The relation between each of these predictors and executive compensation is supported by 
several theories, including agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), managerialism (e.g., Aoki, 
1984; Herman, 1981), human capital theory (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962), social 
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comparison theory (O'Reilly, Main, & Crystal, 1988), managerial power theory (Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2004, 2006), neoclassical labor market theory (e.g., Boyer & Smith, 2001), and 
tournament theory (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). Table 1 provides a brief overview of the 
aforementioned determinants of executive compensation, example operationalizations of these 
predictors, and the theories used to support the relations between these variables and executive 
compensation. Table 1 also includes examples of studies that have examined the relation 
between each of these determinants (e.g., organizational performance, CEO behavior, firm size, 
governance influences/failures) and compensation.  
Although each of these predictors has received empirical attention, some avenues have 
been more fruitful than others. Specifically, the relations between firm performance, firm size, 
governance influences/failures, and CEO compensation have garnered the most attention and 
empirical support (e.g., Devers et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Tosi et al., 2000; 
van Essen et al., 2015). Furthermore, as can be seen from Table 1, three meta-analyses have been 
conducted on these relations (Deutsch, 2005; Tosi et al., 2000; van Essen et al., 2015). Using 
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and managerialism (e.g., Aoki, 1984; Herman, 1981), 
Tosi et al. (2000) examined the effects of organizational performance and organizational size on 
executive compensation and found that both variables were positively associated with executive 
compensation, with organizational size accounting for more variance. Another meta-analysis 
used managerial power theory (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004, 2006) to examine the relation between 
multiple governance-related variables (e.g., CEO duality2, Board size, Board independence) and 
compensation (van Essen et al., 2015). They found that CEO duality, Board size, and Board 
independence were positively associated with total compensation, whereas ownership 
 
2CEO duality refers to a situation where the CEO is also the chairman of the Board (van Essen et al., 2015).   
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concentration and institutional ownership were negatively related to total compensation. No 
statistically significant association was found between CEO tenure and total pay. Finally, 
Deutsch (2005), using agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), examined the effect of the 
proportion of outside directors on a firm’s Board (one example of a governance-related variable) 
on executive compensation. He found no statistically significant relation between the proportion 
of outside directors on a firm’s Board and total pay. The remaining predictors (e.g., CEO 
behavior, CEO personal characteristics, CEO role responsibilities, labor market influences, 
equity considerations) have received less attention and support (Devers et al., 2007; Fulmer, 
2009; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997).  
Although each of the variables that have been examined in the executive compensation 
literature (e.g., organizational performance, organizational size, CEO behavior, equity 
considerations) could potentially influence university president compensation, there has been 
less extensive examination of the relations between these variables and university president 
compensation. Table 2 provides an overview of the variables that have been examined, along 
with example operationalizations and the theories used to support the relations between these 
variables and university president compensation. As can be seen from the table, none of the 
existing studies concerning the determinants of university president compensation have 
examined the role of president behavior, president role responsibilities, governance 
influences/failures, or equity considerations. Rather, studies examining university president 
compensation have focused on university performance, university size and complexity, and 
university president personal characteristics (e.g., educational background, gender). Therefore, 
this systematic review focuses on the influence of these three sets of variables: university 
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performance, university size and complexity, and president personal characteristics on university 
president compensation. 
In the following sections, I review the ways in which each of these variables (i.e., 
performance, size and complexity, and personal characteristics) has been operationalized in the 
existing literature on university president compensation. I also discuss the most frequently used 
theories that explain why each of these factors is theoretically related to executive compensation 
(i.e., agency theory, managerialism, human capital theory). In addition, I provide an overview of 
the current state of evidence regarding the extent to which each of these variables is predictive of 
executive compensation. Lastly, I highlight how these theories may inform predictions regarding 
the potential relations between university performance, non-performance institutional 
characteristics (including size and complexity), president personal characteristics, and university 
president compensation and discuss existing evidence on these relations. The predicted relations 
are displayed in Figure 1. This figure suggests that each of these factors (i.e., university 
performance, non-performance institutional characteristics, president personal characteristics) 
are positively associated with the level of president compensation. In addition, Figure 1 shows 
that the extent of the impact of each of these factors on president compensation may be 
moderated by the type of university (public or private).  
In the following sections, I first review performance and its relation to executive 
compensation. I then consider how non-performance institutional characteristics, including size 
and complexity, may influence executive compensation. Lastly, I discuss the relation between 
personal characteristics and executive compensation. 
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Performance 
Operationalizations of University Performance. University performance has been 
operationalized inconsistently throughout the existing primary studies. This makes it difficult to 
draw definitive conclusions regarding the nature of the relation between university performance 
and university president compensation. Depending on the study, performance has been defined 
and measured as, for instance, total revenue, total enrollment, endowment per student, average 
SAT score, freshman retention rate, acceptance rate, operating surplus, average professor salary, 
and/or amount of alumni giving, among many other metrics (e.g., Bai, 2014; Bartlett & Sorokina, 
2005; Cheng, 2014). With so many different operationalizations of university performance, it is 
difficult to determine what performance actually is, or consists of, let alone whether or not it 
affects president compensation. Therefore, I provide an overview of the different 
operationalizations of university performance before addressing other factors in the current 
literature that contribute to the difficulty of drawing definite conclusions regarding the relation 
between university performance and president compensation. 
A review of the university president compensation literature reveals that two studies (i.e., 
Banker, Plehn-Dujowich, & Xian, 2009; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014) created categories into 
which they sorted the various measures of performance previously used. Banker et al. (2009) had 
one category of performance (e.g., university stature), which included average professor salary, 
tuition, endowment, and average SAT score3. Parsons and Reitenga (2014) sorted their measures 
into four categories of performance (i.e., student quality/reputation, academic environment, 
resources, attract and retain faculty). The student quality/reputation dimension included 
 
3 Banker et al. (2009) also included one dimension meant to measure the experience level of the president, termed 
Experience. This dimension included measures such as university tenure, president tenure, number of working years, 
and age. 
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measures such as SAT score, acceptance rate, the proportion of students who graduated in the 
top 10% of their high school class, and peer assessment scores. The academic environment 
dimension included the following measures: the proportion of classes with fewer than 20 
students, the proportion of classes with greater than 50 students, freshman retention rate, and 
graduation rate. Enrollment, tuition, and endowment were included in the resources dimension. 
Lastly, the attract and retain faculty dimension included average faculty salary. Note that 
although Parsons and Reitenga created performance categories, their results were reported at the 
measure-level, not the category-level.  
The remaining studies used other measures that could also be sorted into categories, even 
though the authors of those studies did not do so. Thus, when creating categories for this study, it 
was necessary to consider the totality of measures used across all studies of determinants of 
president compensation. During this process it became necessary to create new dimensions, 
rename dimensions to make them more descriptive and to divide categories used by the previous 
authors (i.e., Banker et al., 2009; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014) into multiple categories. When 
creating new dimensions, I considered the broader executive compensation literature (e.g., 
Devers et al., 2007; Tosi et al., 2000), particularly for the development of a financial 
performance dimension.  
Table 3 presents an overview of measures that I categorized into the various dimensions 
of performance. As can be seen from the table, a total of seven different performance dimensions 
were developed: financial performance, academic and research performance, faculty quality, 
reputation, academic and research quality, selectivity, and other performance measures. 
Although each of these dimensions includes different types of measures (discussed in the 
following sections), they can all be considered measures of performance because they represent 
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how well universities are doing at meeting their core goals (i.e., research and teaching) rather 
than reflecting personal characteristics of the university president or non-performance related 
institutional characteristics, such as the number of academic departments.  
Financial performance. There are 14 measures categorized into the financial 
performance dimension: alumni giving rate, cost efficiency, endowment, equity ratio, 
fundraising/gifts, grants received, gross margin, investment revenues/returns, bond rating, 
operating surplus, other revenues, financial risk, total assets, total liabilities (see Table 3)4. Each 
of these measures involve financial resources that the university receives or illustrates how 
efficiently/effectively the university uses these resources.  
For instance, alumni giving rate was categorized into the financial performance 
dimension. Alumni giving rate is the percentage of graduates who donate to the university post-
graduation. Because higher rates of alumni giving are indicative of the number of donations 
made to the university by alumni, it is reasonable to categorize this measure into the financial 
performance dimension. Alumni giving rate has been used in several primary studies (e.g., 
Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Langbert, 2006; Sorokina, 2003). 
Endowment was also categorized into the financial performance dimension. An 
endowment represents the amount of wealth available to the university, which could be 
considered analogous to financial assets in the executive compensation literature. Financial 
assets are typically considered a measure of performance in the executive compensation 
literature (Tosi et al., 2000).  
 
4 Note that each of these measures, as well as those in the remaining categories, could be operationalized as either 
the level of a measure (e.g., alumni giving rate of 12%) or change in the level of a measure (e.g., a 1.5% increase in 
alumni giving rate from the previous year). Because all of these measures can be conceptualized this way, no 
distinctions were made between these two conceptualizations when reviewing the literature.  
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Another example of a measure of financial performance is gross margin, which is 
typically measured as revenue minus expenses (Langbert, 2006). Therefore, this measure is 
similar to profit margin, which is a financial performance measure in the executive compensation 
literature (Tosi et al., 2000). Table 3 displays the remaining measures that I categorized into the 
financial performance dimension of university performance.  
Academic and research performance. The second performance dimension is academic 
and research performance. Two measures were categorized into this dimension. They include 
graduation rate and retention rate. The graduation rate represents the percentage of enrolled 
students who graduate within 150% of the expected amount of time. The retention rate indicates 
the percentage of first-year students who return for a second year at the university. Because one 
of the primary goals of universities is to educate students, graduation and retention rates provide 
an indication of how well universities are performing their duties; therefore, both can be 
considered measures of academic performance. These rates were used in several studies (Cheng, 
2014; Langbert & Fox, 2013; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014; Sorokina, 2003, see Table 3). 
Academic and research quality. I identified seven measures of academic and research 
quality: academic support expenses, instructional and research expenses, research and 
development expenses, faculty resource rank, student/faculty ratio, proportion of classes with 
less than 20 students, and proportion of classes with more than 50 students. Although the 
academic performance dimension included student outcomes, such as graduation rate, measures 
in the academic and research quality dimension reflect the amount of resources that universities 
devote to student instruction and to research. For instance, academic support expenses are “the 
sum of all operating expenses associated with activities and services that support the institution’s 
primary missions of instruction, research, and public service” (Cheng, 2014, p. 591). Therefore, 
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this measure represents how much money universities invest to promote instruction and research. 
In this way, academic support expenses are similar to instructional and research expenses as well 
as research and development expenses. These measures were used in two studies (Cheng, 2014; 
Ehrenberg et al., 2001).  
The student/faculty ratio is also representative of the amount of resources universities 
devote to student education. A high student/faculty ratio indicates that there are more students 
per faculty member than when the ratio is low, which means that students receive less 
individualized attention (Friedman, 2016). Therefore, this ratio is an indicator of academic 
quality, with a lower ratio indicating higher quality. 
Faculty quality. One measure was categorized as an indicator of faculty quality – faculty 
salaries. High faculty salaries are used to attract and retain high-quality faculty members (Fisher 
& Govindarajan, 1992; Kroll, Simmons, & Wright, 1990; Nguyen, 2012). Furthermore, faculty 
salary is, in large part, determined by the number of top-tier publications that a faculty member 
has (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). Therefore, higher salaries are indicative of higher quality 
faculty members, as measured by their research productivity. Because research productive 
faculty tend to work for more prestigious universities, faculty salaries is likewise then an 
indicator of the quality of faculty and thus, the performance or prestige of the university. See 
Table 3 for studies that have used this measure (e.g., Bai, 2014; Cheng, 2014; Monks, 2007). 
Reputation. The fourth performance dimension is reputation and includes a total of four 
measures: number of applicants, peer assessment score, whether or not the university was on 
Princeton review’s best college list, and university ranking according to U.S. News and World 
Report. Each of these measures represents the standing of the university in the academic 
community which affects students’ likelihood of applying. For instance, high school students 
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would like to apply to universities with good reputations, ceteris paribus (Luca & Smith, 2013); 
therefore, as a university gains a better reputation, more individuals are likely to apply. Thus, I 
categorized the number of applicants as a measure of reputation. Number of applicants was used 
as an indicator of performance in one study (i.e., Cheng, 2014). 
Peer assessment scores reflect the perceptions that top academics outside of a given 
university have about that university’s quality. These scores are gathered through U. S. News and 
World Report and allow top academics to provide ratings of other universities that are not easily 
measured, including faculty dedication to teaching (Morse, 2017). Therefore, such assessment 
scores reflect universities’ reputations. Several studies used such measures (e.g., Langbert, 2006; 
Langbert & Fox, 2013; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014).  
Whether or not a university made it onto Princeton Review’s list of best colleges and 
other college rankings was also considered a measure of reputation. Princeton Review’s list of 
best colleges is based on student responses to subjective questions on a number of issues (The 
Princeton Review, 2018). When these responses are combined in a holistic manner to determine 
which universities make it onto the “best colleges” list, they reflect the university’s reputation. 
The same is true for other rankings, as they are also a holistic measure of reputation (Bastedo & 
Bowman, 2010; Huang & Chen, 2013). These college rankings were used in several studies (e.g., 
Bai, 2014; He & Callahan, 2017; Saunders, 2007; Tang et al., 2000). Table 3 shows each of the 
measures in the reputation dimension and the studies in which they were used. 
Selectivity. Past research has used several measures of selectivity: acceptance rate, 
admission rating, freshman in the top of their class, percentage of students who graduate in the 
top 10% of their high school class, SAT scores, and student quality. These measures provide an 
indication of the quality of the students in the university. For instance, the acceptance rate is a 
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measure of selectivity because it represents how many students were admitted to the university 
compared to how many had applied. A higher acceptance rate signifies that a university is less 
selective about whom gets admitted, whereas a lower acceptance rate suggest that the university 
is more selective. Higher quality universities are generally more selective because they have 
greater numbers of applicants and thus, can afford to select only the best students. Therefore, the 
acceptance rate should be related to the overall quality of the students. This measure was used in 
four studies (Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Cheng, 2014; Langbert & Fox, 2013; Parsons & 
Reitenga, 2014). 
Similarly, the number of students who graduated in the top of their class, the percentage 
of students who graduated in the top 10% of their high school class, and SAT scores also each 
provide an indication of the quality of enrolled students. Specifically, universities with a higher 
percentage of students who graduated in the top of their high school class are expected to have, 
generally, more high-quality students. Likewise, universities with high average SAT scores are 
expected to have higher quality students than universities that have lower average SAT scores. 
These measures were used in several primary studies (e.g., Banker et al., 2009; Bartlett & 
Sorokina, 2005; Cheng, 2014; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014; Sorokina, 2003). Table 3 displays the 
remaining measures that I categorized into the selectivity dimension of university performance. 
Other performance measures. Three measures were categorized in the other 
performance measures dimension, including student service expenses, environmental 
sustainability score, and social sustainability score (see Table 3). The measures in this category 
either did not fit into the other dimensions or were not clearly defined. For instance, although 
research output could be a measure of academic and research performance, it was not clearly 
defined by He and Callahan (2017), and therefore, was categorized into the “other” dimension.  
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Although student service expenses were clearly defined by Cheng (2014), this measure 
did not fit into any other dimension. Specifically, student service expenses reflect the amount of 
money spent to “contribute to students’ emotional and physical well-being and to their 
intellectual, cultural, and social development outside the context of the formal instruction 
program” (Cheng, 2014, p. 591). Because these expenses are not specifically directed at 
instruction or research, they do not fit into the academic and research quality dimension. Yet, this 
measure does represent part of the investment universities make into their students, and, 
therefore, may still influence president’s compensation. Similarly, although both environmental 
sustainability and social sustainability scores were defined by Pati and Lee (2016) and were 
considered by these authors to be measures of performance, they do not fit into any of the 
previously discussed performance dimensions.  
Summary. The preceding discussion and an examination of Table 3 demonstrates the 
diversity of university performance measures that have been used in the university president 
compensation literature. With so many different performance dimensions and measures, it is 
difficult to determine what performance is and how it is best measured. This increases the 
difficulty in drawing conclusions regarding the relation between university performance and 
university president compensation. In the next section, I discuss why a relation between 
performance and compensation may be expected.  
Overview. Performance is the most frequently studied variable related to compensation 
(Devers et al., 2007; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Although there are several theories that can 
be used to justify a relation between performance and compensation (e.g., equity theory [Adams, 
1965]; expectancy theory [Vroom, 1964]), in the context of executive compensation (including 
university president compensation), agency theory (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976) is the most 
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prominent one. In fact, an examination of the three meta-analytic reviews on executive 
compensation (Deutsch, 2005; Tosi et al., 2000; van Essen et al., 2015) and two narrative 
reviews (Devers et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997) shows that equity theory and 
expectancy theory are rarely mentioned. Although each review addresses agency theory in depth, 
equity theory is only mentioned twice and expectancy theory is only mentioned once across all 
of the five papers reviewed. Furthermore, neither equity theory nor expectancy theory are 
mentioned in any of the primary studies that have examined determinants of university president 
compensation. Therefore, I will provide a relatively thorough explanation of agency theory in the 
following sections.  
Agency theory. Agency theory is relevant to situations where one individual (the 
principal) delegates work to another individual (the agent; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This type 
of relationship, although possible in any situation where work is delegated, is particularly 
relevant to most modern organizations. Ownership in modern organizations is frequently 
separated from control of the organization (Berle & Means, 1932). Stated differently, the owners 
of most organizations are now shareholders (i.e., principals) and the heads of organizations are 
professional managers, also called executives (i.e., agents), hired by the owners of the firm, or 
their representatives (i.e., the Board of Directors). This has the potential to lead to several 
problems. Agency theory attempts to addresses two of these problems (1) the agency problem; 
and (2) risk sharing (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
The agency problem. The first problem, referred to as the agency problem, exists because 
principals and agents have conflicting goals resulting from the desire to maximize one’s own 
benefits (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In essence, principals’ and agents’ goals 
are often diametrically opposed. For instance, principals generally want agents to work as hard as 
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possible to increase the success of the organization. Agents, however, want to pursue their own 
goals, even if actions taken in the pursuit of those goals may not be in the best interest of the 
organization. In addition to conflicting goals, there is also information asymmetry between the 
principals and agents (Eisenhardt, 1989). This exists because agents have more direct access to 
relevant organizational information than principals do just by the fact that principals have 
delegated the work. Although there are many potential issues stemming from the agency 
problem, the two most common ones are adverse selection and moral hazard (e.g., Eisenhardt, 
1989; Shapiro, 2005). Both issues result from the conflicting goals of principals and agents and 
information asymmetries between the parties; however, they arise at different stages of the 
contracting process.  
Adverse selection. Adverse selection occurs during the selection stage where a principal 
is selecting the agent from a pool of potential candidates (Eisenhardt, 1989). At this stage, the 
principal would like to delegate work to the most qualified candidate who will ultimately provide 
the most benefit to the principal. Each potential agent would like to be awarded the work because 
it is associated with some other desirable outcome (e.g., a higher paycheck) (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Shapiro, 2005). Therefore, while the principal is trying to determine a potential agent’s 
qualifications as accurately as possible, each potential agent is trying to show himself or herself 
in the best possible light, regardless of whether it is an accurate portrayal. Unfortunately for the 
principal, it can be difficult to know which agent is best qualified because the principal does not 
have complete access to information and it may be difficult to verify information presented by 
the potential agents (Eisenhardt, 1989). Considering the information asymmetry between the 
principal and potential agents, and the difficulty that the principal may have in verifying 
information provided by potential agents, it is possible that potential agents misrepresent their 
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level of experience and capabilities (Eisenhardt, 1989; Shapiro, 2005). Thus, the principal must 
decide which potential agent to hire based on incomplete, and potentially inaccurate, 
information. If the position an agent is being hired for is that of a CEO of a large organization, it 
presents a very costly problem. In fact, Forbes estimates that it can cost up to 52 million dollars 
to replace a bad CEO hire (Stoddard & Wyckoff, 2009). 
Moral hazard. Even if the best candidate is chosen, moral hazard can still be an issue. 
Moral hazard occurs because of conflicting goals between the principal and agent (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Shapiro, 2005). For example, a principal wants an agent to work very hard to maximize 
beneficial outcomes for the principal (e.g., profit, long-term health of the organization), whereas 
the agent wants to work as little as possible, but still receive high levels of compensation. 
Furthermore, there is information asymmetry between the parties (Eisenhardt, 1989; Shapiro, 
2005). Specifically, the principal does not know if the agent is working hard and pursuing the 
principal’s goals, or, if instead, the agent is shirking his or her duties and pursing self-interested 
goals at the expense of the success of the organization. This is problematic because, for example, 
if a CEO’s compensation is fixed, regardless of the performance of the organization, the 
compensation risk is squarely on the principal. Stated differently, in this instance, regardless of 
whether the organization’s performance or market value drops significantly (to the financial 
detriment of principals) or increases significantly (to the financial benefit of principals), the 
CEO’s compensation remains the same. Thus, because there is no risk to the CEO’s 
compensation, and principals do not have access to all relevant information, the CEO may 
choose to pursue his/her own goals without fearing any negative financial consequences. This 
can be very costly for organizations. For instance, CEO shirking (as measured by the amount of 
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golf played) has been shown to reduce the market value of a firm’s assets by up to 10% 
(Biggerstaff, Cicero, & Puckett, 2016).  
Risk sharing. The second problem that agency theory addresses is financial risk sharing. 
This problem occurs because principals and agents may be comfortable with different levels of 
financial risk, and therefore, may prefer different policies and actions (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & 
Dolton, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Shapiro, 2005). The general assumption is that agents are more 
risk-averse than principals because principals are able to diversify their investments (i.e., they 
disperse their level of risk), while agents are not able to spread out their risk as they are only 
working for one organization (Dalton et al., 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989). The risk sharing problem is 
particularly important to consider when developing ways to manage agency problems, such as 
adverse selection and moral hazard, because the ways in which these problems are mitigated 
(discussed in the next section) often involve the transfer of financial risk from the principal to the 
agent. Given that agents are generally risk averse, they may engage in undesirable behaviors to 
mitigate this increased risk (Shapiro, 2005). For instance, CEOs may manipulate the earnings of 
their organization to artificially inflate the value of their stock options (Zhang, Bartol, Smith, 
Pfarrer, & Khanin, 2008). Therefore, it is important to consider the impact of this transfer of risk 
when determining the optimal way to manage agency problems.  
Managing the agency problem. There are two ways to manage the agency problem. The 
first way to deal with this problem is to reduce information asymmetries by increasing the 
monitoring of the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Corporations attempt to 
do this by having a Board that is supposed to monitor the CEO. Monitoring may have two 
benefits. First, monitoring is intended to allow principals to have access to the same information 
that the agent has and to more accurately determine what the agent is actually doing. Second, 
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there is evidence to suggest that, just by monitoring managers, they perceive themselves to be 
more accountable, which tends to increase their level of performance (Mero, Guidice, & Werner, 
2014). However, monitoring may not always be feasible, and is sometimes virtually impossible, 
as it may be too costly and/or time consuming for principals. Also, if Board members do not 
have the necessary expertise, they may not be able to effectively monitor the CEO. Therefore, 
monitoring is often supplemented with incentives. 
Using incentives allows principals to bring the goals of agents into alignment with their 
own goals (Dalton et al., 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). For example, a 
CEO’s compensation package may include stocks and stock options. Because the ultimate value 
of these options depends on the market value (e.g., stock market performance) of the 
organization, the CEO should, theoretically, work hard and make good management decisions to 
increase the value of the stock as it will increase his/her wealth. This is also the goal of the 
principal (assuming the stock price is due to genuine high levels of performance rather than by 
manipulation by the agent). In essence, by using stocks and stock options, agents are becoming 
principals; thus, their goals are, theoretically, perfectly aligned (Dalton et al., 2007; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, agents are generally risk averse. Therefore, because 
there are aspects of the organization’s performance which are out of their control (e.g., 
unanticipated setbacks or changes in laws that negatively affect an organization’s stock price), it 
is expected that agents will be less comfortable with tying their compensation to organizational 
performance (Eisenhardt, 1989). To balance out this increased risk to the agent, principals may 
use a combination of compensation methods (e.g., fixed salary, stocks, stock options, bonuses). 
However, although there may be stable components to the agent’s compensation, it is still 
beneficial to have part of the agent’s total compensation tied to performance (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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In addition to the consideration of agents’ risk tolerance, there are two other factors that 
influence the extent to which compensation is tied to performance: task programmability and 
outcome measurability (Eisenhardt, 1985, 1989). Task programmability is the extent to which 
the correct course of action for high performance is known (Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990). 
Generally, task programmability of any management position, including a CEO or university 
president, is low because it is difficult to know what the best course of action is in any given 
situation. When task programmability is low, agency theory suggests that it is best to tie 
compensation to organizational performance more strongly (Eisenhardt, 1989). This is due to the 
fact that monitoring is virtually impossible when task programmability is low because one does 
not know what to monitor. Further, because the best behavior is not always known, incentives 
may not be able to be effectively tied to behavior, and thus, must be tied to performance 
outcomes. In sum, agency theory suggests that because the job of executives has very little task 
programmability, their pay should be more strongly tied to organizational performance.  
It is also important to consider outcome measurability, which refers to the extent to which 
outcomes (e.g., performance) can be easily and accurately measured (Anderson, 1985; 
Eisenhardt, 1985, 1989). Outcome measurability at the individual level is unlikely to be high for 
executives as it can be difficult to quantify their individual performance. Furthermore, some 
results of the executives’ decisions and action may not be realized for a long period of time (i.e., 
they have a long time horizon; Eisenhardt, 1989). When outcome measurability at the individual 
level is low, individual performance tends to have a minimal effect on compensation, but rather 
compensation will be relatively stable and mainly based on a fixed salary (rather than having a 
large performance-based component) (Baker, 1992; Eisenhardt, 1989). Alternatively, when 
outcome measurability at the individual level is low, principals may choose to tie agents’ 
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compensation to performance at a higher level (e.g., at the organizational level, especially 
organizational performance). Performance at this higher level is easier to measure because there 
are commonly accepted metrics used to quantify performance (Richard, Devinney, Yip, & 
Johnson, 2009; Tosi et al., 2000). Therefore, agency theory suggests that when outcome 
measurability at the individual level is low, an agent’s compensation may be more strongly tied 
to performance at a different level (e.g., organizational performance). However, because agents 
may not be able to directly and fully control performance at a higher level of abstraction, their 
compensation is likely to include non-performance components (e.g., tenure) as well as 
performance components (e.g., profit).  
Agency theory in the context of for-profit executive compensation. Agency theory is 
frequently used as the theoretical basis for examining the relation between organizational 
performance and CEO compensation (e.g., Devers et al., 2007; Tosi et al., 2000). On its face, 
agency theory appears to suggest that “outcome based [i.e., performance based] compensation 
contracts solve the agency problem” (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998, p. 285; see also, Baker, Jensen, 
& Murphy, 1988). This statement highlights how the use of incentives, particularly for 
executives whose positions have low levels of task programmability, helps align the interests of 
executives and owners, represented by the Board. However, this statement does not consider the 
influence of outcome measurability on the feasibility of using performance-based compensation 
(which, in this context, refers to using incentives to align the principals’ and agents’ goals). As 
previously stated, when outcome measurability is low, it is expected that performance-based 
compensation will be used less frequently (Eisenhardt, 1985, 1989). However, Boards may also 
choose to use a performance measure, or set of measures, at a higher level of abstraction (i.e., 
organizational performance) to set CEO compensation. In the executive compensation literature, 
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there are commonly accepted metrics of organizational financial performance, including net 
income, profits, return on equity, return on assets, and stock price (Richard et al., 2009; Tosi et 
al., 2000). Therefore, one may expect a positive association between organizational performance 
and CEO compensation. Yet, it would be unlikely for organizational performance to account for 
the majority of CEO compensation because the CEO does not have complete control over the 
performance of the organization. If CEO compensation were to be completely determined by 
organizational performance, CEOs may not see their compensation as fair and, because their 
compensation is at greater risk, they may engage in undesirable behaviors (Zhang et al., 2008). 
Taken together, this suggests that organizational performance is likely related to executive 
compensation, but, due to risk considerations, it may not comprise most of the compensation 
package.  
Evidence from the executive compensation literature generally supports this. For 
instance, Jensen and Murphy (1990) found that CEO compensation was related to one measure 
of organizational performance (i.e., stockholder returns), albeit weakly. Specifically, they found 
that for every $1,000 in increased stockholder returns, CEO compensation grew by $3.25. 
However, some more recent studies, also relying on stock market indicators, have found a 
stronger relation between executive compensation and performance (Aggarwal & Samwick, 
1999, 2003; Hall & Liebman, 1998; Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, & Carpenter, 2010). In fact, 
Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) found that CEO compensation grew by $13.78 for every $1000 
increase in shareholder wealth, which is more than four times greater than the amount found by 
Jensen and Murphy (1990). Importantly, however, the strength of the relation between executive 
compensation and performance may depend on the design (e.g., mix of stocks and stock options 
provided) of the CEO’s compensation package (Zhang et al., 2008). 
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Considering other measures of financial performance besides stockholder returns, a meta-
analysis found that short-term return-on-equity accounted for 4.5% of the variance in CEO 
compensation, whereas return-on-assets only accounted for 1.4% of the variance in CEO 
compensation (Tosi et al., 2000). Thus, Tosi et al. (2000) found that different measures of 
performance had distinct effects on future compensation. Considering all of the measures they 
included in their study, however, they found that organizational performance only accounted for 
about 5% of the variance in CEO compensation. Furthermore, examining only the changes in 
performance and compensation, change in performance only accounted for about 4% of the 
variance in changes in CEO compensation (Tosi et al., 2000). Taken together, evidence from the 
executive compensation literature seems to support the notion that organizational performance 
does influence executive compensation. However, the influence of performance on executive 
compensation seems to be relatively minor.  
Agency theory in the context of university president compensation. Considering the 
predictions of agency theory and the results of empirical studies on executive compensation (e.g., 
Aggarwal & Samwick, 2003; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Tosi et al., 2000) helps one make 
predictions regarding the potential association between university performance and university 
president compensation. For instance, as with executives in the for-profit sector, task 
programmability for university presidents is likely to be low because it is difficult to know what 
the best course of action will be in any given situation. This suggests that university president 
compensation will be associated with university performance. Outcome measurability for 
university presidents’ individual performance is also likely to be low; therefore, Boards may 
choose to use university-level performance to determine president compensation, rather than 
individual-level performance. Yet, as this results in more risk for university presidents, it is 
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unlikely that the majority of president compensation would be performance-based. This suggests 
that university president compensation will be related to university performance, albeit weakly. 
However, there are two additional considerations that are worth addressing. First, 
although outcome measurability at the individual level is similarly low for university presidents 
and for-profit executives, it may be easier to measure organizational performance in for-profit 
settings than in university settings. Although, there are commonly accepted metrics of 
organizational performance in the for-profit setting (Richard et al., 2009; Tosi et al., 2000), there 
are no universally agreed-upon metrics of university performance (Langbert, 2006; Oster, 1998; 
Sorokina, 2003). This is evidenced by the highly varied and inconsistent operationalizations of 
performance across primary studies assessing the impact of university performance on president 
compensation (see Table 3). Therefore, it may be, at least initially, more difficult to measure 
performance in the context of higher education. Yet, despite this initial difficulty, once Boards 
decide how they want to measure performance, it is easy to obtain the necessary data. In fact, 
universities are required to report extensive amounts of data to the U. S. Department of 
Education’s National Center for Education and Statistics ("Higher Education Act of 1965", 
1965). Therefore, a positive association is still expected between university performance and 
university president compensation.  
The second consideration is related to whether moral hazard even exists in universities. It 
has been suggested that the assumption of goal misalignment, which is a central tenet in agency 
theory and the concept of moral hazard (Dalton et al., 2007), is unlikely to be as relevant in 
nonprofit organizations (Bai, 2014; Handy & Katz, 1998; Jobome, 2006). For instance, Handy 
and Katz (1998) proposed that presidents of nonprofit organizations are more willing to accept 
lower compensation (at least by comparison to for-profit organizations) because they are 
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intrinsically motivated to perform to the best of their ability due to their commitment to the goals 
of the organization (see also Bai, 2014). If this is the case, the use of performance-based 
compensation would be less desirable. Stated differently, if agents are intrinsically motivated, 
moral hazard may not be an issue because the goals of the principals and agents are already 
aligned. If one assumes that tying pay to performance undermines intrinsic motivation (Deci, 
Koestner, & Ryan, 1999), it would then be unwise to make compensation sensitive to 
organizational performance because this would result in decreased levels of intrinsic motivation. 
However, there is no robust evidence to support the claim of an undermining effect (List, Kepes, 
& McDaniel, 2017).  
Yet, although it may not harm intrinsic motivation, linking compensation to performance 
may still be undesirable if university presidents are intrinsically motivated. In the absence of goal 
misalignment, performance-based compensation unnecessarily transfers risk to the risk-averse 
agent (i.e., by making the agent's compensation variable and partially outside of the agent's 
control; Eisenhardt, 1989). When risk is high, individuals are more likely to engage in behaviors 
to artificially increase their level of compensation (Shapiro, 2005; Zhang et al., 2008). Therefore, 
if intrinsic motivation is high and there is no goal misalignment, using performance-based 
compensation may have negative effects on long-term organizational performance. Despite this 
potentiality, it is important to note that although many have suggested that executives of 
nonprofit organizations, including universities, are intrinsically motivated (e.g., Bai, 2014; 
Handy & Katz, 1998; Jobome, 2006), there is no empirical evidence to support this claim. 
Furthermore, even if these executives are intrinsically motivated, there is still likely to be 
goal misalignment between principals and agents in the university context. Unlike in the context 
of a for-profit corporation where the primary goal is to increase shareholder value, university 
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presidents have many potential stakeholders, including members of the Board of 
Visitors/Trustees/Regents, students, faculty members and other employees, alumni, the federal, 
state, and local governments. (Ehrenberg et al., 2001). It is highly unlikely that members from 
each group of these constituents have the same goals. Therefore, although the Board may, for all 
intents and purposes, function as the principal in this relationship, what they value as high 
performance may not be what other stakeholders’ value. Thus, regardless of whether university 
presidents are intrinsically motivated or not, it is unlikely that their goals will perfectly align with 
the goals of all members of the Board and all other stakeholders. Therefore, Boards may still 
prefer the use of performance-based compensation to help align their goals with the ones of the 
university president.  
Taken together, the goal misalignment that is likely to exist in university contexts as well 
as the low level of task programmability suggests that university performance will be positively 
related to university president compensation. Considering outcome measurability, the situation is 
likely to be similar to the for-profit context. Specifically, because linking compensation to 
university performance results in more risk for presidents, performance-based compensation 
components are unlikely to comprise the majority of the compensation package. However, a 
positive association is still expected. Stated formally, 
Hypothesis 1: University performance will be positively related to president 
compensation. 
As previously mentioned, it is possible that there are differences between public and 
private universities in terms of how university performance influences university president 
compensation. For instance, public and private university presidents may have, on average, 
different levels of goal misalignment with their respective Boards. Although no study has 
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assessed the level of intrinsic motivation among private and public universities, public university 
presidents may be more intrinsically motivated than private university presidents. Public 
university presidents earn, on average, $178,125 less per year than their private university 
counterparts (Parsons & Reitenga, 2014). Given the size of this discrepancy, one could make the 
argument that public university presidents must be intrinsically motivated if they are willing to 
serve as the president of a public university. If this is, in fact, the case, the goals of public 
university presidents would be more aligned with their Boards than private university presidents. 
Thus, moral hazard would be less of an issue for public universities, which, in turns, results in 
less performance-based compensation. Based solely on this argument then, one would expect the 
relation between university performance and university president compensation to be stronger in 
private universities than in public ones.  
However, only three studies have directly compared the effects of various measures of 
performance on university president compensation by university type (Huang & Chen, 2013; 
Monks, 2007; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014). Two of these studies found a positive association 
between university performance and university president compensation for both private and 
public universities (Monks, 2007; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014), whereas one found an association 
between performance and compensation in private universities, but not public ones (Huang & 
Chen, 2013). Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine if there are differences between public 
and private universities based on the few number of studies that have made these direct 
comparisons. Therefore, I ask, 
Research question 1: Are there differences in the strength of the relation between 
university performance and university president compensation in private and public 
universities?  
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 The relation between for-profit organizational performance and executive compensation 
has primarily focused on financial performance indicators (e.g., Aggarwal & Samwick, 2003; 
Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Nyberg et al., 2010; Tosi et al., 2000), which makes sense because the 
primary goal of for-profit organizations is to make money. However, as can be gleaned from 
Table 3, there are several other non-financial indicators of performance in the nonprofit 
educational context. Thus, it is possible that, even if president compensation is related to 
university performance, the strength of this relation may differ across different performance 
dimensions. For instance, given the risk associated with performance-based compensation, 
Boards may base compensation on measures of performance that are more directly under the 
control of the university president. This would suggest that performance dimensions such as 
academic and research quality as well as selectivity are likely to have the strongest relation with 
future president pay. Measures in these dimensions may be easier for a president to impact since 
they can, for example, hire more instructors to reduce class sizes (academic and research quality) 
or raise SAT score requirements (selectivity). In addition, presidents may have control over other 
specific measures (e.g., fundraising). In fact, fundraising is considered a primary responsibility 
and an absolutely essential part of the university president role (Cote, 1985). Thus, the relation 
between fundraising performance and university president compensation may be stronger than it 
is for other performance measures. In fact, a recent survey of university presidents indicated that 
fundraising takes up a majority of university presidents’ time (Gagliardi, Espinosa, Turk, & 
Taylor, 2018). Alternatively, Boards may also choose to focus on performance measures that are 
more aligned with the mission of a university and its continued success, regardless of the 
compensation risk to the university president. If this is the case, one would expect that the 
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relation between performance dimensions such as financial performance and academic and 
research performance would have the strongest association with future president pay.  
However, despite these reasons to believe that there are differences in the strength of the 
association between university performance and university president compensation depending on 
the performance measure used, it is difficult to determine what those differences are from the 
primary studies. Therefore, one goal of this systematic review is to determine if the various 
dimensions of performance, on average, have disparate effects on university president 
compensation. Furthermore, given the potential differences between public and private 
universities (see Research question 1), university type may influence the relative influence of the 
various performance dimensions on executive compensation as well. Stated formally, I ask: 
Research question 2(a): What is the relative influence of the seven different performance 
dimensions on executive compensation? (b) Is the pattern of strength of these relations 
different between public universities and private universities? 
Non-performance Institutional Characteristics 
Operationalizations of Non-performance Institutional Characteristics. Now that I 
have provided a review of organizational performance as a determinant of executive 
compensation, I discuss non-performance institutional characteristics, including organizational 
size and complexity. In the broader executive compensation literature, organizational size 
includes measures such as number of employees, assets, or sales, whereas organizational 
complexity refers to the degree of diversification in the organization, such as the number of 
business lines, plants, departments, etc. (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Nagar, Nanda, & 
Wysocki, 2003). Table 4 presents an overview of how these, and other measures of non-
performance institutional characteristics, have been operationalized in primary studies of 
39 
 
determinants of university president compensation. The non-performance institutional 
characteristics factor includes three dimensions: size, complexity, and other institutional 
characteristics.  
Size. Nine previously used measures were categorized into the size dimension: 
enrollment, total expenditures, institutional support expenses, administration expenditures, other 
expenditures, number of employees, number of administrators, total revenue, and tuition 
revenue. Enrollment was used as a measure of performance in some studies (Cheng, 2014; 
Langbert & Fox, 2013; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014), but as an indicator of university size in others 
(Banker et al., 2009; Huang & Chen, 2013; Langbert, 2006). To determine what category 
enrollment may belong to, I considered the executive compensation literature where number of 
sales is used as an indicator of firm size (Tosi et al., 2000). Because enrollment reflects the 
number of students using the services provided by the university (i.e., taking classes), it can be 
considered analogous to sales and was, therefore, categorized as a measure of size rather than 
performance. Enrollment was used in several primary studies (e.g., Bai, 2014; Huang & Chen, 
2013; Saunders, 2007; Tang et al., 2000).  
Total revenue and tuition revenue can each be considered similar to sales and/or revenue 
in the executive compensation literature. Sales and revenue are both considered indicators of size 
(Tosi et al., 2000). Therefore, total revenue and tuition revenue are both indicative of university 
size. These measures have been used by several researchers (e.g., Bai, 2014; Langbert, 2006; 
Monks, 2007; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014; Pati & Lee, 2016).  
Complexity. A total of three previously used measures were included in the complexity 
dimension: university tier, Carnegie classification, and number of degree-granting programs. All 
of these measures are supposed to reflect the difficulty that the president is likely to encounter 
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due to the complex nature of the university. For instance, university tier and Carnegie 
classification provide information that indicates whether a university is undergraduate-focused or 
if it is a doctoral-granting research institution. More research-intensive universities, including 
doctoral-granting institutions, are considered more complex environments whereas baccalaureate 
colleges, or universities that focus mostly on undergraduate education, are typically considered 
less complex (Parsons & Reitenga, 2014). These measures were used by several researchers (see 
Table 4; e.g., Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; He & Callahan, 2017; Sorokina, 2003; Tang et al., 
2000). The number of degree-granting programs was only used in one study and can be 
considered a measure of complexity because fewer degree-granting programs are likely easier to 
manage than many (see Table 4; Huang & Chen, 2013).  
Other institutional characteristics. The last dimension contains measures that did not fit 
into either of the previous dimensions. A total of 17 measures were categorized as other 
institutional characteristics: percent of aliens enrolled, percent of students who receive financial 
aid, percent of students who receive grant aid, average graduate tuition, ratio of administrative 
staff, ratio of instructional and research staff, average graduate tuition, tuition cost, net tuition 
cost, tuition discount rate, presence of business school, presence of law school, presence of 
medical school, religious affiliation, member of the Council for Christian Colleges and 
Universities, geographic location, size of surrounding community, and year the university was 
founded. Each of these measures is a characteristic of an institution but does not fall into the size 
or complexity dimensions. For instance, although the presence of a business, law, or medical 
school may reflect complexity, if the school is just one of a few in the university, these measures 
are not necessarily indicative of complexity. Similarly, neither religious affiliation nor whether 
or not the university is a member of the Council for Christian Colleges and Universities can be 
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categorized as an indicator of size or complexity. Yet, it is still possible that these variables will 
influence university president compensation. For instance, evidence suggests that religious 
institutions provide compensation packages that are, on average, less generous than non-religious 
institutions (Langbert, 2006). This is consistent with the notion that some university presidents 
may be intrinsically motivated, and thus, aligning compensation with university performance 
may be unnecessary (Bai, 2014; Handy & Katz, 1998). Table 4 includes a list of the studies that 
included these measures in their studies (e.g., Cheng, 2014; Langbert, 2006). 
Overview. Both size and complexity variables have been shown to affect executive 
compensation (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Tosi et al., 
2000; van Essen et al., 2015). A relation between size/complexity and executive compensation is 
predicted by both the managerialist perspective (e.g., Tosi et al., 2000) and human capital theory 
(e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962), although the reasoning for the association between these 
variables is different depending on the theory used. Therefore, the following sections will 
provide an explanation of both theories/theoretical perspectives and highlight evidence provided 
by the executive compensation literature on the relation between organizational size/complexity 
and compensation.  
 Managerialism. The managerialist perspective is related to agency theory in that it 
highlights many of the same issues addressed by agency theory, namely, goal misalignment and 
a risk-averse agent5. However, unlike agency theory, which addresses how principals deal with 
agency problems (e.g., by using incentives to align the goals of principals and agents), the 
managerialist perspective addresses how agency problems create power imbalances that agents 
can use to influence their compensation. For instance, executives may be able to use their power 
 
5 Note that the “principal” and “agent” terminology is typically not used outside of agency theory, but I use it here 
for consistency and clarity of argument.  
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to influence the Board to base their compensation on organizational size or complexity, which is 
less risky for them (i.e., results in less volatility in CEO compensation) than organizational 
performance.  
The key concept within managerialism is that of entrenchment (e.g., Combs & Skill, 
2003). Entrenchment occurs when agents are able to use their power to pursue their own self-
interest, rather than the goals of the principals because they have power over the Board (i.e., the 
de facto principals; Combs & Skill, 2003; Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002). There are 
many reasons why an executive can become entrenched. For instance, shareholders have become 
increasingly dispersed such that no individual shareholder has enough power to effectively 
monitor executives (Berle & Means, 1932; Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002). 
Furthermore, because there are so many shareholders, it is expected that individual ones will not 
perceive it to be worth their effort to attempt to monitor executives (Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-
Mejia, 2002). Although agency theory suggests that Boards can account for this by monitoring 
executives and using incentives, the managerialist perspective proposes that the lack of 
monitoring by these dispersed shareholders allows executives to have more power than they 
would have otherwise, which leads to entrenchment (Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002).  
In addition to shareholder dispersion, executives can become entrenched when Board 
members do not maintain their objectivity. Although Boards are supposed to exert their influence 
over executives to ensure they are not shirking their duties, they are often closely allied with 
CEOs. This occurs for a variety of reasons. For instance, CEOs are able to provide benefits to 
Board members in the form of compensation, charitable contributions, continued seats on the 
Board, etc. (Main, O'Reilly, & Wade, 1995; van Essen et al., 2015). Therefore, Board members 
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who want to receive any of these benefits are likely to design the compensation package in a 
manner which benefits the CEO (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006; Nguyen, 2012; van Essen et al., 2015). 
 Thus, the result of entrenchment, occurring for any reason (e.g., shareholder dispersion, 
alignment between the CEO and the Board), is that the CEO has increased power which can be 
used to influence compensation strategy and decisions. Because, like agency theory, the 
managerialist perspective assumes that agents are risk averse, it is expected that entrenched 
CEOs will use their power to decrease the sensitivity of their pay to organizational performance 
(Tosi et al., 2000). Rather, CEOs would prefer to have their compensation tied to measures such 
as organizational size and complexity (Tosi et al., 2000). Organizational size/complexity is 
preferred by CEOs over organizational performance as the primary determinant of their 
compensation because it is less risky for them than tying their compensation to organizational 
performance (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002; Kroll et 
al., 1990; Tosi et al., 2000). Specifically, CEOs have substantially more direct control over the 
size and complexity of their organization than they do over its performance, especially market-
based measures of performance (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-
Mejia, 2002; Kroll et al., 1990; Tosi et al., 2000). Additionally, organizational size and 
complexity are less variable than organizational performance, so CEO compensation is more 
likely to be stable (Kostiuk, 1990; Tosi et al., 2000). Taken together, this means that using 
organizational size and complexity as the primary determinants of executive compensation 
would result in CEO’s compensation being less risky and volatile. 
Human capital theory. In addition to CEOs’ preference to base compensation on 
organizational size/complexity, Boards may also prefer this because it is easy to justify a link 
between compensation and organizational size/complexity because larger and more complex 
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organizations arguably require higher levels of human capital (Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962; 
Combs & Skill, 2003; Fulmer, 2009). Human capital is the collection of individuals’ knowledge, 
skills, and abilities that contribute to their productivity (Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962; Fulmer, 
2009). According to human capital theory, pay differences between individuals can be traced to 
differences in their respective levels of human capital (Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962). 
Theoretically, leading a large and complex organization requires a high level of human capital. 
Thus, it can be argued that the fair pay associated with leading such an organization is higher 
than the one associated with leading a smaller, less complex organization (Agarwal, 1981; 
Becker, 1962; Fulmer, 2009; Kostiuk, 1990). This is important because there is a theoretical link 
between fairness perceptions and effort (e.g., equity theory [Adams, 1965]; and the fair wage-
effort hypothesis [Akerlof & Yellen, 1990]). Specifically, it is expected that if individuals feel 
that they are not receiving fair compensation for their effort, they will reduce the amount of 
effort they exert in the future (Adams, 1965; Akerlof & Yellen, 1990). Stated differently, when 
compensation is perceived to be too low, the opportunity cost of engaging in work-related 
behaviors, rather than other desired behaviors, increases. This may result in individuals engaging 
in those other behaviors rather than work-related behaviors. Therefore, it may be desirable for 
Boards to make executive compensation commensurate with the size and complexity of the 
organization. This should avoid any decrease in effort by the CEO in response to perceived 
inequities in the level of human capital required for the position and the associated 
compensation.  
Managerialism and human capital theory in the context of executive compensation. 
Both managerialism and human capital theory have been used extensively within the context of 
executive compensation to justify a relation between organizational size/complexity and 
45 
 
executive compensation (e.g., Combs & Skill, 2003; Tosi et al., 2000). Given the dispersion of 
most shareholders (i.e., the lack of influence of shareholders on Board decisions due to not 
voting their shares) and the closeness between the Board and the CEO in many organizations 
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2006; Nguyen, 2012; van Essen et al., 2015), it is likely that CEOs will be 
able to exercise their influence to align incentives to the size and/or complexity of the 
organization. Furthermore, because of the relation between perceived fairness and effort (Adams, 
1965; Akerlof & Yellen, 1990), it is also likely that Boards will compensate CEOs based on the 
required level of human capital for the CEO position (judged on the basis of organizational size 
and complexity; Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962; Combs & Skill, 2003). The relation between 
organizational size and executive compensation has been established meta-analytically. In fact, 
meta-analytic research indicates that organizational size is by far the strongest predictor of 
executive compensation; it accounts for about 40% of the variance in executive compensation 
(Tosi et al., 2000). A positive association has also been found between organizational complexity 
and executive compensation (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989).  
Given the difficulties associated with monitoring CEOs and measuring their performance 
(as discussed in the agency theory section), it is likely that the relation between organizational 
size/complexity and executive compensation is stronger than the relation between organizational 
performance and executive compensation. This notion has also received support. Although 
organizational size accounted for around 40% of the variance in executive compensation, 
organizational performance only accounted for about 5% of the variance (Tosi et al., 2000). 
Focusing on just the change in size and compensation, it was found that approximately 5% of the 
variance in change in compensation was related to change in organizational size (roughly 4% 
was related to change in organizational performance; Tosi et al., 2000).  
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Managerialism and human capital theory in the context of university president 
compensation. Considering the managerialist perspective, human capital theory, and evidence 
from the broader literature of executive compensation, one may anticipate a positive association 
between university size/complexity and university president compensation. Specifically, because 
there are so many different constituencies that university presidents are beholden to (Ehrenberg 
et al., 2001), but little direct way for these constituents to hold university presidents accountable, 
it is likely that university presidents will have considerable power. This would allow them to 
become entrenched and, ultimately, affect the way in which they are compensated (Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2006). Because a central job of university presidents is to set the strategic vision of the 
university (Cote, 1985), they have a fair amount of control over the size and complexity of their 
organization. For instance, they can develop more online programs and thus, enroll more 
students, which increases the size of the organization, or they can decide to expand the number 
of departments and/or degree-granting programs, which results in more organizational 
complexity. Therefore, it is possible that university presidents may also prefer to tie their 
compensation to the size/complexity of their university. However, it is also possible that any 
observed relation between university size/complexity and university president compensation is 
due to the level of human capital needed to lead the university. Stated differently, rather than any 
observed relation between university size/complexity and university president compensation 
being wholly due to university president entrenchment, it may also be reflective of the required 
level of human capital. 
As none of the primary studies examining university president compensation have 
attempted to assess the reasoning for any potential relation between university size/complexity 
and university president compensation (i.e., entrenchment versus reflecting the amount of human 
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capital needed to lead the university), it will not be possible to make this determination in this 
study. However, both theories predict a positive association between university size and 
complexity and university president compensation. Furthermore, just as with the executive 
compensation (explained previously), I expect that university size/complexity will account for 
more variance in university president compensation than university performance. Stated 
formally,  
Hypothesis 2(a): Non-performance institutional characteristics related to university size 
and complexity will have a positive relation with university president compensation; and, 
(b): university size and complexity will account for more variance in university president 
compensation than university performance.  
 Although there is theoretical reasoning to suggest that there is a positive association 
between university size and complexity and president compensation, there is no consistent 
theoretical reasoning to suggest a relation between the measures in the “other” category and 
president compensation. Yet, it is still possible that these measures do influence compensation. 
For instance, universities with a religious affiliation tend to pay their presidents less than non-
religious universities (Langbert, 2006; Saunders, 2007). In addition, the presence of a business 
school, law school, or medical school may be related to university complexity if these schools are 
just one of many different schools in the university. Therefore, the presence of these schools may 
lead to increased levels of compensation for university presidents. However, if the presence of 
these schools does not reflect complexity, managerialism and human capital theory would not 
provide an explanation as to why these characteristics would be related to president 
compensation. Similarly, there is also no theoretical explanation for why many of the other 
measures in this category (e.g., percentage of students who receive grant aid, year the university 
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was founded) would affect university president compensation. However, because these measures 
have been used in other studies, I ask,  
Research question 3: Is there a relation between other non-performance institutional 
characteristics and university president compensation? 
 Differences between private and public universities in the extent to which university 
size/complexity influences president compensation may also exist. The managerialist perspective 
suggests that the relation between size/complexity and compensation will be stronger when 
executives are entrenched and can use their power to influence the Board (e.g., Tosi et al., 2000). 
Thus, it is important to consider whether or not differences are expected between private and 
public universities in the likelihood that presidents will become entrenched. Previously, I 
discussed two antecedents of entrenchment, shareholder dispersion and the alignment between 
the CEO and the Board.  
First, considering shareholder dispersion, it is likely that public universities have greater 
shareholder dispersion than private ones because there are a greater number of stakeholders for 
public universities (e.g., taxpayers, state and federal governments) than there are for private ones 
(Ehrenberg et al., 2001). Because dispersed shareholders are less likely to effectively monitor 
presidents, presidents are able to use their power to reduce the sensitivity of their compensation 
to university performance, and, instead, tie their compensation to measures that they have more 
control over (e.g., university size/complexity). Based solely on this, the managerialist perspective 
suggests that the association between university size/complexity and compensation will be 
stronger for public universities than for private ones. 
In addition to higher levels of monitoring associated with having less shareholder 
dispersion, there are also more monitoring constraints for private universities. Private, nonprofit 
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universities are subject to legislation that directly bans excessive compensation. Specifically, the 
government can impose tax penalties on presidents and Board members of private universities if 
it is determined that presidents received excessive compensation (Hyatt & Johnston, 2015). Due 
to the possibility of these sanctions, private university Boards may be motivated to have a 
stronger association between university performance and the compensation of their presidents 
than their public university counterparts. This also supports the notion that there may be a 
stronger association between university size/complexity in public universities than in private 
ones.  
 Considering the second way that presidents may become entrenched (i.e., the degree of 
alignment between the Board and the university presidents), however, suggests that university 
presidents at private universities are likely to have more power than presidents at public ones. In 
both private and public universities, Board members generally do not receive compensation 
(Nason, 1982). Therefore, university presidents are not able to leverage their influence on Board 
members’ compensation to impact Board compensation decisions. However, in public 
universities, Board members are typically appointed by government agencies or officials, 
whereas in private universities, Board members are typically nominated and elected by the 
university or its alumni (Price, 2018). Because of this, Board members for public universities 
may be more objective (i.e., less beholden to universities presidents) than Board members in 
private universities. If true, this would result in university presidents at public universities having 
less power over their Boards than presidents at private universities. Thus, for private universities, 
the relation between university size/complexity and compensation would be stronger than the 
relation between university performance and compensation.  
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 Taken together, based on the influence of shareholder dispersion, it is reasonable to 
expect that there will be a stronger link between university president compensation and 
university size/complexity in public universities. However, considering the degree of alignment 
between the Board and the university president, it is also reasonable to expect that this relation 
will be stronger in private universities. To address these conflicting perspectives, I ask, 
Research question 4: Are there differences in the strength of the relation between non-
performance institutional characteristics (including university size and complexity) and 
university president compensation among private universities and public universities?  
 There are also likely differences among the non-performance institutional characteristics 
dimensions (see Table 4) regarding the strength of their association with president compensation. 
Specifically, considering only the size and complexity dimensions6, one may reasonably expect 
that university size has a stronger impact on president compensation than university complexity. 
The managerialist perspective suggests that university presidents will use their power to link 
their compensation to measures that they have control over and that are relatively stable (Combs 
& Skill, 2003; Tosi et al., 2000). University size is arguably more easily influenced by a 
university president than university complexity. It is likely easier to, for instance, hire additional 
staff or admit additional students (i.e., increase size) than it is to, for example, create a new 
degree program or add a new department (i.e., increase complexity). This may also explain the 
relatively recent increase in administrators across universities (Greene, Kisida, & Mills, 2010). 
Thus, entrenched presidents are expected to have a greater preference for tying their 
compensation to university size than to university complexity. This is consistent with evidence 
from the executive compensation literature that found a stronger association between 
 
6 Drawing conclusions from the “other” dimension is likely to be difficult because there is no consistent theme 
among these variables. 
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organizational size and compensation than between organizational complexity and compensation 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989). 
Conversely, it is also possible that university complexity has a stronger impact on 
compensation. Considering human capital theory, it is reasonable to expect that the impact of 
university complexity on university president compensation would be greater than the impact of 
university size on compensation. Complex universities require more human capital to run than 
universities that are large, but not complex (Berry, Bizjak, Lemmon, & Naveen, 2006). 
Therefore, the fair level of compensation for two universities that are of equal size, but have 
different levels of complexity is different, with the fair compensation being larger for the more 
complex university. This would result in the relation between university complexity and 
president compensation being larger than the relation between university size and president 
compensation. Because each of these differing perspectives suggests a different pattern of 
relations, I ask, 
Research question 5(a): What is the relative influence of the university size and 
complexity dimensions on president compensation? (b): Is the pattern of strength of these 
relations different between public universities and private universities? 
University President Personal Characteristics 
In addition to performance and institutional characteristics, human capital and personal 
characteristics are also frequently included as predictors of compensation, or as control variables. 
Therefore, I also provide an overview of human capital and other personal characteristics (see 
Table 5). A total of four dimensions are included in this table: demographics, professional 
experience, tenure-related variables, and other personal characteristics.  
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Demographics. There were four different measures categorized into the demographics 
dimension: age, gender, race, and marital status. Each of these demographic measures, 
particularly age and gender, are used frequently in the executive compensation literature, 
typically as control variables (Hall & Liebman, 1998). These measures are also used in the 
university president compensation literature (e.g., Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Cheng, 2014; 
Langbert & Fox, 2013; Monks, 2007) and there is evidence indicating that they are associated 
with compensation. For instance, there is some evidence to suggest that gender is related to 
president compensation (Saunders, 2007; Sorokina, 2003). Age can also be used as a proxy for 
length of working experience, and thus, may also be related to performance (Fulmer, 2009). 
Table 5 includes an overview of these measures and the studies in which they are used.  
Professional experience. A total of eight measures were categorized as measures of 
professional experience: past experience as a tenured professor; past experience in educational 
administration; law, business, or economics degree holder; J.D, M.D., or other professional 
degree holder; field of highest degree; and, prior presidency. Each of these measures reflect the 
background and level of human capital the president has, including past educational experience 
and past job experience, and may, therefore, be related to compensation. These variables were 
used as predictors of compensation in several studies (see Table 5; e.g., Banker et al., 2009; 
Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Cheng, 2014; Ehrenberg et al., 2001; He & Callahan, 2017; Monks, 
2007). 
Tenure. Seven measures were categorized into the tenure dimension: job tenure, 
university tenure, years on faculty before becoming president, number of working years, years of 
experience at prior presidency, seniority, and aggregate experience. Each of these measures 
provide an indication of how much experience presidents have, which may affect their 
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compensation. Tenure is a common measure in the executive compensation literature (e.g., 
Devers et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 2003; Young & Buchholtz, 2002) 
and is also often used in the university president compensation literature (e.g., Banker et al., 
2009; Ehrenberg et al., 2001; Monks, 2007; Pati & Lee, 2016) because it reflects the amount of 
working experience an individual has and thus, may influence compensation. Table 5 shows the 
other measures categorized into this dimension, as well as the studies that used these measures. 
Other personal characteristics. As before, some measures could not be categorized into 
the previous dimensions. Therefore, a total of 10 measures were categorized as other personal 
characteristics: whether the president was in their first or last year as president, if the president 
was an interim president, an internal hire, hired from outside of academia, president alumni 
status, if they were listed on Who’s Who, a member of the clergy, member of an external Board, 
and what their performance was at their past university. These measures are personal 
characteristics of the president that cannot be categorized as demographic variables, professional 
experience variables, or tenure-related variables. However, it is still possible that these measures 
influence compensation. For instance, clergy members are expected to have lower compensation 
than non-clergy members (Ehrenberg et al., 2001), interim presidents are expected to receive less 
compensation than permanent presidents (Cheng, 2014), and presidents who have appeared on 
the Who’s Who list are likely to receive more compensation than those presidents who have not 
been on this list (Saunders, 2007; Sorokina, 2003). 
 Overview. Personal characteristics of CEOs have also been examined as an antecedent to 
their compensation. Using human capital theory, CEO personal characteristics are predicted to be 
related to CEO compensation (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Fulmer, 2009). As mentioned previously, 
human capital theory suggests that differences in pay are partly due to differences in levels of 
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human capital (Agarwal, 1981; Combs & Skill, 2003). Therefore, it may be expected that CEO 
compensation is related to CEO characteristics that are indicative of human capital (e.g., 
education, experience, network connections). Although there is evidence to support the notion 
that human capital variables are associated with higher levels of pay in the non-executive 
workforce (e.g., Fisher & Govindarajan, 1992), there is less evidence to support this notion in 
samples of executives. This may be due to the fact that there is less variance in human capital 
variables among executives than there is in the working population (e.g., Agarwal, 1981). That 
being said, there is some evidence that certain human capital variables are related to CEO 
compensation. For instance, work experience was found to be positively associated with CEO 
compensation, whereas educational variables such as educational level and field of study (i.e., 
major) were not significantly associated with executive compensation (Agarwal, 1981). 
Similarly, Fulmer (2009) reported that CEO age, used as a proxy for experience, was positively 
related to CEO base salary; however, she also found no statistically significant relation between 
CEO age and total compensation (which included bonus and other incentives). These results 
were consistent with the claim that human capital variables, such as experience, are more likely 
to influence base salary because they, like salary, are relatively stable (Fulmer, 2009).   
 Human capital in the context of university president compensation. President 
personal characteristics are likely to influence university president compensation in much the 
same way that they influence for-profit executive compensation. For instance, there is also likely 
to be little variance in some human capital variables among university presidents. Specifically, 
89% of university presidents hold a doctoral degree, 75% have only been the president at their 
current institution, and 58% are 61 years of age or older (Gagliardi et al., 2018). However, there 
is evidence to suggest that some personal characteristics (e.g., gender, reputation [appearance in 
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Who’s Who], tenure, alumni status) are positively associated with university president 
compensation (e.g., Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Sorokina, 2003).  
For instance, being a female was associated with receiving higher compensation among 
top-tier universities (Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005). This may be due to market forces. Because 
there are fewer females in top positions, females, particularly those with prior experience, may 
be in high demand and, therefore, receive a higher level of compensation (Bartlett & Sorokina, 
2005). Similarly, appearance in issues of Who’s Who in America may indicate a university 
president’s level of social capital (Sorokina, 2003). A significant portion of a president’s job is to 
be the figurehead of the university and to fundraise; therefore, social capital may be an important 
factor for success (Sorokina, 2003). It is reasonable then that this measure would be related to 
compensation. Tenure has also been shown to be positively related to compensation (Banker et 
al., 2009; Sorokina, 2003). Tenure is reflective of an individual’s level of experience, and, thus, 
may indicate a president’s ability to handle his or her job duties (Banker et al., 2009; Sorokina, 
2003).  
In sum, although some individual measures of president personal characteristics may 
have a stronger association with university president compensation, the majority of measures are 
likely to lack any significant variance among university presidents. Therefore, the overall 
relation between this category of variables and university president compensation is likely to be 
weak, but still positive. Stated formally, 
Hypothesis 3: University president personal characteristics will be positively related to 
university president compensation. 
In addition, although university president personal characteristics are unlikely to have a 
stronger influence on university president compensation than university size/complexity does, it 
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is possible that these characteristics’ impact on compensation is greater than that of university 
performance. If agents’ risk aversion is higher than assumed by agency theory, Boards may be 
less likely to use university performance to determine university president compensation. Instead 
they may choose to use more stable characteristics (e.g., amount of experience/tenure). That 
being said, it is equally as reasonable to expect that university performance will have a stronger 
impact on president compensation than personal characteristics because of the dynamics 
described by agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, I ask,  
Research question 6: How well do university president personal characteristics predict 
university president compensation in comparison to university performance and 
university size and complexity? 
 As with the previous two characteristics (i.e., performance and non-performance 
institutional characteristics), I explore differences in the relation between personal characteristics 
and president compensation between private and public universities. Although there are reasons 
to suspect that there may be differences between private and public universities in the extent to 
which university performance and/or university size/complexity are used to determine president 
compensation, there is no reason to suspect that there will be differences, on average, between 
the use of president personal characteristics to set compensation among these universities. 
However, to be thorough, it is important to determine if any differences do exist. Thus, I ask, 
Research question 7: Are there differences in the strength of the relation between 
president personal characteristics among private universities and public universities?  
  Consistent with the executive compensation literature, differences in the predictive power 
between the various dimensions of personal characteristics are likely. For instance, amount of 
working experience and other tenure-related variables have been shown to be positively 
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associated with executive compensation (Agarwal, 1981; Fulmer, 2009), as well as president 
compensation (Banker et al., 2009; Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Langbert & Fox, 2013). Thus, one 
would expect measures of tenure (i.e., amount of working experience) to have a fairly consistent, 
and positive, association with compensation. However, measures of professional experience 
(e.g., field of highest degree, professional degree holder) have generally not been found to 
significantly impact compensation for executives (Agarwal, 1981) or university presidents 
(Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; He & Callahan, 2017; Monks, 2007). This suggests that the 
association between measures of tenure and compensation is stronger than the relation between 
measures of professional experience and compensation. To explore this more thoroughly, I pose,  
Research question 8(a): What is the relative influence of the four different personal 
characteristics dimensions on executive compensation? (b): Is the pattern of strength of 
these relations different between public universities and private universities? 
In sum, this meta-analysis will determine the extent to which university performance is 
related to university president pay. In addition, this study also examines the relations between 
two other commonly recognized determinants of executive compensation (i.e., university 
size/complexity, president personal characteristics). In so doing, this paper will help to address 
the controversy surrounding university president compensation. Figure 1 summarizes the 
proposed relations. 
Method 
Literature Search 
 A thorough search was conducted to identify both published and unpublished primary 
studies that assessed the relation between university president compensation and any variables 
related to university performance, non-performance institutional characteristics, and/or university 
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president personal characteristics. Specifically, studies were identified by searching 
ABI/INFORM Complete, Academic Search Complete, Business Source Complete, Education 
Research Complete, ERIC, Proquest Dissertations & Theses, PsycINFO, ScienceDirect. Google 
Scholar was also used to supplement this search process. The following keywords were used, in 
combination, to search the abstracts of these databases: university, college, higher education, 
president, compensation, salary, salaries, and pay. There were no time restrictions placed on 
these searches; the search was completed in November 2018. Additional restrictions were 
applied to Education Resource Complete and ABI/INFORM to limit the number of non-relevant 
results returned. These restrictions, as well as the exact search string and number of results 
returned from each database, are listed in Table 6.  
 Based on these criteria, a total of 702 records were identified through ABI/INFORM 
Complete, Academic Search Complete, Business Source Complete, Education Research 
Complete, ERIC, Proquest Dissertations & Theses, PsycINFO, and ScienceDirect. An additional 
1.5 million results were identified through Google Scholar (of these, 11 were identified as 
potentially relevant)7. After removing duplicates, 663 records were retained (including the 11 
records identified through Google Scholar). The titles and abstracts for these 663 records were 
reviewed for relevancy using the criteria discussed in the next section. A total of 612 of these 
663 articles were excluded; 51 were retained for full-text review. After examining the full text of 
these articles, 29 were excluded because they did not meet the eligibility criteria. Thus, a total of 
22 studies were included in the systematic review. The search process is detailed in the PRISMA 
diagram, included as Figure 4.  
 
7 Not all 1.5 million results from Google Scholar were reviewed. Titles of the search results were screened until 10 
consecutive pages of results (a total of 100 articles) appeared not relevant. This resulted in approximately 500 total 
titles being screened.  
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Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria 
 Decisions regarding the inclusion or exclusion of articles were made based on several 
criteria. For instance, study samples had to include university presidents employed at nonprofit 
universities in the United States. Therefore, studies that took place outside of the U.S., focused 
on faculty members’ compensation, or did not clearly define their sample were excluded. Studies 
also needed to contain variables that could be categorized as measures of university performance, 
non-performance institutional characteristics, or university president characteristics, as well as a 
measure of university president compensation. Studies that assessed the relation between 
university performance, non-performance institutional characteristics, or university president 
characteristics and other variables besides compensation (e.g., turnover) were excluded.  
Data Extraction, Coding, and Preparation 
 All data extraction, coding, and data preparation was performed by the author of this 
dissertation. For each identified article, the following information was extracted for the 
systematic review: author, year, article title, journal, journal impact factor (if applicable), sample 
type (e.g., private, public, private and public university presidents), sample size, study design 
(e.g., cross-sectional, longitudinal), years included, variable names, effect size, effect size type 
(e.g., correlation, beta), statistical significance of each variable examined including the p-value 
(if provided), whether or not the effect size could be converted to a correlation, source of data 
(e.g., Chronicle of Higher Education, U. S. Department of Education), statistical technique 
utilized (e.g., OLS regression, Arellano-Bond dynamic panel modeling), theories utilized, and 
whether or not hypotheses were made.  
Analytical Plan 
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 Although I initially intended to test the proposed hypotheses and research questions using 
meta-analytic techniques, a number of issues were identified during the coding process that 
precluded the use of meta-analytic techniques. Specifically, meta-analysis requires consistent 
effect size estimates (e.g., correlations). Correlations were only provided (or could otherwise be 
derived/calculated) for nine of the 22 studies. An additional nine studies included beta weights 
from regression equations. Although these beta weights were converted using the formula 
provide by Peterson and Brown (2005), including these converted estimates in a meta-analysis 
would be problematic as the number of additional variables in the respective regression 
equations varies widely. For instance, Banker, Plehn-Dujowich, and Xian (2009) only included 
eight variables in their equation, whereas Cheng (2014) included 34 variables. This means that 
the converted beta weights are not comparable and, therefore, including correlations calculated 
from these beta weights would likely result in a misleading/erroneous conclusion (likely 
underestimate of the true relation [Roth et al., 2018]). The remaining four studies did not include 
the necessary information to calculate a correlation or a beta weight.  
 In addition to requiring a consistent effect size, meta-analysis also assumes that effect 
sizes are independent of one another. Unfortunately, many of the identified studies either do not 
report the time period examined in the study or have time periods that overlap with other 
identified studies (which would make the effect sizes in those studies non-independent). One 
way to address this issue is to nest effect sizes within years (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & 
Rothstein, 2009). However, this is unlikely to fully address this issue. The average tenure of 
presidents in my dataset is approximately nine years. Thus, even nesting effect sizes within year 
does not adequately resolve the violation of the assumption independence.  
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 Given the aforementioned issues (inconsistent effect size estimates and independence 
violations), it would be inappropriate to use meta-analytic techniques to address the proposed 
hypotheses and research questions. Therefore, instead, I provided a systematic review of the 
accumulated evidence from the identified studies. Taking this approach allowed me to take stock 
of this literature and provide a qualitative assessment of the extent to which existing evidence 
supports or fails to support the hypotheses as well as shed light on the research questions posed 
in the introduction to this chapter. To aid in this process, I used a version of vote counting, which 
involved counting the number of effect sizes that were positive, negative, and nil (regardless of 
whether these effect sizes were statistically significant). This approach can be used when 
traditional meta-analytic techniques are not appropriate (Higgins & Green, 2011).  
Results 
Performance 
Of the 22 studies identified through the literature search, 21 included at least one variable 
that could be categorized as a university performance variable. Across those 21 studies, a total of 
81 university performance variables were identified (see Table 7, Panel A, Column 2)8. Two 
(2%) of these variables had a nil relation with university president compensation, 57 (70%) had a 
positive association with president compensation, and 22 (27%) had a negative association with 
president compensation (see Table 7, Panel A, Columns 3 and 5). This provides initial support 
for Hypothesis 1, which suggested that university performance is positively related to university 
president compensation.  
 
8 Tang, Tang, and Tang (1996, 2000, 2004) used many of the same variables in their studies (they also used the same 
exact same compensation data in each study). Therefore, to avoid the most blatant independence violation, any 
variables that were duplicated in these studies was only counted once in the analyses reported here.  
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To provide a more detailed assessment of the strength of this association, effect size 
estimates were examined. Of the 81 university performance variables examined, standardized 
effect sizes (either correlations or beta weights) were provided for 65 of them. Although, as 
previously mentioned, it is inappropriate to conduct a meta-analysis to provide a meta-analytic 
effect size estimate, I did examine these effect sizes to determine the likely size of the overall 
effect. Specifically, I converted the beta weights to correlations using the formula provided by 
Peterson and Brown (2005). Evidence suggests that beta weights tend to underestimate the true 
effect size by 12% to 70% (Roth, Le, Oh, Van Iddekinge, & Bobko, 2018); therefore, to provide 
the most generous estimate, I also added 70% to each converted beta weight. I then created two 
averages – the first was an average of the correlations and converted beta weights (the 
conservative, likely under-estimate), the second was an average of the correlations and converted 
beta weights plus 70% (the generous estimate). This allowed me to create a range in which the 
effect size likely exists9. I then considered Cohen (1988) effect size benchmarks to determine the 
likely magnitude of the association between the two variables. Cohen suggested that, for 
correlations, a weak relation is .10, a moderate relation is .30, and a strong relation is .50. I used 
this information to create ranges. Using the absolute value of the effect sizes, values of less than 
.05 indicated no association between the variables (a nil effect size), values between .05 and .24 
indicated weak effect sizes, values between .25 and .44 were considered moderate effect sizes, 
and values of .45 or greater were considered large effect sizes. Using this approach, the results 
 
9 One may question the decision to add 70% rather than 12% to the beta weights to calculate the range in which the 
effect size likely exists; however, this decision was made for two reasons. First, because adding 70% increases the 
size of the range, it provides the most generous interpretation of the results and decreases the likelihood of making a 
Type I error. Second, the number of predictors included in a regression equation can reduce the size of each 
individual beta weight. When converted to correlations, these beta weights are underestimates of the true correlation. 
The majority of the studies examined in this systematic review included eight or more predictors. Therefore, these 
beta weights are likely to be more underestimated than results from studies where only two or three predictors are 
included. Thus, adding 70% to each beta weight, in addition to decreasing the chances of making a Type I error, 
may also be a more accurate reflection of the true correlation than adding 12% would be. 
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suggest that the relation between university performance and university president compensation 
is likely to be positive, but weak.  
 The first research question asked if there was a difference in the relation of university 
performance and university president compensation among public and private universities. Of 
the 21 studies that examined the relation between university performance and university 
president compensation, four included only public universities, 11 included only private 
universities, and three reported their results separately for private and public universities. Across 
the seven studies reporting results for public universities, a total of 30 university performance-
public university president compensation relations were examined (see Table 8, Panel A, 
Column 2). Across the 14 studies reporting results for private universities, 39 university 
performance-private university president compensation relations were examined (see Table 9, 
Panel A, Column 2).  
For public university presidents, 18 of the 30 (60%) effect sizes were positive, 10 of the 
30 (30%) effect sizes were negative, and two of the effect sizes (7%) were nil (see Table 8, Panel 
A, Columns 3 and 5). Considering private university presidents, 29 of the 39 (74%) effect sizes 
were positive. Ten of the 39 (26%) effect sizes assessing the relation between university 
performance and private university president compensation were negative. (see Table 9, Panel A, 
Columns 3 and 5). Taken together, these results suggest that the relation between university 
performance and university president compensation is likely to be positive in both public and 
private universities. It is possible that the relation between university performance and university 
president compensation is stronger in private institutions than in public ones; however, there is 
not enough evidence to state this definitively. Examining the standardized effect sizes (23 for 
public universities and 31 for private universities) suggests that the relation between university 
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performance and university president compensation is likely to be nil to weak and positive for 
public universities and weak and positive for private universities.  
 Research question 2 asked if there were differences in the strength of the relation between 
university performance and university president compensation depending on the specific 
dimension of university performance assessed. Of the 81 university performance variables 
examined, there were seven variables in the academic and research performance dimension, 
eight in the academic and research quality dimension, seven in the faculty quality dimension, 27 
in the financial performance dimension, nine in the reputation dimension, 18 in the selectivity 
dimension, and three in the other dimension. Two of the 81 variables are excluded from this 
discussion because they were created using a combination of measures that spanned multiple 
dimensions (e.g., the variable was described as an average between a financial performance 
metric and a reputation metric). Table 7 provides a summary of the results. As can be seen from 
Table 7, Panel A, Column 3, the percentage of positive effect sizes ranges from 33% (other 
dimension) to 89% (reputation dimension). Considering the information in this table together, it 
appears that performance metrics from the faculty quality, reputation, and selectivity dimensions 
have a more consistent positive association with university president compensation than the other 
four dimensions. Performance metrics from the academic and research performance metric 
appear to have the least consistent positive association with university president compensation. 
Considering the standardized effect sizes that were reported, it appears that variables from the 
faculty quality and reputation dimensions have the strongest relation with university president 
compensation, whereas variables from the academic and research performance, financial 
performance, and selectivity dimensions have the weakest association with university president 
compensation (with the exception of variables from the other dimension, which appear to have 
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no relation with compensation). However, these results should be interpreted with caution as 
there are relatively few numbers of effect sizes in each dimension.  
 Research question 2 also asked if there were differences in the pattern of the relations 
between the performance dimensions and university president compensation between private and 
public university presidents. These results are displayed in Tables 8 and 9. Although there are 
only a small number of effect sizes in each dimension (between one and eight for public 
universities; zero and 16 for private universities), one key difference can be observed. 
Specifically, variables in the faculty quality dimension appear to have a nil or weak positive 
association with public university president compensation, yet these variables appear to have a 
strong positive relation with private university president compensation. However, this 
determination is based on two effect sizes from public universities and four effect sizes from 
private universities; therefore, it should be interpreted with caution. 
Non-performance institutional characteristics 
 A total of 21 studies included at least one variable that could be categorized as a non-
performance institutional characteristic. Hypothesis 2(a) stated that university size and university 
complexity will have a positive association with university president compensation. A total of 60 
effect sizes were reported for the relation between non-performance institutional characteristics 
related to university size and complexity and university president compensation (see Table 7, 
Panel B, Column 2). Of these 60 effect sizes, 47 (78%) were positive, 12 (20%) were negative 
(see Table 7, Panel B, Columns 3 and 5), and one (2%) was nil. This provides initial support for 
Hypothesis 2(a).  
 To provide a more detailed assessment of the strength of this association, effect size 
estimates were examined. Of the 60 non-performance institutional characteristics related to 
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university size and complexity examined, standardized effect sizes (either correlations or beta 
weights) were provided for 33 of them. An examination of these effect sizes suggests that the 
relation between non-performance institutional characteristics related to university size and 
complexity and university president compensation is likely to be weak to moderate and positive 
(see Table 7, Panel B, Column 7). This supports Hypothesis 2(a).  
 Hypothesis 2(b) proposed that non-performance institutional characteristics related to 
university size and complexity would account for more variance in university president 
compensation than university performance. Given the limitations of the data, the amount of 
variance in university president compensation accounted for by these two sets of variables 
cannot be determined. However, an examination of Table 7, Panels A and B, Column 7, indicates 
that university performance seems to have a weak positive effect on university president 
compensation whereas non-performance institutional characteristics related to university size and 
complexity appear to have a weak to moderate positive effect on university president 
compensation. Thus, it is possible that non-performance institutional characteristics related to 
university size and complexity do have a stronger impact on university president compensation 
than university performance. 
 In addition to non-performance institutional characteristics related to university size and 
complexity, there is one additional dimension of non-performance institutional characteristics 
(i.e., the other dimension). Research question 3 asked if there was any association between 
variables in this dimension and university president compensation. There were 25 variables in 
this dimension, nine (36%) of which had positive effect sizes and 16 (64%) of which had 
negative effect sizes. An examination of the effect sizes suggests one theme - university 
presidents at religious institutions earn less than presidents at non-religious institutions, on 
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average. The results for religious institutions are shown in Table 7, Panel B. Therefore, in 
response to Research question 3, at least one non-performance institutional characteristics other 
than university size and complexity is related to university president compensation.  
 Just as with university performance, it is also important to determine if there are 
differences in the strength of the association of non-performance institutional characteristics and 
university president compensation between public and private universities. Given that the only 
result of note in the other dimension was that university presidents at religious institutions are 
compensated less than university presidents at non-religious institutions and all religious 
institutions are private institutions, this set of results will only focus on variables related to 
university size and complexity. Of the 21 studies that examined the relation between non-
performance institutional characteristics related to university size and complexity and university 
president compensation, four included only public universities, 12 included only private 
universities, and three reported their results separately for private and public universities. Across 
the seven studies that included results for public universities, a total of 14 non-performance 
institutional characteristics related to size and complexity-public university president 
compensation effects were examined (see Table 8, Panel B, Column 2). Across the 15 studies 
that reported results for private universities, 36 non-performance institutional characteristics 
related to size and complexity-private university president compensation effects were examined 
(see Table 9, Panel B, Column 2).  
Of the 15 effects from public universities, 12 (80%) were positive, two (13%) were 
negative, and one (9%) was nil (see Table 8, Panel B, Columns 2, 3 and 5). Considering the 36 
private universities effects, 29 (81%) were positive. There were also seven (19%) negative effect 
sizes see Table 9, Panel B, Columns 2, 3 and 5).  
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The patterns of these results suggest that the relation between non-performance 
institutional characteristics related to size and complexity and university president compensation 
is likely to be positive in both public and private universities. This is also supported by the 
standardized effect sizes which suggest that the relation between non-performance institutional 
characteristics related to size and complexity and university president compensation is likely to 
be moderate and positive for both public and private universities. However, given the small 
number of effect sizes from public universities, these results should be interpreted with caution. 
Research question 5 asked if there were differences in the relative influence of variables 
from the size and complexity dimensions on university president compensation and if the pattern 
of differences was similar between private and public universities. Tables 7 – 9 display these 
results. The results from the other dimension are also shown; however, they will not be discussed 
here because, as previously stated, the only consistent theme identified among the variables in 
this dimension was that religious institutions, which are private institutions, provide less 
compensations to their presidents. An examination of Table 7, Panel B, shows that of the 60 non-
performance institutional characteristics variables, 34 can be categorized into the size dimension 
and 25 can be categorized into the complexity dimension. One of the 60 variables could not be 
categorized into either dimension because it was formed from measures that spanned multiple 
dimensions. As can be seen from Table 7, Panel B, the majority of the variables from both the 
size and complexity dimensions are positive and statistically significant. However, the table also 
shows that effect sizes in the size dimension are more likely to be positive than those from the 
complexity dimension (91% versus 60%; see Table 7, Panel B, Column 3). This suggests that the 
effects of university size are likely to have a stronger impact on university president 
compensation than university complexity. This is also supported by the standardized effect sizes 
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– variables in the size dimension appear to have a moderate positive association with university 
president compensation, whereas variables in the complexity dimension seem to have a weak 
positive association.  
Considering Panel B from Tables 8 and 9, the effect of variables in the size and 
complexity dimensions on university president compensation becomes less clear. An examination 
of the percentages in Columns 2 and 3 still suggests that the relation between university size and 
university president compensation is likely to be stronger than the relation between university 
complexity and university president compensation for both public and private universities. 
However, the standardized effect sizes do not support this. Specifically, in public and private 
universities, university size and university complexity both appear to have a moderate positive 
association with university president compensation. Thus, it is difficult to determine definitively 
if university size does, in fact, have a larger impact on university president compensation than 
university complexity.  
President personal characteristics 
 President personal characteristics were assessed in 14 of the 22 identified studies. Across 
those 14 studies, a total of 60 personal characteristic variables were examined. However, unlike 
the previous two categories of variables (i.e., university performance and non-performance 
institutional characteristics), it is not appropriate to lump all the university president personal 
characteristic variables together. Therefore, I will discuss specific groupings of variables. For 
instance, the first dimension of university president characteristics is demographics. This 
dimension included a total of 18 effect sizes that could be categorized into two themes that had at 
least two associated standardized effect sizes: gender and age.  
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Gender was reported 13 times across the identified studies; however, in one instance, 
there was no information about how gender was coded. Therefore, this instance will be excluded 
from subsequent discussion. Eight of the remaining 12 (67%) effect sizes were positive, which 
suggests that male university presidents receive higher compensation (see Table 7, Panel C, 
Column 2 and 3). Four of the 12 (33%) effects were negative, suggesting that females receive 
higher compensation (see Table 7, Panel C, Column 5). Taken together, this suggests that males 
may receive more compensation; however, the effect is likely to be weak and/or inconsistent. An 
examination of the standardized effect sizes provides additional support for this notion. These 
effect sizes suggest that there is a nil to weak positive relation between gender (male) and 
university president compensation (see Table 7, Panel C, Column 7). This provides some 
support, however, for Hypothesis 3 which suggested that there is a positive relation between 
university president characteristics and university president compensation. 
Research question 7 asked if there were differences in the relation between university 
president personal characteristics and university president compensation between public and 
private universities. Tables 8 and 9 display the results of the relation between gender and 
university president compensation separately for public and private universities. These results 
suggest that the relation between male gender and university president compensation in public 
institutions is weak (see Table 8, Panel C, Column 7); whereas in private universities, it is nil 
(see Table 9, Panel C, Column 7). However, the estimate from public universities is based on 
three effect sizes; therefore, it is plausible that this relation is also nil.  
 In addition to the effect of gender on compensation, the relation between university 
president age and university president compensation has also been examined in two studies that 
included only private universities. Both of these studies found a positive association between 
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university president age and university president compensation (see Tables 7 and 9, Panel C). 
However, both effect sizes suggest a weak positive association (see Tables 7 and 9, Panel C, 
Column 7). This finding also supports Hypothesis 3 (Research question 7 cannot be addressed 
since the relation between university president age and university president compensation has not 
been examined in public universities). 
 The second dimension of university president characteristics is professional experience. 
This dimension included a total of 18 effect sizes that could be categorized into one theme with 
at least two associated effect sizes: prior presidency. The relation between presidential 
experience at a prior university and university president compensation was examined six times 
(see Table 7, Panel C, Column 2). The effect was positive in all six instances, suggesting that 
there is a positive association between experience as a university president at a previous 
university and compensation at one’s current university. This is supported by the standardized 
effect sizes which also find a weak positive effect (see Table 7, Panel C, Column 7). This 
supports Hypothesis 3. In response to Research question 7, Tables 8 and 9, Panel C, show that 
this effect appears to be consistent between public and private universities.  
 Tenure is the third dimension of university president characteristics. Variables related to 
tenure were examined 13 times across nine studies. Table 7, Panel C, displays these results. In 10 
of these 13 (77%) cases, the effect was positive (see Table 7, Panel C, Columns 2 and 3). A 
negative effect was observed in three (23%) instances. This suggests that the relation between 
tenure-related variables and university president compensation is positive. An examination of the 
standardized effect sizes suggests that the relation is either nil or weak, but positive (see Table 7, 
Panel C, Column 7). This provides some support for Hypothesis 3.  
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Regarding Research question 7, some differences can be seen when comparing the effects 
of tenure separately for public and private universities (see Panel C of Tables 8 and 9, 
respectively). For public universities, all of the effects are negative. Averaging the standardized 
effect sizes results in a nil effect size (see Table 8, Panel C, Column 7). In private universities, 
however, all of the observed effects were positive (see Table 8, Panel C, Column 4). This 
suggests that the relation between tenure and university president compensation in private 
universities in likely positive. In fact, the standardized effect sizes suggest a weak positive 
association between these two variables (see Table 8, Panel C, Column 7). Taken together, this 
suggests that tenure has a stronger impact on university president compensation in private 
universities than in public universities. However, the estimate from public universities is only 
based on three effect sizes; therefore, this conclusion should be interpreted with caution.  
 There is also an other dimension for university president characteristics. A total of 11 
variables were included in this dimension; however, only one theme could be identified that had 
at least two associated standardized effect sizes: alumni status (see Table 8, Panel C, Column 2). 
Two studies included this variable. One of the two (50%) effects was positive; one (50%) was 
negative, which suggests that there may be a nil effect. The standardized effect sizes suggest that 
the relation between alumni status and university president compensation is nil to positive (see 
Table 8, Panel C, Column 7), providing some support for Hypothesis 3. Interestingly, the 
positive (weak) effect was observed in private universities (see Table 9, Panel C, Column 7), 
whereas the negative (nil) effect was noted in public universities (see Table 8, Panel C, Column 
7). Thus, it is possible that alumni status impact private university president compensation, but it 
is not relevant in public universities. However, this is based on one effect in each setting, so it is, 
at best, weak evidence of such an effect.  
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 In summary, Hypothesis 3 suggested that president personal characteristics would be 
positively related to university president compensation. As can be seen from Table 7, Panel C, 
there is some support for this notion. Specifically, gender (male), age, prior presidency, tenure, 
and alumni status may all potentially have a weak positive effect on university president 
compensation. Research question 6 asked how university president characteristics affected 
university president compensation in comparison to university performance and non-
performance institutional characteristics. An examination of Table 8, Panels B and C, suggests 
that university president characteristics are likely to have less of an influence on university 
president compensation than university performance and non-performance institutional 
characteristics. For instance, considering the standardized effect sizes, all of the university 
president personal characteristics are estimated to have a nil or weak effect on university 
president compensation, whereas the variables from the university performance and non-
performance institutional characteristics categories have nil to strong positive effects (see Table 
7, Panels B and C, Column 7). Research question 7 asked if there were differences between 
public and private universities in the extent to which university president personal characteristics 
are related to university president compensation. Tables 8 and 9, Panel C, show that the effects 
of university president personal characteristics on university president compensation are 
consistent between public and private universities, with the exception of tenure-related variables 
and alumni status, both of which appear to have a stronger relation with university president 
compensation in private universities than in public universities. 
Discussion 
 The controversy surrounding the high levels of compensation paid to university 
presidents has led to several studies that have attempted to assess the determinants of university 
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president compensation. The main goal of this systematic review was to examine the extent to 
which the compensation paid to university presidents is determined by university performance. 
In doing so, this review also assessed the impact of non-performance institutional characteristics, 
including university size and complexity, as well as university president personal characteristics 
on university president compensation. The influence of each of these sets of variables is 
supported theoretically by agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), managerialism (e.g., Aoki, 
1984; Herman, 1981), and/or human capital theory (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962). 
Therefore, this review also offers insight into the efficacy of each of these theories. Next, I will 
discuss the results and theoretical implications for each of the examined set of variables. 
University Performance 
The findings of this systematic review are supportive of predictions from agency theory. 
As discussed in the theoretical overview, agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) suggests that 
university performance will have a positive, but weak, association with university president 
compensation. The prediction that the relation is positive is based on the low task 
programmability and outcome measurability present in the job of university president which 
makes it difficult to monitor and judge the appropriate individual decisions and behaviors of 
university presidents. Therefore, to align the goals of the university president and the Board, it 
may be necessary to make university president compensation contingent on university 
performance (as opposed to relying on monitoring or tying university president compensation to 
individual university president performance). The prediction that the relation between university 
performance and university president compensation is relatively weak is based on the idea that, 
because university performance is not directly under the control of university president 
compensation, basing university president compensation on university performance transfers 
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undue risk to university presidents. To compensate for this, university performance should only 
have a small effect on university president compensation. The findings of this systematic review 
support these predictions - there seems to be a weak positive association between university 
performance and university president compensation (see Table 7, Panel A).  
The conceptual review provided also suggested that the relation between university 
performance and university president compensation may be weaker in public universities than in 
private ones. This argument was based on the idea that, because public university presidents earn 
less money, on average, than private university presidents, public universities presidents may be 
more intrinsically motivated to perform, and, therefore, goal alignment is less necessary for 
public university presidents than for private university presidents (Bai, 2014; Handy & Katz, 
1998). An examination of Tables 8 and 9, Panel A, indicates that the relation between university 
performance and university president compensation is nil to weakly positive in public 
universities, but weakly positive in private universities. Thus, it seems that public university 
president’s compensation is likely to be less strongly linked to university performance than the 
compensation of private university presidents. If accurate, this could be due to differences in the 
extent to which public and private university Boards feel they need to incentivize performance. 
However, given that this review did not allow an exact effect size to be calculated, it is possible 
that there is no actual difference between public and private universities in terms of the strength 
of the relation between university president compensation and university performance. Thus, this 
is still an open question. 
I also proposed, based on agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), that various 
dimensions of university performance may have differential effects on university president 
compensation. Specifically, to mitigate the risk to university president’s compensation, Boards 
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may choose to link aspects of university performance to university president compensation that 
are more directly under university presidents’ control, such as academic and research quality 
selectivity, and fundraising. Alternatively, Boards may choose to incentivize performance in 
dimensions that are most aligned with the mission of the university and its long-term success, 
such as financial performance and academic and research performance. Interestingly, this review 
found that university reputation has the strongest and most consistent impact on university 
president compensation, while the other dimensions have weak and/or inconsistent relations with 
university president compensation (see Tables 7 through 9, Panel A). One potential reason for 
the effect of university reputation is that it is typically measured through the use of university 
rankings (He & Callahan, 2017; Huang & Chen, 2013; Monks, 2007). These rankings take into 
account metrics from several different performance dimensions, including alumni giving 
(financial performance dimension) and graduation rate (academic and research performance 
dimension), as well as SAT scores (selectivity dimension), class size (academic and research 
quality dimension), and faculty salary (faculty quality dimension) (Morse, 2017). Thus, aligning 
university president compensation to university reputation, as measured by university ranking, 
may be considered by university Boards to be the easiest and most straightforward way to judge 
overall university performance. Given that many Board members tend to lack expertise in the 
field of higher education (Price, 2018), it is logical to assume that they would prefer to use a 
metric that is easy to obtain (i.e., they are published every year by various organizations, The 
Princeton Review, 2018; U. S. News & World Report, 2019) and understand. It is also possible 
that these rankings are normatively accepted just as stock price/market value is in the for-profit 
context.  
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 In sum, the main predictions of agency theory appear to be somewhat supported by this 
systematic review. The overall relation between university president compensation and 
university performance tends to be weak, but positive. Furthermore, specific dimensions (e.g., 
reputation) do appear to have a moderate to strong positive association (using the cutoffs 
discussed in the Method section) with university president compensation. If these dimensions 
(e.g., reputation) include metrics (e.g., ranking) that university Boards would like to see most 
improved, it is possible that these results provide strong support for agency theory. However, the 
accuracy of secondary predictions based on agency theory concepts are unclear (in the case of 
the differences between public and private universities), or unsupported (in the case of the 
various dimensions of university performance having a greater or weaker effect).  
Non-performance Institutional Characteristics 
In addition to the relation between university president compensation and university 
performance, this systematic review also examined the extent to which other non-performance 
institutional characteristics influence university president compensation. In particular, 
managerialism (e.g., Aoki, 1984; Herman, 1981) and human capital theory (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; 
Becker, 1962), support a relation between university size as well as complexity and university 
president compensation. Managerialist arguments state that university presidents may become 
entrenched and can use their power to strengthen the impact that university size has on their 
compensation while weakening the extent to which the Board ties their compensation to 
university performance. This is desirable for university presidents because university size and 
complexity may be more directly under their control than university performance. The argument 
from human capital theory (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962) suggests that larger and more 
complex universities require more human capital to lead, and, therefore, the fair pay for 
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presidents of these universities is higher. The results of this systematic review support the 
general predictions of both theories.  
As indicated in Tables 7 through 9 (Panel B), the relation between non-performance 
institutional characteristics related to university size and complexity appear to have a weak to 
moderate positive association with university president compensation. Furthermore, the overall 
pattern of results related to university performance and non-performance institutional 
characteristics related to university size and complexity suggests that the latter set of variables 
have a stronger influence on university president compensation than does university performance 
(Table 7, Panels A and B), which is consistent with the findings from the executive 
compensation literature (Tosi et al., 2000).  
The theoretical overview also highlighted competing theoretical arguments for why the 
relation between university size and complexity and university president compensation may be 
different for public and private universities. Specifically, one argument suggests that private 
universities have less shareholder dispersion and thus less powerful university presidents than 
would be expected in public universities. If true, this first argument would result in the 
association between university size and complexity and university president compensation being 
weaker in private universities than in public ones. Conversely, public university Boards are 
typically appointed by the state’s governor (Price, 2018), which may result in public university 
presidents having less power over their Boards compared to private university presidents. In this 
second argument, the relation between university size and complexity and university president 
compensation would be weaker in public universities than in private universities. However, 
empirical evidence does not indicate substantive differences between public and private 
universities in terms of the strength of the association between university president compensation 
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and university size and complexity. This suggests that either (a) neither of the competing 
arguments presented are valid, or (b) both are valid and the effects of one balance out the effects 
of the other.  
The closest test of the efficacy of managerialism versus human capital theory that can be 
gleaned from this systematic review is gained by examining whether university size or university 
complexity has the greater relation with university president compensation. This assessment can 
provide insight into which of these two theories may be more relevant because university size is 
likely more easily manipulated than university complexity (managerialism), yet leading a 
complex university arguably requires more human capital than leading a large, but simple 
university (human capital theory). Table 7, Panel B shows that university size seems to have a 
larger association with university president compensation than does university complexity. 
Therefore, one can infer that the managerialist arguments are more relevant than the arguments 
grounded in human capital theory. Stated differently, these findings suggest that university 
president compensation is related to non-performance institutional characteristics because 
university presidents tend to be entrenched and exert their power over Boards to ensure that their 
compensation is based on metrics that are more directly under their control. However, it is 
important to note that once the results are broken out separately by public and private 
universities (Tables 8 and 9), no substantive differences are noted between the effect of 
university size and university complexity on university president compensation.  
In sum, the main predictions of managerialism and human capital theory are supported; 
however, it is difficult to say definitively whether the reason for the finding that non-
performance institutional characteristics related to university size and complexity is due to 
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university president entrenchment and power (managerialism) or because the fair wage for a job 
that requires high-levels of human capital is high (human capital theory).  
University President Personal Characteristics 
This systematic review also aimed to determine if university president personal 
characteristics influence their compensation. Human capital theory suggests that differences in 
pay are due to differences in levels of human capital (Agarwal, 1981; Combs & Skill, 2003). 
Therefore, university president compensation may be related to president personal characteristics 
that are indicative of human capital. However, for positions high in the organizational hierarchy, 
including university presidents, variance in human capital is likely to be low (e.g., Agarwal, 
1981; Gagliardi et al., 2018); therefore, any observed relation should be relatively weak. Tables 7 
through 9, Panel C, indicate that each personal characteristic variable of interest has a nil or weak 
association with university president compensation, supporting this notion.  
Of the examined human capital variables, university president’s experience at a prior 
university had the most consistent effect – it was weak, but positive. Therefore, it seems as if 
Boards tend to pay a premium for university presidents with prior experience as president, 
especially since only about 25% of presidents have prior experience as a university president 
(Gagliardi et al., 2018). Thus, these presidents may be offered a higher initial compensation than 
university presidents without experience at a previous university. This suggests that university 
presidents are, in part, compensated for their level of human capital, consistent with human 
capital theory.  
Summary of Theoretical Implications 
 Taken together, the findings from the systematic review are somewhat consistent with the 
theories discussed. Specifically, university performance was found to be positively, albeit 
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weakly, associated with university president compensation. This provides some support for 
agency theory. In fact, some dimensions of university performance appear to have a moderate or 
strong impact (using the cutoffs discussed in the Method section) on university president 
compensation which provides strong support for agency theory. University size and complexity 
also appear to impact university president compensation, supporting managerialism and human 
capital theories. Even some university president personal characteristics seem to have a weak, 
but positive effect on university president compensation, lending support to human capital 
theory. Thus, each theory discussed in this paper received at least some level of support.  
Results of this review are also somewhat consistent with evidence from the broader 
executive compensation literature, which found that organizational size has a greater influence 
on CEO compensation than organizational performance does (Tosi et al., 2000). Specifically, the 
overall pattern of results (see Table 7) indicates that non-performance institutional characteristics 
related to university size and complexity have the strongest association with university president 
compensation, followed by university performance. University president personal characteristics 
have the weakest association with university president compensation. However, a more nuanced 
examination of the university performance results finds that some university performance 
dimensions have a similar or stronger impact on university president compensation than does 
university size and complexity. This is in contrast with findings from the executive compensation 
literature, which suggest that organizational size has a significantly stronger effect than 
organizational performance on executive compensation. Therefore, it is possible that 
performance is emphasized more heavily in the nonprofit educational context than in the for-
profit context, which would provide even stronger support for agency theory predictions in the 
nonprofit educational context.  
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Limitations and Future Research 
 Although this systematic review offered a comprehensive picture of the current state of 
the evidence regarding the determinants of university president compensation, including 
university performance, university size and complexity, and university president characteristics, 
there are several limitations. First, the initial intent was to conduct a meta-analysis to provide a 
better understanding of the correlation between university president compensation and various 
metrics, yet, that was not possible, primarily because the available primary studies did not report 
the necessary data. Therefore, even though Tables 7 through 9 do provide information about the 
likelihood that an effect is positive or negative and the approximate magnitude of the effect, they 
do not include a specific effect size that would be able to quantify how much additional 
compensation a university president receives for increased university performance, university 
size and complexity, or greater accumulation of human capital. This information is necessary in 
order to fully understand the practical implications of these findings. For instance, although it is 
useful to know that university president compensation and university performance are related, it 
is possible that, for example, for every $1 increase in financial performance (e.g., endowment), a 
university president is compensated an extra $50,000. Under such a situation, one may 
reasonably argue that the benefit provided by a $1 increase in endowment is not worth an extra 
$50,000 paid to the president. Utility analysis would be helpful in this regard, however, because 
an effect size could not be calculated, it was not possible to conduct one for this study. 
Furthermore, although exploring how changes in university performance lead to changes in 
university president compensation could have provided additional information about the 
justification of university president compensation, only three studies (i.e., Cheng, 2014; Parsons 
& Reitenga, 2014; Sorokina, 2003) included in this review examined change in university 
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performance and compensation levels rather than just the levels themselves. Given the small 
number of studies, it was not possible to make a distinction between change and level. Therefore, 
this systematic review only provides an answer to the question of whether university 
performance and university president compensation are related, not whether the actual levels of 
university president compensation is justified. To best address the issue of justification, it is 
necessary to look at how relations evolve over time using longitudinal data and regression-based 
data analytic methods.  
 Second, it is also possible that the results of the systematic review are affected by factors 
not considered in this study. For instance, it is possible that results from primary studies using 
different methodologies (e.g., cross-sectional v. panel designs; different data analytic techniques) 
are different. These differences may be due to, for instance, statistical power (i.e., panel designs 
may have a larger total N and thus more statistical power) or the specific characteristics of the 
data analyses conducted (e.g., are fixed and/or random effects accounted for; what assumptions 
are made regarding causality). Unfortunately, only eight of the 22 studies included in the 
systematic review used panel data; furthermore, only six studies employed a method other than 
OLS regression and the methods used by these six studies also differed. Therefore, creating 
subgroups based on these characteristics would result in small ks, which could produce 
misleading results. However, given that substantive differences may exist, future systematic 
reviews that occur after more studies have been conducted should take these factors into 
consideration.  
 A third limitation present in this study was that no distinction could be made between 
private religious institutions and private non-religious institutions. It is possible that the relation 
between university performance and university president compensation is different in religious 
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schools than in non-religious schools, as individuals working at religious institutions may be 
more intrinsically motivated than those working at non-religious schools. This argument is based 
on the fact that university presidents from religious schools receive significantly less 
compensation than individuals at non-religious schools (Langbert, 2006). However, only one 
study (Saunders, 2007) provided results separately for religious and non-religious institutions. In 
all other studies including private universities, if the religious orientation of the university was 
considered, it was as a predictor or control variable. However, future research should consider 
examining differences between not only public and private universities, but also religious and 
non-religious universities.  
 In addition to these first three issues, it is also important to note that systematic reviews 
(and meta-analyses) are limited by the quality of the studies included in them (Borenstein et al., 
2009). If the data included in the individual studies is outdated, or the quality of these studies is 
poor, then the results reported in Tables 7 through 9 may not accurately reflect the underlying 
effect. Unfortunately, there were several issues present in the primary studies which may impact 
the confidence that one can have in these results. For instance, many of the primary studies did 
not clearly report important details such as variable definitions (e.g., Langbert & Fox, 2013; 
Saunders, 2007; Tang, Tang, & Tang, 1996), sample size (i.e., Huang & Chen, 2013; Tang et al., 
1996), years included (e.g., Pati & Lee, 2016; Tang et al., 2000), or the effect size metric (i.e., 
O'Connell, 2005). This lack of clarity makes it difficult to be sure that the results of this 
systematic review are an accurate depiction of the actual relations of interest. Furthermore, many 
of the studies included data that was more than 10 years old (e.g., Ehrenberg et al., 2001; 
Langbert, 2006; Sorokina, 2003). It is possible that the strength of the relations of interest have 
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changed over time. Thus, future studies should be sure to clearly and accurately report their 
methodology and results as well as use more up-to-date data.  
Potentially the most problematic limitation of this systematic review is that it could not 
shed light on questions about which there was limited or no data. For example, this study only 
examined the relation between university president compensation and university performance, 
non-performance institutional characteristics, and university president personal characteristics. 
Yet, it is possible that the relation between university performance and university president 
compensation is different depending on the component of compensation (e.g., merit increases, 
bonuses, deferred compensation) examined. It was also not possible to determine if university 
president compensation affects these variables (i.e., university president compensation and 
university performance, non-performance institutional characteristics, and university president 
personal characteristics) in the future. Only three of the studies included in the review (Hunt et 
al., 2019; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014; Tang et al., 2004) included university president 
compensation as a predictor and, besides university president compensation, these studies 
contained only one overlapping variable – university size. To have a good understanding of the 
justification of the high compensation paid to university presidents, it is also useful to know if 
high rates of compensation lead to future performance increases, not just whether they are based 
on prior performance. Therefore, future studies should explore these additional open questions to 
continue to shed light on this controversy. 
Conclusion 
The goal of Study 1 of this dissertation was to conduct a systematic review of primary 
studies that have explored variables related to university president compensation. Such a review 
should help to shed light on the applicability of three major theories from the for-profit executive 
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compensation literature – agency theory, managerialism, and human capital theory – to the 
nonprofit educational context. A total of 22 studies were identified through the literature search. 
A synthesis of the results of these studies indicated that some of the predictions of agency theory, 
managerialism, and human capital theory are applicable and supported. Specifically, university 
performance, non-performance institutional characteristics, and university president personal 
characteristics were each related to university president compensation. An analysis of the 
dimensions of each of these variables suggests that university reputation had a larger impact on 
university president compensation than the other university performance metrics; university size 
had the strongest and most consistent relation with university president compensation compared 
to other non-performance institutional characteristics; and, whether or not the president has prior 
experience as a president at another institution had a more consistent relation with university 
president compensation than other president personal characteristics. However, there are still 
several open questions that could not be addressed by this review. Study 2 of this dissertation 
attempts to examine a subset of these open questions, as well as address methodological 
limitations encountered in the systematic review.  
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CHAPTER 3 
A Nuanced Examination of the Relation between University Performance and University 
President Compensation 
University president compensation has become an increasingly controversial topic over 
the past several years (Dillon, 2004; Sonnenberg, 2017; Stripling & Fuller, 2011; Svluga, 2018). 
In fact, despite the increasing costs of attending university and the rising levels of student loan 
debt, university president compensation has continued to rise steadily (Svluga, 2018). In 2015, 
there were 58 university presidents paid over $1 million, 19 more than the previous year 
(Bauman, Davis, & O'Leary, 2018; Sonnenberg, 2017; Svluga, 2018). Although there continue to 
be questions surrounding whether or not university presidents should receive such high levels of 
compensation when costs for students continues to increase, many suggest that these high levels 
of compensation are necessary to attract the best candidates and justifiable because of the 
extensive requirements of the job and to incentivize future performance (e.g., Cotton, 2012; 
Roediger, 2005). To explore these arguments, several researchers have examined variables that 
are theoretically related to university president compensation (Bai, 2014; Hunt et al., 2019; 
Parsons & Reitenga, 2014).  
In the previous chapter (Chapter 2), I briefly reviewed both the university president 
compensation literature and the broader executive compensation literature (see Tables 1 and 2). 
The review indicated that university performance, university size and complexity, and university 
president personal characteristics have all been examined as determinants of university president 
compensation. Therefore, the goal of Study 1 (discussed in Chapter 2) was to conduct a 
systematic review to determine what relation, if any, these three sets of variables have with 
university president compensation. In doing so, I also reviewed the theories relevant to each of 
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these sets of relations. Specifically, I reviewed agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) to address the theoretical association between university performance and 
university president compensation. I also discussed managerialism (e.g., Aoki, 1984; Herman, 
1981) and human capital theory (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962) in order to examine why 
university size and complexity may influence president compensation. Lastly, I reviewed the 
predictions of human capital theory (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962) regarding the 
association between university president characteristics and president compensation.  
Based on my review of the literature on university president compensation, the broader 
executive compensation literature, and the aforementioned theories, I proposed several 
hypotheses and research questions to answer in the systematic review. However, although the 
review shed light on the current state of the literature, the examination was not without 
limitations. For instance, the quality and accuracy of a systematic review is limited by the 
individual studies included in it (Borenstein et al., 2009). If the data included in the individual 
studies is outdated, or their quality is poor, the results from a systematic review may not 
accurately reflect the underlying effect. Therefore, the first part of the two-part study discussed 
in this chapter (Chapter 3) will review the hypotheses and research questions from Chapter 2 and 
attempt to replicate the findings with more current data.  
An additional limitation of systematic reviews is that they can only answer questions for 
which sufficient primary study data exists. For example, if the primary studies only examined 
relations between university performance and university president total compensation, it would 
not be possible to examine the relation between university performance and the various 
components of total compensation (e.g., merit increases, bonuses, deferred compensation). 
Likewise, if primary studies only examined the relation between university performance and 
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future university president compensation, a systematic review would not be able to shed light on 
the relation between president compensation and future university performance. In my review of 
the university president compensation literature, I identified several gaps (including the two 
examples mentioned above [components of compensation, relation between compensation and 
future performance]) that have not been explored in a sufficient number of primary studies, and 
thus, could not be addressed in the systematic review. Therefore, the second part of this two-part 
study will review these gaps and attempt to fill them.  
Part I: Replication 
 Part I of this chapter provides a replication of Study 1 (Chapter 2). Therefore, Part I 
addresses one of the research questions posed in the problem statement (see Chapter 1): 
Research question 1: What impact, if any, does university performance have on 
university president compensation? 
Part II: Addressing Identified Gaps 
Part II of this chapter discusses and addresses gaps I identified in the university president 
compensation literature, as well as in the broader executive compensation literature. Thus, results 
of this study will answer the following research questions posed in the problem statement (see 
Chapter 1):  
Research question 2a: Does the relation between university performance and university 
president compensation differ depending upon which component of compensation is 
measured? 
Research question 2b: Is there a reciprocal relation between university president 
compensation and university performance? 
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Research question 2c: How does the link between university performance and university 
president compensation change over time? 
Research question 2d: Is the relationship between university performance and university 
president compensation linear? 
In addressing these questions, this study contributes to both the university president 
compensation literature and the broader executive compensation literature in general. 
Specifically, this study provides a more nuanced examination of the relation between university 
performance and university president compensation by breaking compensation into its various 
components (e.g., merit increase, bonus, deferred compensation) as well as examining reciprocal 
and nonlinear relations. This study may, therefore, help to provide evidence to address the 
ongoing controversy surrounding the increasing levels of compensation among university 
presidents and provide guidance to those who set, and regulate, university president 
compensation. 
Part I: Replication 
As discussed above, Part I of this study is a replication of Study 1 (from Chapter 2). As 
such, the theoretical framework to set up the following hypotheses and research questions is only 
briefly reviewed below. Please see Chapter 2 for a more comprehensive explanation of the 
hypotheses and research questions. The hypotheses and research questions are organized below 
by the specific determinant that they address (i.e., university performance, non-performance 
institutional characteristics, university president personal characteristics). 
University Performance 
 Organizational performance has been identified as a key determinant of executive 
compensation in the private sector (Tosi et al., 2000). Several studies, reviewed in Chapter 2 
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(e.g., Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Cheng, 2014; Ehrenberg et al., 2001; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014; 
Saunders, 2007), have also examined the relation between university performance and university 
president compensation; however, the findings have been mixed. Many of the currently existing 
studies on this relation in university settings have been atheoretical (e.g., Ehrenberg et al., 2001; 
Monks, 2007). That being said, the majority of those that have relied on theory have invoked 
agency theory in their theoretical grounding (e.g., Cheng, 2014; He & Callahan, 2017; Langbert, 
2006; Pati & Lee, 2016), which supposes a positive effect of performance on subsequent 
compensation. To attempt the replicate the findings in Chapter 2, I test the following, 
Hypothesis 1: University performance will be positively related to president 
compensation. 
In my review of the current literature on the relation between university performance and 
university president compensation, I also noted research questions. First, although agency theory 
suggests that there may be differences between public and private universities, only three studies 
have provided a direct comparison of the relation between university performance and president 
compensation in public versus private universities (Huang & Chen, 2013; Monks, 2007; Parsons 
& Reitenga, 2014). Therefore, I examine the following, 
Research question 1: Are there differences in the strength of the relation between private 
universities and public universities?  
In addition, although there are reasons to believe that different measures of performance 
are more strongly or weakly tied to university president compensation, based on the general state 
of the literature, it is difficult to determine where these differences are. Therefore, I also aimed to 
explore in Chapter 2 the relative influence of various performance dimensions on president 
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compensation, as well as if these findings are stable across both public and private universities. 
Stated formally, 
Research question 2(a): What is the relative influence of the seven different performance 
dimensions on executive compensation? (b) Is the pattern of strength of these relations 
different between public universities and private universities? 
University Non-Performance Institutional Characteristics 
 Chapter 2 also reviewed the relation between various non-performance institutional 
characteristics (including university size and complexity) and university president compensation. 
As discussed, the managerialist perspective (e.g., Aoki, 1984; Herman, 1981), human capital 
theory (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962), and evidence from the broader literature of executive 
compensation (Tosi et al., 2000), suggest a positive association between university 
size/complexity and university president compensation. In addition, evidence from the broader 
executive compensation literature suggests that size and complexity have a greater influence on 
executive compensation than does organizational performance (Tosi et al., 2000). To attempt to 
replicate the findings in Chapter 2, I test the following, 
Hypothesis 2(a): Non-performance institutional characteristics related to university 
size/complexity will have a positive relation with university president compensation; and, 
(b): university size and complexity will account for more variance in university president 
compensation than university performance.  
 Although the managerialist perspective (e.g., Aoki, 1984; Herman, 1981) and human 
capital theory (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962) suggest that there is a positive association 
between university size as well as complexity and president compensation, there is no consistent 
theoretical reasoning to suggest a relation between other non-performance institutional 
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characteristics (e.g., religious affiliation, geographic location) and president compensation. 
However, it is possible that these characteristics influence compensation. Therefore, I examine 
the following research question, 
Research question 3: Is there a relation between other non-performance institutional 
characteristics and university president compensation? 
In addition, as previously mentioned, there may be differences between public and 
private universities; however, only three studies have provided a direct comparison of the 
relation between university performance and president compensation in public versus private 
universities (Huang & Chen, 2013; Monks, 2007; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014). Thus, it is difficult 
to determine what differences may exist between public and private universities. Therefore, I 
ask, 
Research question 4: Are there differences in the strength of the relation between non-
performance institutional characteristic dimensions (including university size/complexity) 
among private universities and public universities?  
Although evidence suggests that organizational size and complexity have a strong 
association with executive compensation, it is not currently known which of these characteristics 
has the greater impact on university president compensation, or whether there is a difference 
between public and private universities.  
Research question 5(a): What is the relative influence of the university size and 
complexity dimensions on president compensation? (b): Is the pattern of strength of these 
relations different between public universities and private universities? 
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University President Personal Characteristics 
 Human capital theory (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962) suggests a relation between 
some personal characteristics (e.g., tenure) and compensation. In the context of universities, 
there is some evidence to support this idea. Specifically, positive associations between personal 
characteristics, including gender, reputation, tenure, and alumni status, and university president 
compensation have been observed in primary studies (e.g., Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Sorokina, 
2003). However, these effects were not found in every primary study (e.g., Banker et al., 2009; 
Cheng, 2014). To replicate findings from Chapter 2, I test, 
Hypothesis 3: University president personal characteristics will be positively related to 
university president compensation. 
In addition to this hypothesis, several research questions related to the personal 
characteristics of university presidents were posed in Chapter 2. First, there is evidence from the 
broader executive compensation literature (Tosi et al., 2000) that size is the strongest predictor of 
executive compensation and that organizational performance only accounts for about 5% of the 
variance in executive compensation. However, though it is unlikely that personal characteristics 
account for more variance than university size/complexity, it is possible that these characteristics 
have a greater effect on university compensation than university performance. Therefore, I 
examine the following, 
Research question 6: How well do university president personal characteristics predict 
university president compensation in comparison to university performance and 
university size and complexity? 
Second, as with university performance and non-performance characteristics, potential 
differences in the strength of the association between university president personal 
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characteristics and university president compensation were also examined in Chapter 2. In an 
attempt to replicate the findings from Chapter 2, I address the following, 
Research question 7: Are there differences in the strength of the relation between 
president personal characteristics and university president compensation among private 
universities and public universities?  
Third, though university president personal characteristics may be related to university 
president compensation, there are multiple dimensions of personal characteristics (i.e., 
demographics, professional experience, tenure/length of experience, other [see Table 5]). There 
may be differences in the relative influence of each of these dimensions on compensation. 
Further, the relative influence of each of these dimensions on university president may be 
different in public and private universities. Therefore, I examine the following question, 
Research question 8(a): What is the relative influence of the four different personal 
characteristics dimensions on executive compensation? (b): Is the pattern of strength of 
these relations different between public universities and private universities? 
Part II: Addressing Identified Gaps 
Although the results from the systematic review and the replication in Part I of this study 
can inform our understanding of how university president compensation is determined (e.g., 
through university performance, university non-performance institutional characteristics, and 
president personal characteristics), there are several questions that these results cannot answer. 
As previously mentioned, one limitation of the review provided in Chapter 2 is that when there is 
insufficient number of primary studies that have addressed a particular relation of interest, that 
relation cannot be evaluated. My review of the university president compensation literature 
highlighted that there are several open questions that could not be examined in a systematic 
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review. Therefore, in this part of the study, I will review a subset of these identified gaps (i.e., 
gaps pertaining to the relation between university performance and university president 
compensation), review several theories that may help to shed light on these open questions, and 
empirically test several hypotheses pertaining to these gaps.  
Identified Gaps 
First, although there are several different components of university president (and 
executive) compensation (e.g., base salary, bonus, deferred compensation, benefits), the majority 
of primary studies on the topic of university president compensation focused on salary or total 
compensation (e.g., Cheng, 2014; Galle & Walker, 2014; He & Callahan, 2017; Huang & Chen, 
2013). Thus, despite important and well-established theoretical differences between the 
components of compensation, we have no knowledge of how the relations between the 
aforementioned predictors and the individual components of compensation may differ. This is 
also the case in the broader executive compensation literature. For instance, only total 
compensation, total cash compensation, or salary (which are all highly correlated) were included 
in the meta-analysis that assessed the relation between organizational size, organizational 
performance, and executive compensation (Tosi et al., 2000). Thus, even in the broader 
executive compensation literature, we know little about the differences in the relation between 
performance and the various aspects of performance.  
Second, existing primary studies have failed to integrate findings and theories across 
literature areas examining the relations between pay and performance as well as performance and 
pay. Specifically, only three of the studies on university president compensation included in the 
systematic review provided an assessment of the influence of university president on university 
performance (Hunt et al., 2019; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014; Tang et al., 2004). Consequently, 
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although theory supports both sets of relations (i.e., performance has an impact on compensation; 
compensation influences performance), little is known about the potential reciprocal effects. The 
most recent narrative review of the executive compensation literature highlighted that this gap 
also exists in the broader executive compensation literature (Devers et al., 2007).  
Third, the studies examining the relation between university president compensation and 
university performance have lacked nuance in their assumptions about the potential nature of this 
relation. For instance, all of the existing studies have assumed that the relation between 
university performance and university president compensation is linear. However, there is theory 
to support nonlinear relations between these variables. In fact, there is some evidence from the 
executive compensation literature that supports this view (e.g., Kuo, Lin, Lien, Wang, & Yeh, 
2014). Thus, it is important to explore the possibility of nonlinear relations in the nonprofit 
educational context.  
Lastly, none of the existing primary studies proposed and tested how the relation between 
university performance and university president compensation changes over time. Yet, 
depending on the theory utilized, the magnitude of these relations may vary over time. For 
example, agency theory suggests that the relation between university performance and university 
president compensation should remain stable over time (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
managerialist perspective, however, suggests that the relation between performance and 
compensation may weaken over time (e.g., Aoki, 1984; Herman, 1981).  
 Each of these gaps highlights that even if we have a consistent estimate of the linear 
relation between compensation and performance, there are many nuances about the relation that 
are not yet understood. This is problematic for several reasons. First, without a complete 
understanding of the nature of the relation between these two variables, we cannot be confident 
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that our assessment of the link between university performance and university president 
compensation, including the different components of compensation, is accurate (e.g., 
performance may appear to be weakly linked to total compensation, but may have a strong 
relation to bonuses). If this is the case, we may make suggestions about compensation policy that 
could be misleading.  
Second, if university president compensation seems to have no relation with subsequent 
university performance, then it could be argued that tying performance to compensation is not an 
effective way to continually align interests and thus also incentivize future performance. Agency 
theory suggests that using incentives will help to align the interests of the university president to 
those of the Board, which should ultimately benefit university performance. If providing 
monetary incentives has no effect on future performance, however, this practice would result in 
wasted financial resources. Third, if the relation between university performance and subsequent 
university president compensation are not linear, it may be beneficial to know the inflection 
point(s). Fourth, understanding if and how the relation between these two variables changes over 
time may be valuable. For example, if the relation between university performance and 
university president compensation tends to weaken over time, Boards, and those individuals who 
appoint Board members, can take steps to prevent this from occurring. Because compensation is 
an essential part of an organization’s overall human resource management strategy (Kepes, 
Delery, & Gupta, 2009), it is important to have a solid understanding of the potentially complex 
nature of the relation between performance and compensation. 
Gap 1: The Effect of University Performance on the Various Components of Compensation 
 The majority of studies that explored the relation between organizational performance 
and executive compensation operationalized compensation as either total compensation, total 
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cash compensation or salary (Tosi et al., 2000). In the context of universities, compensation is 
typically defined as either salary, salary and benefits, total cash compensation, or total 
compensation. In fact, Table 10 shows that, of the 22 studies reviewed in the previous chapter, 
10 operationalized compensation as president’s salary, four studies as salary plus benefits, five as 
total cash compensation, and nine as total compensation. 
Although two studies that operationalized compensation as salary and benefits also 
measured salary individually (i.e., Banker et al., 2009; O'Connell, 2005) and two studies 
separated total cash compensation from benefits (i.e., Tang et al., 2000, 2004), none of these 
studies made a distinction between salary and bonuses. Furthermore, only two studies specified 
that long-term, or deferred compensation, was included as a component of total cash 
compensation or total compensation (i.e., Parsons & Reitenga, 2014; Pati & Lee, 2016) and 
neither of these studies directly compared the effects of salary, bonuses, and deferred 
compensation. This is problematic as it presupposes that there are no meaningful differences 
between the distinct components of compensation. However, there likely are important 
differences. It is possible or even likely that performance is more or less related to each 
individual component of compensation.  
 The components of compensation. Prior to discussing the potential explanations for why 
performance may be differentially tied to the various components of compensation, it is 
necessary to define each component and highlight its particular characteristics. Base pay is a 
form of fixed compensation that is usually set based on a combination of human capital 
considerations (e.g., knowledge, experience) and benchmarking (Murphy, 1999). Changes in 
base pay can occur for a variety of reasons, one of which is the previous year’s performance. The 
portion of the change in base salary that is due to performance is typically termed a merit 
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increase, or merit pay (e.g., Park & Sturman, 2016). Merit raises are usually provided in the form 
of percentages of base salary (Murphy, 1999). Such raises have features of both fixed and 
variable compensation in that they must be re-earned every year, but once they are earned, they 
are added into the permanent base salary10 (Park & Sturman, 2016). Because these increases 
become permanent (i.e., incorporated into base pay), they result in permanently higher total labor 
costs for the organization (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Nyberg, Pieper, & Trevor, 2016). For 
instance, a 5% raise awarded on a base pay of $80,000 is $4,000, resulting in a new base pay of 
$84,000. If the individual receives another 5% raise the following year, the raise would be 
$4,200, and the new base pay would be $88,200. The subsequent year, with the same 5% raise, 
base compensation would be $92,610. Thus, in just these three years, the costs of compensating 
this one employee increased by $12,610. One can easily see how quickly these costs can add up 
over time, especially if the employee stops performing at a high enough level to justify the new 
high base pay. Thus, from the organization’s perspective, merit increases are not necessarily a 
desirable form of compensation. This explains why merit raises (at least in the U. S.) are only 
about 3%, on average (Miller, 2018).  
 Bonuses are similar to merit increases in that they are typically awarded because of 
performance; however, unlike merit increases, bonuses are not added into permanent base salary 
(Park & Sturman, 2016; Sturman & Short, 2000). Therefore, bonuses do not permanently 
increase the organization’s total cost of compensating labor (Kahn & Sherer, 1990). Consider the 
aforementioned example of the 5% merit raises. If over the course of the three years described, 
5% bonuses were awarded instead of 5% merit raises, the organization would save $12,810 
($264,810 minus $252,000) in labor costs just from that one employee. However, because 
 
10 This explains why it is more appropriate to measure the effect of performance on base pay by examining changes 
in base pay.  
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bonuses must be re-earned every year, they are strictly a form of variable compensation (Park & 
Sturman, 2016), and thus, are riskier than merit increases for employees, including university 
presidents and other executives. 
Deferred compensation may also be considered a form of variable compensation; 
however, unlike bonuses, deferred compensation is not awarded immediately (Park & Sturman, 
2016)11. Rather, receiving deferred compensation requires university presidents not only to 
perform well, but also to remain with the university for a specified amount of time (Eaton & 
Rosen, 1983; Park & Sturman, 2016). Stated differently, when deferred compensation is 
awarded, it is added into a pool of compensation that can be received at a later date, based on the 
agreed upon terms (e.g., after a specified number of years, after leaving the position). Therefore, 
similar to bonuses, this type of compensation is also risky for university presidents. Base pay 
(including the proportion of base pay resulting from merit increases), bonuses, and deferred 
compensation are all components of total cash compensation. 
  Benefits are not a form of cash compensation. Instead, benefits include health insurance, 
retirement contributions, housing, vehicles, etc. (Bai, 2014; Murphy, 1999). Benefits are 
typically associated with a particular position, irrespective of performance. This may explain 
why many of the primary studies that assessed the relation between university performance and 
university president compensation separated benefits from other forms of compensation (e.g., 
Bai, 2014; Banker et al., 2009; Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Ehrenberg et al., 2001; Tang et al., 
2000). The sum of cash compensation and benefits is termed total compensation. To understand 
why each of these specific components of compensation may be differentially related to 
 
11 Merit increases are also not awarded immediately as they are spread across a year’s paycheck. However, once 
awarded, individuals do start receiving rewards immediately. Thus, deferred compensation is still unique in regards 
to the timeframe associated with actually receiving the award after it is granted.  
102 
 
performance, it is first helpful to consider why any component of compensation would be 
performance-related. A thorough review of agency theory is provided in Chapter 2; however, I 
provide a brief review here to remind the reader.  
 Agency theory. Agency theory is the most frequently cited theory to explain the relation 
between performance and compensation in the context of executive compensation and is also 
frequently cited in studies assessing the relation between performance and compensation in 
academic settings (e.g., Banker et al., 2009; Devers et al., 2007; Tang et al., 2000; Tosi et al., 
2000). Agency theory is relevant in organizations where the individuals in charge of running the 
organization are not the owners of the organization, as is the case in universities (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Specifically, although university presidents are charged with 
running universities, they are not inherently accountable for all decisions they make. Stated 
differently, the decisions presidents make may affect the university’s financial situation, 
university employees’ salaries, student outcomes, etc., but, in the absence of any monitoring, 
control, or reward system, their decisions do not necessarily directly impact the financial 
situation of the university presidents themselves. Therefore, university presidents may be less 
motivated to exert effort toward ensuring the long-term success of the university. This represents 
the classic agency problem that occurs because principals (owners or key stakeholders) and 
agents (those to whom work has been delegated) may have conflicting goals resulting from the 
desire to maximize ones’ outcomes (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Another 
defining feature of the agency problem is the existence of information asymmetry between the 
principals and agents (Eisenhardt, 1989). Meaning, agents have access to information that the 
principals do not have access to, and thus, principals cannot verify what agents are doing or the 
effects of these actions. In the case of universities, university presidents have more access to 
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information (e.g., university performance metrics, financial situation, progress on strategic 
initiatives) than Boards do by the very nature of their position as the president.  
There are two general ways to manage the agency problem – monitoring and incentives 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Although monitoring can be an effective way to manage the agency problem, 
it is unlikely to be effective in the university context. As discussed in Chapter 2, task 
programmability for university presidents is low as the proper actions are not always known. 
This makes monitoring less effective because Boards will not know what actions and behaviors 
to monitor. In addition, Board members generally do not have a background in higher education. 
Thus, they may not have the necessary expertise to effectively monitor university presidents. 
Therefore, incentives are theoretically more appropriate in university settings. Using incentives 
allows principals to bring the goals of the agents into alignment with their own goals (Dalton et 
al., 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, by choosing appropriate 
incentives, principals may bring agents’ goals in-line with their own goals (i.e., the high 
performance of the university; Dalton et al., 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
This, then, should encourage agents to act in the best interest of the organization, rather than just 
in their own interest. Stated differently, by tying university president compensation to university 
performance, Boards are hoping that university presidents will exert more effort in the service of 
the university to, ultimately, increase university performance. 
There is one additional consideration from agency theory relevant to this discussion- the 
concept of financial risk. Agency theory predicts that principals and agents may be comfortable 
with different levels of risk, and therefore, may prefer that president compensation be more, or 
less strongly, tied to performance (Dalton et al., 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Shapiro, 2005). The general assumption is that agents are risk-averse (i.e., they prefer their 
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compensation to be less strongly tied to performance and thus more stable) because they are not 
able to spread out their risk as they are only working for one organization (Dalton et al., 2007; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). Stated differently, because agents theoretically only have one major source of 
income, they prefer that income to be stable, rather than variable. This suggests that university 
presidents will prefer compensation that is less risky. This is important for Boards to consider 
because presidents may engage in undesirable behaviors to mitigate the increased risk resulting 
from tying compensation to performance (Shapiro, 2005; Zhang et al., 2008). Thus, Boards are 
likely to use both fixed and variable forms of compensation to balance the amount of financial 
risk that university presidents may incur.  
 Taken together, agency theory suggests that because university presidents do not directly 
benefit from, and, conversely, are not directly harmed by, the performance of the university, they 
may make decisions that are not in the best interest of the university and its stakeholders (e.g., 
students and faculty; Dalton et al., 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shapiro, 
2005). According to agency theory, making compensation dependent on the performance of the 
university may help to alleviate this problem and encourage university presidents to act in the 
best interest of the university and its stakeholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, if enhancing 
university performance is the ultimate goal of this practice (i.e., tying university president 
compensation to university performance), Boards must also consider other potential 
consequences of this practice that may not have a positive effect on university performance 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Zhang et al., 2008). Specifically, Boards must balance the desire to motivate 
university presidents with the potential negative effects of making presidents’ compensation 
riskier and increasing labors costs to the university such that its financial performance is 
ultimately harmed.  
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 Differential relations between university performance and the components of 
compensation. As previously mentioned, benefits include health insurance, housing, vehicles, 
etc. (Bai, 2014; Murphy, 1999). These are typically considered to be fixed forms of 
compensation (Murphy, 1999). In fact, employers are required by law to provide some benefits 
(i.e., health insurance; "Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act", 2010). Thus, it is unlikely 
that university performance is related to changes in benefits. Although previous research found 
that university performance is related to president benefits (e.g., Tang et al., 2000), this study 
used cross-sectional data, and thus, did not test if changes in performance are tied to changes in 
benefits. Rather, Tang et al. (2000) found that benefits were related to variables such as 
expenditures, whether the university was a research or doctoral school, the university’s 
reputation, and the cost of tuition. It makes sense that larger, more complex universities, with 
good reputations would have more resources, and thus would be able to offer their presidents 
better benefits packages (e.g., better life insurance plans); yet, according to theory, it is still 
unlikely that university performance is tied to university president benefits12.  
 Agency theory suggests that components of cash compensation (i.e., merit pay, bonuses, 
and deferred compensation) will be tied to university performance (Eisenhardt, 1989), but it is 
possible that this occurs to differing degrees. For instance, university performance is expected to 
have a positive, but modest effect on merit pay. As previously mentioned, the defining feature of 
merit pay is that raises from one year are added automatically into base pay (Nyberg et al., 
2016). Therefore, although new raises can be earned each year, it is not necessary for university 
presidents to maintain high levels of university performance to continue reaping rewards 
 
12 Note that no formal hypothesis is made because the data necessary to test this idea (i.e., the cost of benefits 
provided to the president at each university) is not available to the author. Due to the unavailability of this data, and 
because a nil effect is predicted, benefits will not be included in further discussions in this paper.  
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resulting from one year’s performance in subsequent years; thus, this practice would not 
effectively align the interests of university presidents and Boards over time. Furthermore, 
because any pay raises are added to base pay, merit pay results in higher total expenditures for 
the university over the long-term, which may harm overall university financial performance 
(Kahn & Sherer, 1990; Nyberg et al., 2016). Given that Boards “bear ultimate legal 
responsibility for … monitoring the institution’s fiscal welfare” (Association of Governing 
Boards of Universities and Colleges, 2015, p. 3), providing large merit increases, which can 
ultimately harm the financial performance of the university, is unlikely to be desirable. This 
suggests that performance is unlikely to be a strong predictor of merit pay, as this practice would 
not effectively and efficiently mitigate agency problems.  
 Bonuses, however, unlike merit pay, do not result in permanent increases to base pay 
(Nyberg et al., 2016; Park & Sturman, 2016). Rather, bonuses are paid in lump sums and must be 
re-earned each year. Therefore, using bonuses requires that performance be high every year 
(Nyberg et al., 2016; Park & Sturman, 2016). Thus, bonuses more effectively align the interests 
of university presidents and university Boards than does merit pay. Furthermore, because 
bonuses do not get added to base pay, providing bonuses is a more cost-effective practice than 
using merit pay (Kahn & Sherer, 1990; Park & Sturman, 2016; Sturman & Short, 2000). 
Therefore, bonuses are also an efficient way to mitigate agency problems. This suggests that 
performance will have a stronger effect on subsequent bonuses than on other forms of 
compensation. 
It is difficult to determine whether deferred compensation will be more effective at 
aligning the interests of university presidents and Boards than either merit pay or bonuses. 
Although being awarded deferred compensation only requires high performance in one year, 
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actually receiving the awarded deferred compensation requires some degree of continued 
alignment of the interests of university presidents and Boards for a number of subsequent years 
to prevent termination and thus the loss of the deferred compensation (Park & Sturman, 2016). 
Stated differently, if receiving the deferred compensation is contingent upon staying with the 
university for a specified number of years, a university president may only be motivated to 
expend enough effort to not be fired, resulting in minimal interest alignment. Yet, even if 
alignment is minimal, deferred compensation is still expected to be awarded based on university 
performance, as Boards are unlikely to encourage poorly performing university presidents to 
remain with the university. Furthermore, providing deferred compensation may be more 
desirable from the Board’s perspective because, as it is not paid out immediately and is not 
added into a president’s base salary. Therefore, it may be more cost-effective over the long-term 
than providing merit increases.  
Taken together, the preceding arguments can be used to make two formal hypotheses and 
pose one research question,  
Hypothesis 1: University performance will have a positive effect on future (a) merit pay, 
(b) bonuses, and (c) deferred compensation. 
Hypothesis 2: University performance will have a greater effect on future bonuses than it 
does on merit pay. 
Research question 1: How does the effect of university performance on deferred 
compensation compare to its effect on bonuses and merit pay? 
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Gap 2: The Reciprocal Relation Between University Performance and University President 
Compensation 
 The relation between compensation and subsequent performance. The previous 
section (and all of Chapter 2) focused on the relation between university performance and 
subsequent university president compensation as this is the most commonly studied ordering of 
these variables in the executive compensation literature, including the university president 
compensation literature. However, there is also theory (e.g., expectancy theory; Vroom, 1964) to 
support a relation between compensation and subsequent university performance. Stated 
differently, depending on the theory utilized (i.e., agency or expectancy theory), the causal 
ordering of these variables is different. Despite this, the relation between compensation and 
subsequent performance is rarely tested, particularly in the context of university president 
compensation. 
For instance, concerning the studies reviewed in Chapter 2, only three included an 
examination of the influence of compensation on future performance (Hunt et al., 2019; Parsons 
& Reitenga, 2014; Tang et al., 2004). Hunt et al. (2019) only examined the effect of university 
president compensation on one aspect of future performance – financial performance 
(specifically, fundraising) and this effect was not statistically significant. Although Parsons and 
Reitenga (2014) did find statistically significant relations between compensation and some 
performance measures (e.g., university reputation and resources), they measured compensation 
as the residual in the equation using university selectivity (defined as average SAT scores) and 
complexity (defined as enrollment and Carnegie classification) as predictors of compensation 
rather than examining distinct effects of each component of compensation on future 
performance. As discussed in the previous section, there are differences among these 
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components of compensation, and thus, differing effects of each component on subsequent 
university performance should be expected. Furthermore, Parsons and Reitenga (2014) did not 
compare the strength of the impact of compensation on future performance to that of 
performance on future compensation. Therefore, not only is there still insufficient evidence that 
compensation influences future performance in the context of universities, we also do not 
understand the potential reciprocal effects that exist between these two variables in the context of 
universities.  
The most recent narrative review of the executive compensation literature (i.e., Devers et 
al., 2007) pointed out that these issues also exist in the broader executive compensation 
literature. Specifically, Devers et al. (2007, p. 1024) note, “little attention has been paid to the 
complexities inherent in determining the nonrecursive effects that are likely to occur in the pay-
performance-pay arena […] Furthermore, work comparing and contrasting the effects of variable 
ordering is virtually nonexistent”. The authors suggest that this lack of integration exists because 
the theories used to support each relation (i.e., the executive compensation–organizational 
performance relation and the organizational performance–executive compensation relation) are 
incompatible. However, this is not necessarily accurate.  
Agency theory suggests that university president compensation should be tied to 
university performance to reduce the likelihood that the presidents will shirk their duties or 
pursue goals that are not aligned with the goals of the university Board (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). The implicit assumption is that this practice will lead to future high 
performance. If this were not the case, there would be no reason to tie compensation to 
performance. Yet, agency theory does not describe exactly how or why this would occur. To 
understand why aligning compensation with performance may be an effective practice, one can 
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turn to more traditional motivational theories (e.g., expectancy theory; Vroom, 1964) that are 
typically used to support a relation between compensation and subsequent performance. 
Combining these two theories is in line with the work of other compensation researchers (Banks, 
Woznyj, Kepes, Batchelor, & McDaniel, 2018; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992). 
Expectancy theory. Expectancy theory was developed to explain how individuals make 
choices about which behaviors to engage in based upon the anticipated outcome of each behavior 
(Chiang & Jang, 2008; Vroom, 1964). Thus, it is compatible with agency theory because, at its 
core, agency theory is concerned with getting agents to engage in behaviors that principals want 
them to engage in, rather than behaviors that the agent wants to engage in (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Expectancy theory provides a description of the conditions that 
influence the choices that agents make (Vroom, 1964). Therefore, principals can rely on 
expectancy theory to inform policies aimed at increasing the likelihood that agents engaged in 
behaviors desired by principals. Stated differently, whereas agency theory explains why a 
performance-based pay policy may be necessary, expectancy theory explains how such a policy 
should be implemented to be effective.  
In expectancy theory, Vroom (1964) proposed that each potential task an individual may 
engage in is associated with a motivational force equal to the product of three distinct 
perceptions (i.e., expectancy, instrumentality, and valence). Expectancy perceptions refer to the 
extent to which individuals feel that their effort can lead to performance. Instrumentality 
perceptions denote the extent to which individuals believe that performance can lead to outcomes 
(e.g., rewards). Lastly, the value that individuals place upon these outcomes is termed valence 
(Bartol & Locke, 2000; Vroom, 1964). Because these perceptions are theorized to combine in a 
multiplicative manner, if any one is weak, the motivational force associated with the given task 
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will also be weak. It is not likely that an individual will choose to engage in the task with a weak 
motivational force; instead the individual is likely to engage in some other task that is associated 
with a stronger motivational force. In the context of a university, this means that if, for example, 
the motivational force associated with playing golf is stronger than the motivational force 
associated with contacting potential financial donors, a university president is more likely to play 
golf.  
The practice of compensating a university president for university performance affects 
instrumentality and valence perceptions. Specifically, if a president’s employment contract states 
that rewards will be provided if performance reaches a particular threshold, that president is 
likely to believe that if he or she reaches the specified performance threshold, the associated 
rewards will be provided. Similarly, if a president discerns a past pattern of the Board providing 
a reward for a particular level of performance, that president is also likely to believe that similar 
high performance will yield similar rewards in the future. Stated differently, the university 
president will have high instrumentality perceptions. Thus, over time, the practice of rewarding 
high levels of performance should strengthen university presidents’ instrumentality perceptions. 
Furthermore, if the rewards are large enough, they will be perceived as valuable (i.e., have a 
strong valence). The combination of strong instrumentality and valence perceptions should, 
theoretically, result in a strong motivational force. Therefore, the motivational force to exert 
effort and display behaviors aimed at improving university performance should be stronger than 
that of behaviors that are unlikely to result in higher university performance (as they are not 
being rewarded). This will lead university presidents to engage in these performance-related 
behaviors more frequently, which, ultimately, should have a positive effect on subsequent 
university performance. Stated formally,  
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Hypothesis 3: University president compensation will have a positive effect on future 
university performance.  
 Differential relations between components of compensation and subsequent 
performance. To determine how effectively each component of university president 
compensation may motivate individuals to increase future performance, one must consider how 
each component may differentially affect valence perceptions. All else constant, one may expect 
merit pay to have greater valence than the valence associated with any other component of 
compensation (Nyberg et al., 2016). As demonstrated previously, over time, one year’s merit pay 
represents a larger sum of money than a bonus or deferred compensation of the same amount 
because each new merit increase becomes permanent. From this perspective, a $4,000 merit 
increase should lead to a larger increase in subsequent performance than a $4,000 bonus or 
$4,000 in deferred compensation. Furthermore, considering that part of the attraction of deferred 
compensation is that at least a portion of this pay can be realized when the awarded individual is 
in a lower tax bracket (Eaton & Rosen, 1983), $4,000 in deferred compensation is likely be end 
up being a larger reward than a $4,000 bonus awarded immediately because taxes are deducted 
from it at a lower rate. Taken together, these considerations suggest that changes to base pay will 
result in the highest levels of future performance, followed by deferred compensation, and then 
bonuses. Stated formally,  
Hypothesis 4a: Merit pay will have the largest effect on future performance. 
Hypothesis 4b: Deferred compensation will have a moderate effect on future 
performance (as compared to merit pay and bonuses).  
Hypothesis 4c. Bonuses will have the weakest effect on future performance.  
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However, Nyberg et al. (2016) highlighted that factors besides the amount of money that 
merit pay represents over time should be considered when making predictions regarding the 
effect of various components of compensation on subsequent performance. For instance, 
individuals’ choices are affected by various psychological factors (e.g., Kahneman, 2011; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In addition to the objective amount of a financial reward, valence 
is also affected by the reward’s salience. From this perspective, one would expect bonuses to 
have the largest valence, and thus, the strongest relation with future performance (Nyberg et al., 
2016). Whereas a $4,000 bonus would be received in one lump sum payment, changes to base 
pay are spread out over every paycheck. Thus, a $4,000 increase to base pay would only translate 
to a raise of $153.85 per paycheck (assuming payments are issued bi-weekly). Further, 
considering that deferred compensation is by its very nature not received immediately, presidents 
would not actually receive any of the awarded deferred compensation until a later date. 
Therefore, considering psychological factors, such as a reward’s salience, suggests that bonuses 
will have the strongest effect on future performance, followed by changes to base pay, and then 
changes in deferred compensation (Nyberg et al., 2016).  
This is consistent with predictions based on the concept of net present value (Gallo, 
2014). Specifically, to determine the value of a reward, one must consider not only the objective 
financial value of the reward, but also what an individual may do with the reward once it is 
received. If an individual invests the received reward, the value of that reward should also take 
into account the potential return on that investment. From this perspective, bonuses are expected 
to have a stronger valence than both merit pay and deferred compensation, as an individual 
receiving a bonus can invest it immediately. 
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This consideration yields different hypotheses than the rationale that assumes individuals 
act in an economically rational manner. To determine which rationale is more accurate, I propose 
the following competing hypotheses. Note that this approach is consistent with the strong 
inference approach devised by (Platt, 1964). 
Hypothesis 5a: Bonuses will have the largest effect on future performance. 
Hypothesis 5b: Merit pay will have a moderate effect on future performance (as 
compared to bonuses and deferred compensation).  
Hypothesis 5c. Deferred compensation will have the weakest effect on future 
performance.  
 Reciprocal relations between university performance and university president 
compensation over time. Given that agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) suggests a 
relation between university performance and university president compensation, and expectancy 
theory (Vroom, 1964) suggests a relation between university president compensation and 
university performance, it is important to consider the reciprocal nature of these variables. In 
order to do this, one must examine how the relations between these two variables evolve over 
time.  
Research question 2: Does the strength of the relations between university president 
compensation and university performance change over time? If so, do they become 
weaker over time or stronger? 
Gap 3: Curvilinear Relations Between University Performance and University President 
Compensation 
 The majority of studies that assess the relation between organizational performance and 
future executive compensation assume that the relation between these two variables is linear. For 
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instance, the largest meta-analysis on executive compensation that is frequently cited as evidence 
that organizational size has a stronger effect on executive compensation than organizational 
performance makes no mention of potential nonlinearities (Tosi et al., 2000). Furthermore, 
Devers et al. (2007) only discuss linear relations between organizational performance and future 
executive compensation. The situation is similar in the context of universities. Specifically, all 22 
studies reviewed in Chapter 2 (see Table 7 for a list of these studies) restricted their analyses of 
the association between university performance and university president compensation to linear 
relations. If only linear associations are examined, the relation between organizational 
performance and executive compensation (or university performance and university president 
compensation) may be underestimated if it is, in fact, nonlinear.  
 There are several reasons to believe that the relation between organizational performance 
and organizational president compensation is nonlinear. For instance, agency theory highlights 
that agents are risk averse (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This risk aversion 
should be taken into account when devising incentive plans, as agents may engage in undesirable 
behaviors to mitigate their risk (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Zhang et al., 2008). 
In the context of universities, one potential way to do this is to provide some compensation 
increase regardless of the level of university performance (e.g., by providing cost of living 
adjustments, seniority-based pay raises).  
Besides decreasing the risk exposure of presidents, there are other reasons to believe that 
at least some increase in compensation will be provided regardless of the level of performance. 
For instance, considering that university performance is not completely under the control of a 
university president, presidents may view receiving a small or no raise as inequitable. This would 
be particularly problematic because equity theory suggests that compensating a university 
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president in an inequitable manner will lead these presidents to withdraw effort in the future, 
which would ultimately harm university performance (Adams, 1965). Given that agency theory 
suggests making compensation commensurate with performance to encourage agents to engage 
in desirable behaviors (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), it would be 
counterproductive to provide compensation commensurate with poor performance (i.e., little or 
no compensation increase) as this would cause presidents to reduce effort in the future. 
Therefore, considering the risk involved in providing no compensation increase, it can be 
expected that, even when performance is below the desired goal or target, at least some baseline 
compensation increase will still be provided. Figure 2 provides a graphic depiction of this. Below 
the performance threshold, a non-zero reward is still provided; however, this reward is not 
reflective of university performance. Therefore, until the performance threshold is met, the 
reward is stable (i.e., is does not increase as poor performance becomes slightly less poor). 
Stated differently, before the performance threshold, the correlation between performance and 
compensation rewards is predicted to be zero.  
Once performance rises above the threshold, however, agency theory suggests that the 
best way to align the interests of the university president and the Board is to tie compensation to 
actual university performance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This is represented 
by the first inflection point in Figure 2. This first bend represents the point at which 
compensation (i.e., merit increases, bonuses, deferred compensation) is provided to reward 
performance, and therefore, incentivize future performance. The area between this first inflection 
point and the second inflection point (discussed next) is termed the “incentive zone” (Murphy, 
1999, p. 11, see also Indjejikian & Nanda, 2002). This is the area in which incremental 
improvements in performance are rewarded with incremental increases in rewards (i.e., merit 
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increases, bonuses, deferred compensation; Indjejikian & Nanda, 2002; Murphy, 1999). Thus, in 
the incentive zone, the correlation between university performance and compensation rewards is 
predicted to be non-zero. 
It is also reasonable to assume that at very high levels of performance, the link between 
university performance and compensation will decrease in strength. This is due to the fact that it 
would not be as cost efficient to continue to compensate university presidents at increasingly 
high levels, even if performance is high (Brown, Sturman, & Simmering, 2003). Here, it is also 
useful to consider the relation between pay and future performance. Specifically, although this 
relation is not frequently examined in the executive compensation literature, there is evidence 
from the employee (non-executive) compensation literature that suggests that the incentive effect 
of compensation diminishes at high levels of compensation. For instance, both cardinal utility 
theory (Eaton & Rosen, 1983; Larrick, 1993) and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) 
suggest that exceedingly high levels of pay will have “decreasing marginal returns” (Mitra, 
Jenkins, Gupta, & Shaw, 2015, p. 154). This means that, at very high levels of compensation, the 
compensation–performance relation is likely to be weaker than at moderate levels of 
compensation. For instance, a 5% increase in compensation may be expected to result in a 5% 
increase in future performance. However, a 100% increase in compensation is likely to result in a 
less than 100% increase in future performance. Based on this reasoning, universities may set a 
maximum reward at a point where the anticipated effect on future performance is not expected to 
be high enough to warrant additional investment in the form of higher rewards. This is 
represented by the second inflection point in Figure 2. Specifically, this second bend shows that, 
after a certain performance threshold, the maximum reward (i.e., merit increase, bonus, deferred 
compensation) will be provided. Above this level of performance, no additional rewards will be 
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awarded. Stated differently, once the maximum financial reward is provided, the relation 
between university performance and compensation rewards is predicted to be zero.  
Taken together, agency theory can be used to suggest that the relation between 
organizational performance and executive compensation would look more similar to the solid 
line with the two inflection points depicted in Figure 2 than to the dashed line that most studies 
assume. It is informative to note that the solid line in Figure 2 is similar to the line in the figure 
depicting target “incentive zones” provided and discussed by Murphy (1999) and adapted by 
Indjejikian and Nanda (2002). An adapted version of these figures (i.e. with transposed axes) is 
displayed as Figure 3. This figure was developed based on survey results that indicated that 
organizations’ executive bonus plans do not award performance bonuses below a certain 
performance threshold (Indjejikian & Nanda, 2002; Murphy, 1999). Above this performance 
threshold, bonuses are based on performance until a pre-determined cap is reached. Thus, above 
a certain level of performance bonuses compensation will not continue to increase in size 
(Indjejikian & Nanda, 2002; Murphy, 1999).  
Although neither of these articles discussed why this may occur theoretically, they 
provided initial empirical evidence that such a relation may exist, at least for bonuses. However, 
there is no reason to believe that this type of relation would not apply to other components of 
compensation as well. Specifically, changes in base pay and deferred compensation may also be 
used to align the interests of university presidents and Boards; thus, the same theoretical should 
arguments are likely to apply. Taken together, based on the empirical evidence and the 
theoretical arguments discussed above, I propose that the relation between university 
performance and university president compensation is nonlinear. Stated formally,  
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Hypothesis 6: The relation between university performance and future university 
president compensation (as measured using merit pay, bonuses, and deferred 
compensation) is nonlinear. 
Method 
Sample  
The sample of public and private nonprofit university presidents used in this study was 
derived from the executive compensation database populated by the Chronicle of Higher 
Education (CHE) (Bauman et al., 2018; The Chronicle of Higher Education, 2018a, 2018b). 
Individuals who served as a university president for the same university across the 2013 – 2015 
years were included in this study. A total of 438 university presidents fit this criterion. Of these 
438, 25 individuals were the heads of university systems (e.g., Texas State University System, 
Montana State University System). University performance data are not provided at the system 
level; therefore, these 25 individuals were removed from the dataset. Individuals who were 
presidents of specific universities within these systems were included in the dataset assuming 
they held that position between 2013 and 2015. An additional 10 individuals were removed from 
the sample because they received zero total compensation in either 2013, 2014, and/or 2015. 
This resulted in a total of 403 university presidents. Of the 403 university presidents in the 
analysis, 290 (72%) were from private universities, whereas 113 (28%) were from public 
universities. 
Measures 
Because the goal of Part I of this study was to replicate the results in Study 1, it includes 
more measures, and different specific operationalizations of these measures, than Part II. 
Therefore, the measures used in in each part will be described separately. However, all measures 
used in either Part I or Part II of this study are defined in Table 11.   
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Part I.  
University president compensation. In Part I of this study, university president 
compensation was operationalized as total compensation, which includes all compensation 
received by the university president in a given year. As deferred compensation, set aside, and 
employer retirement contributions are not received by a president at the time they are awarded, 
these types of compensation were not included in total compensation (Bauman et al., 2018). All 
data pertaining to the compensation of the university presidents in this sample were obtained 
through the CHE (Bauman et al., 2018; The Chronicle of Higher Education, 2018a, 2018b). The 
CHE gathers compensation data from private colleges and universities using the Internal 
Revenue Service’s Form 990 (Bauman et al., 2018). This form is required by the IRS for most 
nonprofit institutions, including most nonprofit private universities. Public universities are not 
required to file the IRS’ form 990, therefore, the CHE gathers compensation data via surveys 
(Bauman et al., 2018). 
University performance. University performance was defined in nine different ways, 
with at least one operationalization per university performance dimension. The specific metrics 
were informed by theory, research, and the results of Study 1. Endowment and fundraising-
related variables were the most frequently examined variables in the studies included in the 
systematic review; therefore, the two university financial performance metrics used in this study 
are endowment per full-time equivalent (FTE) student and fundraising. Fundraising was defined 
as a university’s reported gifts.  
Graduation rate, although only measured in three of the studies included in the systematic 
review, appeared to have a larger impact on university president compensation than the other 
operationalizations of academic and research performance. Therefore, graduation rate, defined 
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as the percentage of a cohort that graduates within 150% of the normal time (Ginder, Kelly-Reid, 
& Mann, 2018), was used as one measure of academic and research performance. The 
percentage of students in a cohort that default on certain Federal loans within three years of 
entering repayment, termed three-year cohort default rate (U. S. Department of Education, 2018) 
was also used as a metric of academic and research performance. This measure has not been 
examined in prior studies; however, given that part of the controversy surrounding university 
president compensation is that it continues to rise despite increasing student loan debt, it is 
possible that university Boards are beginning to take students’ ability to repay their loans into 
account when determining university president compensation. Three-year default rate can be 
considered a measure of academic and research performance because students’ ability to repay 
their loans is likely, in part, tied to the value of their education and degree. This metric was 
reversed scored in the analyses.  
Of the various academic and research quality measures used in previous studies, student-
to-faculty ratio, defined as total FTE students divided by total FTE faculty (Ginder et al., 2018), 
seemed to have the largest impact on university president compensation. Therefore, student-to-
faculty ratio was used as the measure of academic and research quality in this study. Regarding 
the faculty quality dimensions, each of the measures used in previous studies involved faculty 
salary, therefore, in this study, average full-time faculty salary is used. University ranking was 
the most common measure of university reputation used in prior studies and is, therefore, used in 
this study as well. University ranking was coded as 0 = unranked, 1 = ranked.  
Regarding the selectivity dimension, two metrics, acceptance rate and average SAT 
score, were used as these were the two mostly commonly used measures of selectivity in prior 
studies. Acceptance rate is defined as the number of admitted students divided by the number of 
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applicants (Ginder et al., 2018). Because lower acceptance rates are indicative of higher 
selectivity, this variable was reverse scored. Average SAT score was measured using the average 
SAT equivalent score (i.e., it includes converted ACT scores as well as SAT scores) for all 
students admitted to a university (Ginder et al., 2018).  
The data for endowment per FTE, graduation rate, student-to-faculty ratio, and 
acceptance rate were obtained through the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System 
(IPEDS) (National Center for Education Statistics, 2018). The IPEDS database is maintained by 
the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), which is part of the Institute of Education 
Sciences (IES) and the U. S. Department of Education (Ginder et al., 2018). All colleges and 
universities that apply for, or receive, federal funding under Title IV of the Higher Education Act 
of 1965 are required to complete to the IPEDS surveys ("Higher Education Amendments Act of 
1992", 1992). The three-year cohort default rate, average faculty salary, and average SAT score 
were acquired through the College Scorecard database (U. S. Department of Education, 2018). 
This database is maintained by the U. S. Department of Education and includes data collected 
through IPEDS as well as data from the National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS) and the 
U.S. Department of Treasury. Lastly, university ranking data was obtained from U. S. News and 
World Report (USNWR; Morse, 2017) via The Washington Post (Anderson, 2015), which 
publishes university rankings over time as determined by USNWR.  
 Non-performance institutional characteristics. There were a total of four non-
performance institutional characteristics used in this study. Enrollment, defined as the 
university’s FTE enrolled students, was used as it was the most frequently used metric of 
university size in previous studies. Carnegie classification was a commonly used measure of 
university complexity in prior studies and is a normatively accepted way to categorize 
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universities based on the types of degrees they issue and the amount of research they produce 
(The Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education, n.d.) and was, therefore, used 
to measure university complexity. A university’s Carnegie classification was coded as 0 = 
Baccalaureate/Associate’s universities or Associate’s colleges, 1 = Baccalaureate university, 2 = 
Master’s university, 3 = Doctoral/Professional university, 4 = Doctoral university – High 
research activity, and 5 = Doctoral university – Very high research activity. It was also important 
to include a measure of institutional ownership (coded as private = 1; public = 0) and whether the 
university was religiously oriented (religious = 1, non-religious = 0) as there is evidence that 
both of these variables have a significant impact on university president compensation. Data 
pertaining to enrollment, Carnegie classification, and religious orientation was collected through 
the IPEDS database (National Center for Education Statistics, 2018), whereas data necessary for 
the public/private university variable was obtained through the CHE’s executive compensation 
database (Bauman et al., 2017; The Chronicle of Higher Education, 2018a, 2018b).  
 University president personal characteristics. Four university president personal 
characteristics were used in this study. Gender was the most frequently examined demographic 
variable in previous studies. In this study, gender was coded as 1 = female and 0 = male. A 
university president’s tenure in their current position (measured in months) was used to assess 
the impact of tenure-related variables on university president compensation. Two professional 
experience variables were used – a dummy code indicating if the university president has a Ph.D. 
or equivalent degree (Ph.D. holder = 1, no Ph.D. = 0) and a dummy code indicating if a 
university president had prior presidential experience at another university (prior presidency = 1, 
no prior presidency = 0). Prior presidential experience was included because it was identified in 
the systematic review as a consistent predictor of university president compensation. Although 
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only one prior study included a measure of whether or not the university president held a Ph.D., 
this variable could be related to university president compensation, as a Ph.D. is the highest 
degree that one can earn.  
 Data on the tenure of university presidents was obtained through the CHE’s executive 
compensation dataset (Bauman et al., 2017; The Chronicle of Higher Education, 2018a, 2018b) 
and, when the information was unavailable from the CHE, though web searches (e.g., university 
websites, university presidents’ LinkedIn profiles). The remaining data (i.e., gender, Ph.D. 
holder, prior presidency) was obtained through web searches.  
 Control variables. Two additional variables were used as control variables. The non-
compete enforceability index of the state in which a university resides was obtained and updated 
using methodology from Garmaise (2011)13. This variable captures how legally enforceable a 
non-compete agreement is by state. Non-compete agreements reduce the likelihood that an 
individual will leave an organization (Garmaise, 2011). In this context, highly enforceable non-
compete agreements make it less likely that university presidents will leave their current 
organization and go to another university than non-compete agreements that are not as easily 
enforceable. This could be related to university president compensation in one of two ways. On 
the one hand, it is possible that Boards will pay university presidents less when they reside in a 
state where non-compete agreements are highly enforceable because the Board is less worried 
that the president will leave. This notion has received support from the for-profit literature 
(Garmaise, 2011). On the other hand, because highly enforceable non-compete agreements add 
significant risk to a university president (i.e., he/she has less of an opportunity to move to 
another university), a university Board may feel inclined to pay their president more highly in 
 
13 Special thanks to Dr. Joseph Coombs for providing the non-compete enforceability index data.  
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exchange for the president’s willingness to sign the non-compete. This would be supported by 
social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). Given how this variable 
could relate to university president compensation, it is important to account for its potential 
influence.  
 A measure of university density was also included as a control variable. This variable is a 
count of how many colleges and universities are in a university’s metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA). The number of universities in a university’s MSA may be related to university president 
compensation for two reasons. First, if there are a large number of universities in a given area, 
there are many potential job opportunities for potential university presidents; therefore, to attract 
high performing university presidents and incentivize them to stay with their current university, 
Boards may pay presidents more. This notion has been supported in the for-profit literature 
(Wheaton & Lewis, 2002). A large number of universities in a university’s MSA may also be a 
general indicator of how populous an area is, which could reflect the cost of living in an area and 
how many other non-university employment opportunities exist, both of which could influence 
the level of compensation paid to university presidents.  
Part II.  
 University president compensation. In Part II of this study, the following dimensions and 
forms of university president compensation were measured, and separately assessed, depending 
on the specific hypothesis: change in total compensation, merit pay, bonus pay, or deferred 
compensation, set aside. Each of the respective measures were obtained through the CHE or 
derived using information provided by the CHE. Specifically, change in total compensation was 
defined as the difference between current year’s total compensation and previous year’s total 
compensation. Merit pay was operationalized as the difference between current year’s base 
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salary and previous year’s base salary14. Bonus pay included all bonuses and incentives received 
by a university president in a given year. Lastly, deferred compensation, set aside was all 
compensation that was set aside in a given year to be paid out to university presidents in a future 
year. 
 To calculate change in total compensation and merit pay, it was necessary to obtain 
compensation data from the CHE for 2012 in addition to the data from 2013 to 2015. Because 
this study included individuals who were present at their university from 2013 to 2015, there 
were some instances where change in total compensation and merit pay for 2012 to 2013 could 
not be calculated. Information about these individuals’ change in total compensation and merit 
pay for the 2013 to 2014 time period was still included in the analysis.  
 Change in total compensation, merit pay, bonus pay, and deferred compensation were 
each operationalized as their respective raw numbers (e.g., merit increase of $4,000) and relative 
numbers compared to base pay (e.g., merit increase of 5% of base pay) or, in the case of total 
compensation, to prior total compensation (e.g., 5% increase in total compensation compared to 
prior year’s total compensation). There is evidence to suggest that the relative increases in 
compensation may have a stronger impact on performance outcomes than absolute increases 
(Mitra, Tenhiälä, & Shaw, 2016). For instance, a $4,000 merit increase on a base pay of $60,000 
represents a 6.66% raise; whereas a $4,000 merit increase on a base pay of $100,000 only 
represents a 4.00% raise. Research regarding the smallest noticeable pay increases conducted by 
Mitra et al. (2016) found that individuals’ behavioral intentions (to, for example, increase 
performance) are not positively impacted until raises rise above a certain threshold (4.2% for    
 
14 It is important to note that base salary is not necessarily comparable between public and private universities. Base 
salary for public universities includes compensation provided by private university foundations; base salary for 
private universities includes sick pay and employee contributions to 401(k) and/or 403(b) plans (Bauman et al., 
2018). 
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U. S. samples). Thus, whereas a $4,000 merit increase should motivate individuals with a base 
pay of $60,000 to increase their level of performance, the same result would not be expected for 
individuals that receive a $4,000 merit increase and have a base pay of $100,000. Stated 
differently, the same absolute raise can have differing effects on performance outcomes 
depending on how that raise compares to current base pay. 
 University performance. For Part II of this study, university performance was defined as 
change in endowment. Change in endowment was chosen for several reasons. Boards cite that 
the three most significant challenges faced by universities are their financial stability, the net 
tuition for students, and the decrease in state and federal funding (Association of Governing 
Boards of Universities and Colleges & Gallup, 2018). Having large endowments can help with 
each of these issues. In fact, large endowments allow universities to subsidize the education of 
students directly by providing financial aid using endowment funds and indirectly by relying less 
on tuition revenue and more on endowment funds to cover university expenses (Association of 
Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, 2019; Baum & Lee, 2018). Therefore, 
endowments are a very important metric of university performance. In addition, university 
presidents, as the primary fundraisers and financial managers of universities (Cote, 1985), can 
have a substantial impact on the size of a university’s endowments. Taken together, it is 
reasonable to expect that Boards would emphasize university endowments when considering the 
compensation of university presidents and that university presidents would likewise emphasize 
increasing the size of university endowments.  
 To calculate change in endowment, it was necessary to obtain data from 2012 and 2016 
as well as from 2013 to 2015. Because of this study focused on individuals who were at the same 
university from 2013 to 2015, it is possible that some university presidents were not employed 
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by their respective university in 2012 or 2016. However, it is likely that any performance 
increases from 2012 to 2013 would factor into future compensation decisions. It is also likely 
that any policies, initiatives, or changes university presidents make will still have an effect on the 
university’s performance one year after that president leaves the university. This is discussed 
more in the analytical approach section.  
 Control variables. Based on the results of Part I, five control variables were chosen to be 
included in all analyses relevant to Part II of this study. Specifically, change in FTE enrollment, 
non-compete enforceability, university density, and dummy codes indicating whether the 
university was private or public and religious or non-religious were used in Part II. These 
measures were defined and coded the same was as in Part I, except that change in FTE 
enrollment was used rather than total FTE enrollment.  
Analytical Approach 
 Part I. Past studies on the relation between university performance and university 
president compensation have used a variety of different statistical methods including ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression (e.g., He & Callahan, 2017; Langbert & Fox, 2013; Monks, 2007; 
Pati & Lee, 2016), random-effects regression (Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005), fixed-effects 
regression (Bai, 2014), and the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel model (Cheng, 2014). Although 
OLS regression without cluster-robust standard errors has been used most frequently and is 
easiest to specify, its use in longitudinal studies is problematic, as several important assumptions 
would be violated. However, because most of the previous studies did use OLS regression 
without cluster-robust standard errors, the hypotheses from Part I of this study, which focuses on 
replication, were tested twice – once using the OLS framework without cluster-robust standard 
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errors and once using random coefficient modeling (RCM), which accounts for clustering and 
both fixed and random effects15.  
 For the OLS analyses, total compensation at Time 2 was regressed on all university 
performance measures, non-performance institutional characteristics, university president 
personal characteristics, and control variables measured at Time 1. To determine which set of 
variables accounts for the most variance in total compensation, three separate analyses were 
conducted where each category of variables was entered into the analysis in the second step. This 
allows one to compare each category’s relative R2 change when accounting for the remaining 
variables. Outliers were identified by considering z-scores and Mahalanobis distances. 
Observations with z-scores over 3.0 or statistically significant Mahalanobis distances were 
considered outliers for purposes of these analyses. All analyses were conducted including and 
excluding outliers. Because differences between public and private universities are of interest in 
this study, all analyses, including the outlier analyses, were performed using the full sample, only 
public universities, and only private universities. Furthermore, all of these analyses were 
replicated using Time 3 compensation regressed on all of the university performance measures, 
non-performance institutional characteristics, university president personal characteristics, and 
control variables measured at Time 2. If these results are similar to the previous time-period’s, 
then one can have more confidence in the initial results. Conversely, if the Time 1 to Time 2 
results are not replicated at Time 2 to Time 3, then one should be more skeptical that the initial 
observations are reflective of true underlying effects. All OLS analyses were conducted in SPSS 
v.25 (IBM Corp., Released 2017).  
 
15 Alternatively, rather than using RCM, one could also calculate cluster-robust standard errors for the OLS analyses 
to address the non-independence problems associated with combining data across years (Wooldridge, 2013).  
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 Using the RCM approach, total compensation at Time 2 was regressed on the relevant 
Time 1 variables and total compensation at Time 3 was regressed on the relevant Time 2 
variables simultaneously. All RCM analyses were conducted using R version 3.5.0 and R Studio 
version 1.2.1335 (R Studio, 2019) with the multilevel and nlme packages (Bliese, 2016; Pinheiro, 
Bates, DebRoy, Sakar, & R Core Team, 2019). To determine which set of variables accounts for 
the most variance in total compensation, the marginal R-square and 95% confidence intervals for 
each variable were calculated using the r2glmm package (Jaegar, 2017; Johnson, 2014; 
Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013). Outliers were identified as cases for which the normalized 
residuals were greater than two standard deviations outside of the normal distribution (Pinheiro 
et al., 2019). All analyses were conducted separately for public and private universities and 
including and excluding outliers. 
 Part II. All analyses for Part II were conducted using RCM. For Hypotheses 1, 2, and 
Research questions 1 and 2, there was a one-year lag between university performance and future 
university president compensation. For Hypotheses 3, 4, 5, 6 and Research question 2, there was 
a two-year lag between university president compensation and future university performance. 
This longer lag was used to allow for some time for any changes made by a university president 
to take effect. Outliers were identified in the same manner as in Part I. All analyses were 
conducted with and without outliers; however, as differences between public and private 
universities were not the primary interest in Part II, analyses were only conducted using the full 
sample of universities, rather than separately for public and private universities. Also, because 
the relative impact of each predictor was not the primary interest for Part II, R2 values and 
confidence intervals are not shown.  
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Results 
Part I: Replication  
 Sample descriptives. As previously mentioned, there were a total of 403 university 
presidents included in the sample - 290 (72.0%) from private universities and 113 (28.0%) from 
public universities. The majority of the university presidents were males (325, 80.6%) and 232 
(71.4%) of these men worked at private universities. There were also 78 female university 
presidents (19.4% of the total sample), most of whom worked for private universities (58; 
74.4%). As anticipated, roughly three-quarters (304; 75.4%) of the university presidents held a 
Ph.D., or equivalent degree (212 [69.7%] at private universities and 92 [30.3%] at public 
universities). Only 58 (14.4%) of the university presidents had been president at another college 
or university prior to their current position. Of the 290 private university presidents, 43 (14.8%) 
had a prior presidency; 15 (13.3%) of the 113 public university presidents had a prior presidency. 
The mean tenure at Time 1 was 88.38 months (SD = 72.57). Only university presidents 
who were president at their university for all three timepoints of interest were included in the 
dataset, therefore, the mean tenure at Time 2 was 12 months more than at Time 1, and the mean 
tenure at Time 3 was 12 months after that. Presidents from private universities had significantly 
longer tenure (M = 96.07, SD = 77.01) than presidents from public universities [(M = 68.64, SD 
= 55.26), t(283) = 3.982, p < .001]. Levene’s test indicated unequal variance (F = 10.28, p = 
.001), so the degrees of freedom were adjusted from 401 to 283.  
The mean total compensation for university presidents in 2013 was $488,590.04 (SD = 
$374,624.88). The mean compensation increased in 2014 (M = $527,082.24, SD = 470,629.13) 
and again in 2015 (M = $569,813.67, SD = $472,982.11). In 2013, private university presidents 
received significantly more total compensation (M = $516,790.14, SD = $427,791.13) than 
public university presidents [(M = $416,218.10, SD = $155,471.89), t(400) = 3.46, p = 001]. 
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Levene’s test indicated unequal variance (F = 14.21, p < .001), so the degrees of freedom were 
adjusted from 401 to 400. This difference between public and private universities persisted in 
2014 and 2015. Total compensation across all three years was highly skewed; thus, the natural 
log of the variable was used in all subsequent analyses. 
University performance.  
Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 predicted that university performance would be positively 
related to university president compensation. Table 12 presents the correlation matrix for the full 
sample of universities. An examination of this table provides initial support for this hypothesis. 
Specifically, almost all the university performance variables included in the analyses had a 
positive and statistically significant relation with university performance across all timepoints. 
There was, however, one exception. Student-to-faculty ratio had a negative association with 
university president compensation that was statistically significant considering student-to-faculty 
ratio at Time 1 to university president compensation at Time 2 (r = -.108, p < .05), but was not 
statistically significant between student-to-faculty ratio at Time 2 and university president 
compensation at Time 3 (r = .077, ns). It is important to note though that, generally, lower 
student-to-faculty ratios are desirable and, thus, indicative of higher performance. Stated 
differently, the statistically significant negative correlation between student-to-faculty ratio 
(Time 1) and university president compensation (Time 2) provides evidence for a positive 
relation between university performance and university president compensation. Taken together, 
the correlational evidence suggests that Hypothesis 1 is supported.  
As mentioned in the Method section, this hypothesis was also tested using two 
regression-based approaches - OLS and RCM. The benefit of these approaches over just 
examining the correlations is that they can determine if the effect of university performance on 
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compensation is positive and significant when accounting for the effects of other variables of 
interest. Considering the OLS approach first, Table 13, Panel A provides the standardized 
regression coefficients (beta weights) for the model that includes all predictors in this study (i.e., 
university performance, non-performance university characteristics, university president personal 
characteristics, and control variables) in one step. The relevant beta weights for full sample from 
Time 1 to Time 2 are shown in Column 2, whereas the beta weights for the Time 2 to Time 3 
predictions are shown in Column 5. Looking first at Column 2, one can see that only three 
university performance variables had a statistically significant effect on university president 
compensation – graduation rate (β = -.238, p = .032), average faculty salary (β = .196, p = .044), 
and average SAT score (β = .252, p = .021). Interestingly, graduation rate had a negative effect 
on university president compensation, suggesting that universities where students are less likely 
to graduate have more highly paid presidents. These results indicate that, when controlling for 
the other variables of interest, there is little evidence that university performance positively 
affects university president compensation, which is in contrast with the correlational results. 
Turning to Column 5, it can be seen that the results from Time 2 to Time 3 are not consistent 
with the results from Time 1 to Time 2. Specifically, in Column 5, only endowment per FTE has 
a statistically significant impact on university compensation (β = .186, p = .028). Graduation 
rate, average faculty salary, and average SAT score are not statistically significant in Column 5 
and endowment per FTE is not statistically significant in Column 2. This further suggests that 
university performance has little, if any, consistent influence on university president 
compensation. While these results indicate that Hypothesis 1 may be largely unsupported, it is 
possible that they were influenced by the presence of outliers.  
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Table 13, Panel B displays the standardized regression coefficients for the model that 
includes all predictors in this study in one step, excluding outliers. The results in Table 13, Panel 
B, Column 2 are fairly consistent with the results in Table 13, Panel A, Column 2. Graduation 
rate (β = -.256, p = .008), average faculty salary (β = .218, p = .007), and average SAT score (β = 
.364, p < .001) each remained statistically significant predictors of university president 
compensation once outliers were removed. In addition, after the removal of outliers, university 
ranking also became statistically significant (β = .147, p = .032). The results of the Time 2 to 
Time 3 analysis with outliers removed, shown in Table 13, Panel B, Column 5, are inconsistent 
with those shown in Table 13, Panel A, Column 5. Specifically, once outliers were removed, 
endowment per FTE was not statistically significant (β = .132, p = .080), but average faculty 
salary (β = .194, p = .014) and average SAT score (β = .195, p = .029) were.  
Taken together, these results suggest that average faculty salary and average SAT score 
are the only two university performance variables that have a consistent, statistically significant, 
positive impact on university president compensation. The remaining university performance 
variables have inconsistent or insignificant effects on university president compensation. The 
impact of average faculty salary and average SAT score as compared to the other university 
performance variables is also supported by the correlational findings as average faculty salary 
and average SAT score had the two strongest sets of relations with university president 
compensation. Thus, these analyses suggest limited support for Hypothesis 1.  
The RCM results both before and after outlier removal are shown in Table 14, Panels A 
and B, Columns 2 and 3. As can be seen, these results do not completely replicate the results 
from the OLS analyses. Specifically, before outlier removal, only one university performance 
variable had a statistically significant effect on university president compensation – endowment 
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per FTE (b = .116, SE = .034, p < .01). After outlier removal, endowment per FTE (b = .134, SE 
= .031, p < .01) and average faculty salary (b < .001, SE < .001, p < .05) both have a statistically 
significant impact on university president compensation; however, the estimate for average 
faculty salary is virtually zero (i.e., < .001). Thus, from a practical standpoint, it does not appear 
to impact compensation. Taken together, these results do suggest a reliable effect of endowment 
per FTE on compensation, yet the remaining university performance variables do not appear to 
have any significant relation with future compensation. Therefore, although the specific variables 
that are shown to influence compensation are not consistent between the OLS and RCM 
analyses, the conclusion that Hypothesis 1 has limited support is consistent.  
Research question 1. Research question 1 asked if there are differences in the strength of 
the relation between university performance and university president compensation between 
public and private universities. Table 15 displays the correlation matrix, as well as the means and 
standard deviations, for public and private universities separately. The correlations for private 
universities are below the diagonal and the ones for public universities are above the diagonal. 
Considering private universities first, the results appear to be fairly consistent with the results for 
the full sample. Specifically, all the university performance variables, except student-to-faculty 
ratio, had a positive and statistically significant relation with university president compensation. 
As previously stated, the negative association between student-to-faculty ratio and university 
president compensation was expected. The results for public universities are similar, except that 
none of the correlations between student-to-faculty ratio and university president compensation 
were statistically significant. These correlational results suggest that the pattern of relations 
between university performance and university president compensation are similar.  
136 
 
Table 13, Panel A, Column 3 shows the standardized regression coefficients for private 
universities for the Time 1 to Time 2 analysis, whereas Column 6 displays the results from the 
Time 2 to Time 3 analysis. Considering the results in Column 3, there were two variables that 
had a statistically significant effect on university president compensation – graduation rate (β = -
.247, p = .050) and university rank (β = .235, p = .043). However, the results in Column 6 
indicate that only one variable, endowment per FTE (β = .252, p = .042), had a statistically 
significant effect on university president compensation.  
The results of the Time 1 to Time 2 and Time 2 to Time 3 analyses for private 
universities after outlier removal are shown in Table 13, Panel B, Columns 3 and 6, respectively. 
In the Time 1 to Time 2 analysis, graduation rate (β = -.285, p = .004), average faculty salary (β 
= .278, p = .029), university rank (β = .195, p = .029), and average SAT score (β = .195, p = 
.029) all had a statistically significant impact on university president compensation. The results 
of the Time 2 to Time 3 analysis (Table 14, Column 6) indicated that endowment per FTE (β = 
.195, p = .037) and university ranking (β = .249, p = .004) were the only two statistically 
significant variables. Considering the results in Table 13, Panels A and B, suggests that 
university rank has the strongest and most consistent effect on private university president 
compensation.  
The results of the analyses for public universities are displayed in Tables 13, Panel A and 
B, Columns 4 and 7. Table 13, Panel A, Column 4 shows that only three-year default rate had a 
statistically significant impact on university president compensation (β = -.270, p = .050) from 
Time 1 to Time 2. This result was consistent even after outliers were removed (β = -.358, p = 
.014; see Table 13, Panel B, Column 4). The Time 2 to Time 3 results, both including outliers 
(see Table 13, Panel A, Column 7) and excluding identified outliers (see Table 13, Panel B, 
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Column 7) indicated that none of the university performance variables have a statistically 
significant impact on university president compensation.  
Taken together, the results in Table 13, Panels A and B, for only private universities 
(Columns 3 and 6), and only public universities (Columns 4 and 7) show that the majority of 
university performance variables across all of the analyses do not have a positive, statistically 
significant impact on university president compensation. However, it appears that university 
performance has a stronger influence on university president compensation in private universities 
than in public universities. That being said, it is important to note that there are only 98 public 
university presidents including in the analyses; therefore, it is possible that statistically 
significant effects were not observed due to low statistical power.  
The relevant RCM analyses are displayed in Table 14, Panels A and B, Columns 4 and 5 
(private universities) and Columns 6 and 7 (public universities). These results also suggested that 
the relation between university performance and university president compensation is stronger in 
private universities than in public universities. Although endowment per FTE had a statistically 
significant effect on compensation in private universities (before outlier removal: b = .172, SE = 
.057, p < .01; after outlier removal: b = .196, SE = .048, p < .01), no university performance 
variables appeared to have an effect on public university president compensation.  
Research question 2. Research question 2 asked how the different performance 
dimensions varied in their prediction of university president compensation, and if these results 
were consistent between private and public universities. The results from the full sample 
indicated that average faculty salary (a measure of faculty quality) and average SAT score (a 
measure of university selectivity) had the strongest effect on university president compensation 
(see Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 2 and 5). However, there was another measure of 
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selectivity, acceptance rate, that had little impact on university president compensation. 
Therefore, to get a sense of how the various dimensions as a whole predicted university president 
compensation, the average beta weight for each dimension was compared. The results were fairly 
consistent across timepoints and considering the analyses with and without outliers. Specifically, 
faculty quality had the strongest impact on university president compensation, followed by 
selectivity, reputation, and academic and research performance (each with similar average beta 
weights). Financial performance and academic and research quality had the weakest impact on 
university president compensation. All effects were consistently positive, except for the effect of 
academic and research performance, measured by graduation rate and three-year default rate, 
which had a negative influence on university president compensation. According to this result, 
universities where students are less likely to graduate and more likely to default on their student 
loans compensate their presidents more highly. 
For private universities, the strongest predictor was university ranking, which is a 
measure of reputation (see Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns, 3 and 6). The results across 
timepoints and with and without outliers were fairly consistent. Reputation had the strongest 
effect on university president compensation, followed by faculty quality, then financial 
performance. Academic and research performance, academic and research quality, and 
selectivity had relatively weak effects on university president compensation.  
Three-year default rate (a measure of academic and research performance) had the 
strongest and most consistent impact on university president compensation for public universities 
(albeit only for the Time 1 to Time 2 results; see Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 4 and 7). 
However, graduation rate, the other measure of academic and research performance had a small, 
and statistically insignificant influence on compensation. Therefore, when averaging these 
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effects, the influence of the academic and research performance dimension was diminished. In 
fact, the dimension with the highest average beta weight was faculty quality; yet, the measure of 
faculty quality, average faculty salary, did not have a statistically significant effect on university 
president compensation in any of the analyses. Furthermore, considering the average beta 
weights after outlier removal (see Table 13, Panel B, Columns 4 and 7), only faculty quality, 
which was not statistically significant, is above .100, the remaining average beta weights range 
from .081 (selectivity) to .006 (financial performance). This suggests that none of the university 
performance dimensions have much of an effect on university president compensation. However, 
as previously mentioned, this observation may be due to low statistical power.  
Taken together, an examination of the average beta weights for the various dimensions of 
university performance suggests that the different dimensions may have differing impacts on 
university president compensation depending on the sample characteristics.  
The RCM results for the full sample suggested that endowment per FTE, a financial 
performance metric, was the only university performance variable with a statistically significant 
effect on university president compensation. However, the other financial performance metric, 
fundraising, was not statistically significant. That being said, even averaging their respective R2 
values (see Table 14, Panels A and B, Column 3), the financial performance dimension still 
accounts for more variance in university president compensation than the remaining university 
performance dimensions. This finding is consistent for private universities (see Table 14, Panels 
A and B, Column 5). For public universities, none of the university performance variables in any 
dimension had a statistically significant impact on university president compensation (see Table 
14, Panels A and B, Column 7). Therefore, the relative impact of the dimensions is a moot point. 
University non-performance institutional characteristics. 
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Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 stated that non-performance institutional characteristics 
related to university size and complexity will have a positive relation with university president 
compensation. Considering the correlations in Table 12, it appears that both university size 
(measured by FTE enrollment) and university complexity (measured by Carnegie classification) 
had a positive association with university president compensation, with rs ranging from .309 to 
.338 (all p < .001). This provides initial support for the idea that university size and complexity 
have a positive relation with university president compensation. Turning to the regression results 
presented in Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 2 and 5, it appears that university size had a 
consistent, positive, and statistically significant impact on university president compensation, 
whereas university complexity had no statistically significant impact on compensation. It is 
possible that these results are due to the strong correlation between university size (FTE 
enrollment) and university complexity (Carnegie classification), which ranges from r = .835 (p < 
.001) to r = .838 (p < .001). Yet, the statistically significant effect of university size on university 
president compensation suggests support for Hypothesis 2.  
The RCM analyses shown in Table 14, Panels A and B, Column 2 and 3, were consistent 
with the OLS analyses. Specifically, FTE enrollment appeared to have a positive and statistically 
significant effect on university president compensation (before outlier removal: b = .305, SE = 
.066, p < .01; after outlier removal: b = .298, SE = .061, p < .01). Thus, one can have more 
confidence in the OLS results and the conclusion that there is a positive relation between 
university size and complexity and university president performance.  
Hypothesis 2 also stated that university size and complexity would account for more 
variance in university president compensation than did university performance. The correlational 
results were mixed in their support of this notion. Specifically, acceptance rate, average SAT 
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score, average faculty salary, and graduation rate all had mean correlations with university 
president compensation that were stronger than those of FTE enrollment and Carnegie 
classification, whereas, student-to-faculty ratio, three-year default rate, fundraising, and 
endowment per FTE had weaker mean correlations.  
Table 16 presents the results of the R2 change when each category of variables was 
entered into the model at step 2 (i.e., after all of the other predictors were entered in step 1). An 
examination of these results (Table 15, Panels A and B, Columns 2 and 5) indicates that 
university performance consistently accounts for more unique variance in university president 
compensation than does university size and complexity, which suggests that this part of 
Hypothesis 2 is not supported. However, it is important to note that the R2 change between 
university performance and university size and complexity may not be comparable as university 
performance includes nine variables whereas university size and complexity includes only two.  
Therefore, the beta weights were also examined. Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 2 
and 5, suggest that university size has a stronger influence on university president compensation 
than does university performance. Specifically, the beta weights for university size ranged from 
.442 (p < .001) to .604 (p < .001), whereas the largest beta weight across all university 
performance variables for either timepoint, including or excluding outliers, was -.256 (p = .008) 
(see Table 13, Panel B, Column 2). This provides evidence in support of the second part of 
Hypothesis 2; however, considering the R2 change and average beta weights together suggests 
that there is inconclusive evidence to say that this portion of the hypothesis was supported (i.e., 
that non-performance institutional characteristics related to size and complexity would account 
for more variance in university president compensation than does university performance).  
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The RCM analyses, however, do suggest strong support for this notion. In fact, the R2 
value for FTE enrollment (.045 both before and after outlier removal; see Table 14, Panels A and 
B, Column 3) was higher than the largest R2 value for any of the university performance 
variables. Furthermore, even the sum of all of the R2 values for university performance (a total of 
nine variables) was less than the R2 value for FTE enrollment (one variable). Therefore, the RCM 
results support Hypothesis 2.  
Research question 3. Research question 3 asked if there was a relation between other 
non-performance institutional characteristics and university president compensation. There were 
two variables included in the analysis that could fit this description – institutional ownership and 
religious orientation. Table 12 shows that there was no statistically significant relation between 
ownership (private or public) and university president compensation. However, the standardized 
regression coefficients in Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 2 and 5, indicate that whether the 
university is public or private had a significant impact on university president compensation with 
βs ranging from .390 (p < .001) to .774 (p < .001). This is not surprising given that, as previously 
reported in the sample descriptives section, private university presidents receive significantly 
higher compensation than public university presidents. Turning to whether or not the institution 
was religious, the correlations in Table 12 suggest that university presidents at religious 
universities earn significantly less money than presidents at non-religious universities. This was 
also supported by the beta weights in Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 2 and 5, which ranged 
from β = -.170 (p < .001) to β = -.205 (p < .001).  
The RCM results were consistent with the ones from the OLS analyses. The results in 
Table 14, Panels A and B, Column 1 show that both institutional ownership and religious 
orientation had a statistically significant impact on university president compensation. The effect 
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on institutional ownership was positive, meaning that private university presidents received 
higher compensation than public university presidents (before outlier removal: b = .579, SE = 
.127, p < .01; after outlier removal: b = .402, SE = .123, p < .01). Religious orientation, as 
anticipated, had a negative effect, such that university presidents at religious institutions received 
lower compensation than their counterparts at non-religious institutions (before outlier removal: 
b = -.263, SE = .075, p < .01; after outlier removal: b = -.262, SE = .074, p < .01). 
 Research question 4. Research question 4 asked if the relation between non-performance 
institutional characteristics and university president compensation is different among private and 
public universities. The correlational results followed a similar pattern in for private and public 
universities. Both university size and complexity had statistically significant correlations with 
university president compensation in private and public samples (see Table 15). This was also 
supported by the regression coefficients in Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 3 and 6 as well as 
4 and 7. Although there were some instances where the beta weights associated with these 
variables were not statistically significant, these variables did generally appear to influence 
university president compensation. In addition, religious orientation was examined in the private 
university sub-sample; however, as public universities cannot be religiously oriented, the effects 
of religious orientation were very similar to those of the full sample.  
Results of the RCM analyses were consistent with the results of the OLS analyses. Non-
performance institutional characteristics did appear to have a significant influence on university 
president compensation in both private and public institutions. Religious orientation also had a 
negative, statistically significant impact on private university president compensation (see Table 
14, Panels A and B, Columns 4 and 6). Therefore, it appears that non-performance institutional 
characteristics affect private and public universities in much the same way. 
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Research question 5. Research question 5 was aimed at determining whether university 
size or university complexity has a stronger influence on university president compensation, and 
if this effect was the same across public and private universities. As previously stated, in the full 
sample, university size had a statistically significant impact on university president 
compensation, whereas university complexity did not (see Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 2 
and 5). However, this observation could have been due to the high degree of multicollinearity 
between these two variables. In private universities, the effect of university size was positive and 
statistically significant across all timepoints, both including and excluding outliers; however, the 
effect of complexity was negative and only statistically significant at Time 1 after the removal of 
outliers (see Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 3 and 6). This suggests that university size has a 
greater influence on compensation than does complexity. However, an examination of the 
correlations in Table 15 indicates that multicollinearity was also a problem in this sub-sample (rs 
ranging from .784 to .785, ps < .001). Thus, no definitive conclusion can be drawn about the 
relative influence of these variables. Interestingly, in public universities, where there was less 
multicollinearity (although still potentially a problematic amount [rs from .592 to .617, ps < 
.001]), the beta weights for university size and complexity are very similar (university size: βs 
from .292, p = .028, to .387, p = .003; university complexity: βs from .320, p = .016, to .374, p = 
.006). Therefore, it is possible that these two variables have a similar impact on university 
president compensation and that this effect is consistent across private and public universities.  
Results from the RCM analyses were similar to those from the OLS analyses (see Table 
14, Panels A and B). Specifically, for the full sample and the private university sub-sample, 
where multicollinearity was high, university size appeared to have a stronger impact on 
university president compensation than did university complexity. The estimates ranged from 
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.298 to .399, ps < .01 for university size and from -.132 to -.02, ns for university complexity (see 
Table 14, Columns 2 – 5, Panels A and B). For the public university sub-sample, which had less 
multicollinearity, the estimates for university size were similar to but higher than those for 
university complexity (university size bs: .145 [before outlier removal] and .136 [after outlier 
removal], ps < .05; university complexity: .126, p < .01 [before outlier removal] and .100, p < 
.05 [after outlier removal]). Interestingly, for public universities, the R2 values for university 
complexity were actually higher than those for university size (see Table 14, Columns 7, Panels 
A and B). This suggests that, accounting for the other variables in the model, university 
complexity explains more unique variance than does university size.  
Taken together, these results suggest that more research is needed to disentangle the 
differential effects of university size and university complexity on university president 
compensation.  
University president personal characteristics.  
Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 stated that university president personal characteristics would 
be related to university president compensation. There were four such variables examined in this 
study – tenure, whether or not the president held a Ph.D., gender, and prior presidential 
experience. The results in Table 12 do not support Hypothesis 3. In fact, none of these variables 
had a statistically significant association with university president compensation. The regression 
results also provided little support for this hypothesis – statistically significant beta weights were 
only noted at Time 1 after the removal of outliers (tenure: β = .116, p = .003; Ph.D. holder: β = 
.073, p = .048; prior presidency: β = .080, p = .029; see Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 2 
and 5). Given that these effects were not noted at Time 2, it is likely that Hypothesis 3 is 
unsupported.  
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The RCM results were similar. Specifically, the only university president personal 
characteristic that was statistically significant was tenure after outlier removal (b = .001, SE < 
.001, p < .05; see Table 14, Panels A and B, Column 2). However, given that this estimate was 
so small, it is unlikely that tenure has any practically significant effect on university president 
compensation. The results of the OLS and RCM analyses, taken together, fail to support 
Hypothesis 3.  
Research question 6. Research question 6 asked how well university president personal 
characteristics predicted university president compensation in comparison to non-performance 
institutional characteristics related to university size and complexity. Given that there was 
evidence to suggest that university performance and non-performance institutional characteristics 
did have a significant positive effect on university president compensation, but there was no 
evidence that personal characteristics had such an influence, one can conclude that university 
president personal characteristics are poorer predictors than these other variables. This is given 
further support by the results noted in Table 16, which show that university president personal 
characteristics only account for a statistically significant amount of unique variance in one 
instance – Time 1 to Time 2, excluding outliers, for private universities.  
The RCM analyses also supported this notion (see Table 14, Panels A and B, Column 2 
and 3). Although the R2 values for president personal characteristics were higher than many of 
those of university performance combined, they were still less than the R2 values for endowment 
per FTE. Therefore, one can conclude that university performance and non-performance 
university institutional characteristics have a greater effect on university president compensation 
than do university president personal characteristics.  
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Research question 7. Research question 7 was aimed at determining if there were 
differences in the relation between university president personal characteristics and university 
president compensation for private and public universities. For both private and public 
universities, the correlational results were largely similar to those of the full sample. Only one 
variable – prior presidential experience – had a statistically significant relation with university 
president compensation, and only for public universities (see Table 15). However, the regression 
results were more mixed. In private universities, after the removal of outliers, tenure (β = .166, p 
< .001) and whether or not the president held a Ph.D. (β = .084, p = .027) were both statistically 
significant at Time 1 and Time 2 (see Table 13, Panel B, Columns 3 and 6). No statistically 
significant effects of university president personal characteristics were observed for public 
universities (see Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 4 and 7). Taken together, this suggests that 
university president personal characteristics may have some limited influence on university 
president compensation in private universities, but not in public universities. However, as 
previously noted, this may be due to lack of statistical power for public ones.  
The RCM results, however, do not agree with the OLS results for private universities. 
Specifically, they suggest that university president personal characteristics have no significant 
effect on university president compensation for either private or public universities (see Table 
14, Columns 4 – 7, Panels A and B).  
Research question 8. Research question 8 was interested in differences between the 
various dimensions of university president personal characteristics in their effect on university 
president compensation. There was no evidence to support a relation between any of these 
characteristics in the full sample or in public universities; therefore, any differences are likely to 
be inconsequential. In private universities, there was evidence to suggest that tenure and whether 
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or not the university president held a Ph.D. has an influence on their compensation. The variable 
tenure falls into the tenure-related variables dimension, whereas educational degree (i.e., Ph.D. 
holder) is included in the professional experience dimension. Therefore, these results suggest that 
these two dimensions have a greater influence on compensation than variables in the 
demographics dimension, such as gender, appear to have. That being said, prior presidential 
experience was also included in the professional experience dimension and, in this study, it 
appeared to have no significant effect on compensation. Taking this into account, as well as the 
results in Table 13, Panel B, Columns 3 and 6, which show that tenure had a larger beta weight 
than the Ph.D. holder dummy code, suggests that tenure-related variables likely have the 
strongest impact on compensation, followed by professional experience and that demographics 
are unlikely to play any significant role in the determination of compensation.  
As previously mentioned, the RCM analyses found no evidence of any statistically and 
practically significant effects of any of the university president personal characteristics examined 
in either the full sample, private university sub-sample, or public university sub-sample. 
Therefore, the RCM analyses suggest that any differences between the dimensions in terms of 
their relative impact are likely to be inconsequential.  
Summary.  
University performance. The results of Part I indicate that there is little evidence that 
overall university performance influences university president compensation. However, there is 
evidence to suggest that specific metrics of university performance are linked to future university 
president compensation. The specific metrics affecting private university president compensation 
are different, however, when one considers the OLS results versus the RCM results.  
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The OLS results suggest that average faculty salary and average SAT score have the 
largest influence on university president compensation in the full sample of universities, that 
university rank has the largest effect when only considering private universities, and that none of 
the performance variables affect public university president compensation. Although the 
conclusions drawn from the RCM results are comparable with the conclusions of the OLS 
analyses for public universities, they contrast with the OLS results for private universities and for 
the full sample. Specifically, the RCM results suggest that endowment per FTE influences 
university president compensation in the full sample and in private universities, whereas the 
remaining university performance metrics do not.  
To make sense of these findings, one must consider the differences between the OLS 
analyses and the RCM analyses. For instance, in this study, the OLS analyses were conducted 
separately by timepoint. The RCM analyses, however, pooled data across years. Therefore, the 
RCM analyses had a larger overall sample size, leading to decreased sampling error and more 
statistical power. From a practical standpoint, this means because of the way the OLS and RCM 
analyses were implemented in this study, the results from the RCM analyses are more likely to 
be robust and reflective of the true underlying effect than the results from the OLS analyses. 
Considering this, the main takeaway from this study regarding the relation between 
university performance and subsequent university president compensation is that there is 
evidence to suggest that endowment per FTE affects private university president compensation, 
but there is little evidence to say that any university performance metric affects public university 
president compensation.  
Non-performance institutional characteristics. Results from the OLS and RCM analyses 
largely agreed regarding the effect of non-performance institutional characteristics on university 
150 
 
president compensation. University size, as measured by FTE enrollment, had a positive effect 
on university president compensation at both private and public universities. Furthermore, this 
variable accounted for more variance in university president compensation than all the university 
performance variables combined. In addition, university complexity, as measured by a 
university’s Carnegie classification, appeared to have a positive effect on university president 
compensation at public universities. Regarding the other non-performance institutional 
characteristics, institutional ownership was a significant predictor of university president 
compensation in the full sample (i.e., private university presidents, on average, receive higher 
compensation than public university presidents). Religious orientation of the university was also 
a significant predictor of university president compensation in the full sample and in private 
universities, with university presidents from religious institutions receiving less compensation, 
on average, than those presidents from non-religious institutions.  
President personal characteristics. For university president personal characteristics, the 
OLS analyses and RCM analyses showed different results. The OLS analyses suggested that, 
after outlier removal, university tenure and whether or not the president had a Ph.D. influenced 
compensation for private university presidents; however, the RCM analyses showed that these 
variables, and the remaining university president personal characteristics variables, had no effect 
on university president compensation at either public or private universities. Given the larger 
sample size for the RCM analyses, one can thus draw the conclusion that none of the university 
president personal characteristics measured in this study have a significant effect on university 
president compensation.  
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Part II: Identified Gaps 
Sample descriptives. Of the 403 university presidents included in the Part I analyses, 
compensation component data were available for 395 (98%). Across the three timepoints 
relevant in this study, the mean increase in total compensation was $34,495.18 (Mdn = 
$12,974.00; SD = $386,095.71)16 and the mean relative increase in compensation was 
43,503.78% (Mdn = 3.18%, SD = 1,061,219.42%). The average merit pay (i.e., increase from 
prior year’s base salary) was $21,237.84 (Mdn = $10,327.00; SD = $51,202.56). In terms of the 
percentage change from prior year’s base salary, the mean increase was 208,519.74% (Mdn = 
2.85%; SD = 2,360,850.84%). The mean bonus across the three timepoints was $34,745.12 (Mdn 
= $00.00; SD = $119,857.63), which, as a percentage of base salary, translates to a 21,887.98% 
increase on average (Mdn = 00.00%; SD = 753,248.39%). Lastly, the average deferred 
compensation, set aside (from here on, the term “deferred compensation” will refer to deferred 
compensation, set aside) was $56,374.74 (Mdn = $25,500.00; SD = $94,069.78). As a percentage 
of base salary, this corresponds to a mean of 17,142.02% (Mdn = 7.17%; SD = 567,502.94%). 
The correlation matrix, depicted as Table 17, includes the mean and standard deviation for each 
of the variables included in the analyses for Part II separated by timepoint.  
Gap 1: The effect of university performance on the components of compensation.  
Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 suggested that university performance would have a positive 
effect on each component of future compensation. In Part II, university performance was defined 
as the change in university endowment per FTE. University president compensation was 
measured as the change in total compensation. In addition, three specific components of total 
 
16 The means and standard deviations provided throughout this section are very large. These numbers were 
influenced by 14 individuals who received, in at least one time period, a compensation increase of over $1 million. 
Therefore, the medians provided may be more informative of the typical compensation provided. 
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compensation were examined – merit pay, bonus, and deferred compensation. All compensation 
variables were also measured as a percentage of total compensation (for change in total 
compensation) or a percentage of base salary (for merit pay, bonus, and deferred compensation). 
An examination of the correlations in Table 17 shows that there were no statistically significant 
correlations between change in endowment and any measure of compensation. This initial 
evidence suggests that performance is unlikely to have an effect on compensation.  
The RCM results for the effect of the change in endowment on each compensation 
measure are presented in Tables 18 through 25. Model 1 in these tables includes only the control 
variables used in the Part II analyses, whereas Model 2 includes the control variables as well as 
change in endowment. Considering the change in total compensation first, the results indicated 
that change in endowment had a positive and statistically significant effect on the change in total 
compensation prior to the removal of outliers (b = .134, SE = .032, p < .01, see Table 18, Model 
2, Panel A); however this effect disappeared after outliers were removed (b = .007, SE = .003, 
ns, see Table 18, Model 2, Panel B). No statistically significant effects were noted for the relative 
change in total compensation measure (see Table 19, Model 2, Panels A and B). This suggests 
mixed support for the notion that university performance affects university president 
compensation. However, it is possible that university performance has clearer effects on the 
specific components of compensation.  
Considering the raw metric of the compensation components first (see Tables 20, 22, and 
24, Models 1 and 2, Panels A and B), the results indicated that change in endowment had a 
statistically significant and positive effect on merit pay prior to (b = .091, SE = .027, p < .01; 
Table 20, Model 2, Panel A), and after (b = .053, SE = .006, p < .01; Table 20, Model 2, Panel 
B), outlier removal. Thus, it seems that university performance does have an effect on the raw 
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metric of merit pay. In addition, Table 24, Model 2, Panel B, indicates that change in endowment 
had a positive and statistically significant effect on deferred compensation after the deletion of 
outliers (b = .044, SE = .016, p < .01). However, there was no evidence to suggest that change in 
endowment influences bonuses (see Table 22, Model 2, Panels A and B).  
The results of the effect of change in endowment on the relative measures of the 
compensation components are shown in Tables 21, 23, and 25, Models 1 and 2, Panels A and B. 
An examination of these tables shows that that there was no evidence that change in endowment 
had an effect on any of these relative compensation component measures. 
Taken together, it appears that Hypothesis 1 was supported for merit pay, received mixed 
support for change in total compensation and deferred compensation, and was unsupported for 
bonuses, the relative measure of total compensation, and the relative measures of all 
compensation components.  
Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 stated that university performance would have a greater 
effect on bonuses than on merit pay. However, although a statistically significant effect of 
university performance on the raw metric of merit pay was noted, no similar effect was noted for 
bonuses. University performance also appeared to have no effect on the relative metrics of either 
merit pay or bonuses. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was unsupported. 
Research question 1. Research question 1 asked how the effect of change in endowment 
on deferred compensation compared to its effect on merit pay and bonuses. An initial review of 
the results in Tables 20, 22, and 24, Model 2, Panels A and B, suggests that the effect of change 
in endowment on deferred compensation is likely to be weaker than that of merit pay, but 
stronger than that of bonuses. To investigate this further, the respective R2 values for change in 
endowment on merit pay, deferred compensation, and bonuses were examined. The R2 values for 
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the effect of change in endowment on merit pay (before outlier removal: R2 = .014; after outlier 
removal: R2 = .095), were larger than those for deferred compensation and bonuses (before 
outlier removal: R2 = .001; after outlier removal: R2 < .001 for both deferred compensation and 
bonuses). This, together with the results of Hypothesis 1, suggests that change in endowment 
affects merit pay, but not the other components of compensation.  
Gap 2: Reciprocal relations between university performance and university 
president compensation. 
Relation between compensation and subsequent university performance.  
Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 stated that university president compensation has a positive 
effect on future university performance. An examination of the correlations in Table 17 indicates 
that change in total compensation and relative change in total compensation had no statistically 
significant effects on change in endowment. There were also no statistically significant relations 
between the components of compensation (for both raw and relative metrics) and change in 
endowment, with one exception. Time 1 and Time 2 deferred compensation values had a 
statistically significant effect on change in endowment at Time 3 and Time 4, respectively. 
However, these effects were inconsistent. The effect from Time 1 to Time 3 was negative (r = -
.159, p < .01), whereas the effect from Time 2 to Time 4 was positive (r = .109, p < .01). This 
provides mixed support for Hypothesis 3 for the deferred compensation component of total 
compensation and no support for the remaining compensation variables.  
The RCM results are shown in Tables 26 through 33, Models 1 and 2, Panels A and B. 
As with the previous set of results, Model 1 in these tables includes only the control variables. 
Model 2 includes the control variables and the relevant compensation variable. Considering 
change in total compensation first, there was support for a statistically significant effect of 
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change in total compensation on change in endowment both before and after outlier removal; 
however the effect was in the opposite direction then was expected (before outlier removal: b = -
.187, SE = .032, p < .01; after outlier removal: b = -1.036, SE = .022, p < .01, see Table 26, 
Model 2, Panels A and B). This suggests that increases in total compensation led to future 
decreases in endowment. There was no evidence that relative change in total compensation 
impacts changes in endowment (see Table 27, Model 2, Panels A and B).  
Turning to the components of compensation, there was also no evidence to suggest that 
any of these compensation components, either in their raw or relative form, had a statistically 
significant effect on change in endowment (see Tables 28 – 33, Model 2, Panels A and B). 
Considering these results along with the negative effects observed for changes in total 
compensation suggests that Hypothesis 3 is not supported.  
Hypotheses 4 and 5. Hypotheses 4 and 5 made predictions about how the relations 
between the components of compensation and change in endowment would vary in strength. 
Because no statistically significant effects were noted for any of these components (see Tables 
26 through 33, Models 1 and 2, Panels A and B), Hypotheses 4 and 5 are not supported and will 
not be discussed further.  
Changes in the relationship between performance and compensation over time.  
Research question 2. Research question 2 asked if the strength of the relation between 
university president compensation and university performance changes over time. To examine 
this question a series of time by performance and time by compensation interactions were 
examined. Statistically significant interactions would suggest that the relation between university 
president compensation and university performance depended on the time period examined. The 
results of these interactions are depicted in Model 3, Panels A and B of Tables 18 through 33. 
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Across these 16 tables, only one statistically significant interaction was observed. Specifically, 
there was a statistically significant, negative interaction between time and change in endowment 
in the prediction of bonuses (before outlier removal: b = -1.066, SE = .396, p < .01; after outlier 
removal: b = -.965, SE = .198, p < .01). This interaction was plotted and is displayed in Figure 5, 
Panels A (before outlier removal) and B (after outlier removal). Figure 5 shows that changes in 
endowment at Time 1 lead to larger bonuses at Time 2, but that this effect weakens for the 
subsequent timepoint (change in endowment at Time 2 affecting bonuses at Time 3). However, 
most university presidents did not receive a bonus (72% and 68% of the sample did not receive a 
bonus at Time 2 and Time 3, respectively). With so few individuals receiving bonuses, it is 
difficult to determine if the observed interaction is actually reflective of the true underlying 
effects. Therefore, caution is warranted regarding the interpretation of the interaction. Taken 
together, there is little conclusive evidence provided by this study that the relations between 
university performance and university president compensation change over time.  
Gap 3: Curvilinear relations between university performance and university 
president compensation.  
Hypothesis 6. Hypothesis 6 suggested that there would be a curvilinear relation between 
university performance and future university president compensation. To evaluate this, two 
additional models were examined. Model 4 in Tables 18 through 25, Panels A and B, included a 
quadratic effect for university performance, while Model 5 in these tables included quadratic and 
cubic terms. Considering change in total compensation first, one can see that although the 
quadratic term was not statistically significant in Model 4 and Model 4 as a whole offered no 
significant improvement over the linear model (shown in Model 2), Model 5, which included the 
cubic term, did appear to be a more accurate depiction of the underlying effect. Specifically, the 
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cubic term for change in endowment was statistically significant both before (b = -.007, SE = 
.002, p < .01) and after (b = -.007, SE < .001, p < .01) outlier removal (see Table 18, Model 5, 
Panels A and B). The plot of the cubic relation is shown in Figure 6, Panels A (before outlier 
removal) and B (after outlier removal). This finding suggests that, at least for the raw metric of 
change in total compensation, curvilinear relations may exist. No effects were found for relative 
change in total compensation (see Table 19, Columns 4 and 5, Panels A and B).  
 Turning to the components of compensation, two additional observed effects were 
noteworthy. Results indicated that changes in endowment had a statistically significant cubic 
effect on merit pay before (b = -.006, SE = .002, p < .01) and after (b = -.023, SE = .002, p < .01) 
outlier removal (see Table 20, Model 5, Panels A and B). This effect is depicted in Figure 7, 
Panels A (before outlier removal) and B (after outlier removal). There was also a statistically 
significant quadratic effect of changes in endowment on bonuses (before outlier removal: b = -
.069, SE = .033, p < .05; after outlier removal: b = -.067, SE = .016, p < .01); see Table 22, 
Model 4, Panels A and B). Figure 8, Panels A (before outlier removal) and B (after outlier 
removal) display a plot of this effect.  
 Although the observed curvilinear effects suggest some support for Hypothesis 6, an 
examination of the figures for each of these three effects indicates that the results did not take the 
expected form (which is depicted in Figure 2). Furthermore, no nonlinear effects were observed 
for deferred compensation or any of the relative measures of the components of compensation 
(see Tables 19, 21, 23 – 25, Models 4 and 5, Panels A and B). Taken together, these results 
suggest that even though some nonlinear relations were observed, Hypothesis 6 was not 
supported.  
Summary.  
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Effect of university performance on compensation components. In Part II of this study, 
RCM results indicated that change in endowment did have a linear effect on merit pay (i.e., 
change in base salary) both before and after outlier removal. Results for the linear effect of 
change in endowment on the remaining components of compensation were either inconsistent 
(i.e., only observed before or after the removal of outliers – change in total compensation, 
deferred compensation) or non-existent (bonuses, all relative measures of compensation).  
Effect of compensation components on university performance. Results of the RCM 
analyses suggested that none of the compensation variables, in either their raw or relative form, 
had a statistically significant and positive effect on change in endowment. However, contrary to 
expectations, there was evidence to suggest that increases in total compensation led to future 
decreases in endowment.  
Changes in the relation between university performance and university president 
compensation over time. The results of the interaction analyses showed that time was a 
significant moderator of the relation between change in endowment and bonuses. Specifically, 
findings indicated that, at Time 1, changes in endowment had a positive effect on bonuses; 
however, this effect was not observed at Time 2. However, the majority of university presidents 
did not receive a bonus at either Time 1 or Time 2, which could have impacted the results. Thus, 
overall, there was little conclusive evidence to suggest the relations between university 
performance and university president compensation changed over time.  
Curvilinear effects of university performance on compensation components. Consistent 
(i.e., both before and after outlier removal) nonlinear effects of changes in endowment were 
noted for three compensation variables. Specifically, a cubic effect was noted for changes in total 
compensation and merit pay. A quadratic effect of changes in endowment was observed for 
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bonuses. This is particularly interesting given that changes in endowment did not have consistent 
linear effects on changes in total compensation or bonuses. However, these nonlinear effects did 
not follow the expected pattern. Furthermore, there was no evidence of nonlinear effects of 
changes in endowment on deferred compensation or on any of the compensation variables in 
their relative form.  
Discussion 
 The purpose of this study was two-fold. First, the goal of Part I was to conduct a 
replication of previous research regarding the effect of university performance (and other 
relevant variables) on university president compensation. Second, the goal of Part II was to 
provide insight on several gaps that exist within the current literature on university president 
compensation. In doing so, the hope was that this study would shed light on our current 
understanding of the dynamics surroundings the various relations between university 
performance and university president compensation. This, in turn, would add to our 
understanding of how predictions based on theories typically used in the for-profit executive 
compensation literature generalize to the nonprofit educational context. In particular, this study 
explored predictions derived from agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), 
managerialism (e.g., Aoki, 1984; Herman, 1981), human capital theory (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; 
Becker, 1962), expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), prospect theory (e.g., Kahneman, 2011; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), cardinal utility theory (Eaton & Rosen, 1983; Larrick, 1993), and 
equity theory (Adams, 1965). In addition to the theoretical insight this study aimed to provide, it 
also intended to address the ongoing controversy related to the high pay of university presidents 
(see Dillon, 2004; Sonnenberg, 2017; Stripling & Fuller, 2011; Svluga, 2018) and provide 
guidance to Boards and lawmakers.  
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 In the following sections, I will first review how the results of Part I compared to those 
from the systematic review. Theoretical and practical implications of the results from Parts I and 
II will then be discussed. Limitations and ideas for future research directions will be addressed 
after the implications section. Lastly, a summary of the overall conclusions from this study will 
be provided. Summaries of the results were provided on pages 148 – 150 (Part I results) and 157 
– 158 (Part II).  
Part I Results – Comparison to the Systematic Review  
Results from Part I did somewhat correspond to those from the systematic review. 
Specifically, both the systematic review and this study found that university performance had a 
positive, but somewhat weak effect on university president compensation for the full sample and 
for public universities. Both studies also suggested that the effect of university performance on 
university president compensation is stronger in private universities than in public ones. Also, in 
both studies, non-performance institutional characteristics related to size had a positive effect on 
university president compensation at both private and public universities. Furthermore, the 
results from the review and this study indicated that non-performance institutional 
characteristics, especially university size, had a stronger effect on university president 
compensation than either university performance or university president personal characteristics.  
However, despite the general agreement on these findings, the effect of specific variables 
that were shown to affect university president compensation differed. For instance, in the 
systematic review, reputation and faculty quality were identified as the dimensions that had the 
strongest relation with compensation; however, in this study, the RCM results indicated that 
endowment per FTE (a measure of financial performance) was the university performance metric 
with the largest effect, at least for the full sample and for private universities. Additionally, for 
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private universities, size and complexity dimensions of the non-performance institutional 
characteristics were both found to have a moderate effect on university president compensation 
in the systematic review, yet, in Part I of this study, only university size had a significant effect.  
There are a few potential explanations for these discrepancies. First, the results from the 
systematic review and Part I of this study are not directly comparable. Conclusions from the 
systematic review were drawn using correlations or other types of effect sizes (e.g., beta weights) 
converted to correlation coefficients, whereas conclusions from Part I of this study were based 
on regression coefficients from either OLS or RCM analyses. Indeed, if one were to ignore both 
the OLS results and the RCM results, the correlations do suggest that university rank (a measure 
of reputation) and average faculty salary (a measure of faculty quality) were more strongly 
associated with university president compensation than was endowment.  
Second, no exact estimates or determinations of statistical significance were made in the 
systematic review. This also makes it difficult to compare those results to the ones in this study. 
For instance, in the full sample, the approximate magnitude of the effect of reputation was 
determined by nine effects and the magnitude of the effect of faculty quality was determined by 
seven effects. With such small ks (and ns), it is possible that, had exact estimates and confidence 
intervals been calculated, the results would have been statistically insignificant due to large 
amounts of sampling error. Similarly, it is possible that the magnitude of the effect of the 
financial performance dimension (which contained 27 effects), although smaller than that of 
reputation and faculty quality, could have been statistically significant due to the estimate being 
more precise and thus having a narrower confidence interval. If this were the case, the results of 
the systematic review may have been more similar to the results of this study. In fact, although 
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endowment did have a consistent effect, it was relatively weak, only uniquely accounting for, at 
most, 3.5% of the variance in university president compensation.  
Implications 
The results from Part I and Part II of this study have several implications for research and 
practice. Each of these implications will be detailed below, starting with those implications 
related to research. 
 Research. The findings in Part I provide support for agency theory in the nonprofit 
educational context. Board members have stated that they are concerned about financial stability, 
the net tuition for students, and the decrease in state and federal funding (Association of 
Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges & Gallup, 2018); large endowments can help 
alleviate these concerns. Furthermore, university presidents are the financial managers and 
primary fundraisers for universities (Cote, 1985); therefore, endowments may be more directly 
under their control than metrics such as university ranking. Thus, it makes sense from an agency 
theory perspective that endowments have stronger effects on university president compensation 
than other performance metrics. However, endowment funds are also typically invested and, as 
such, are subject to market forces (Association of Governing Boards of Universities and 
Colleges, 2019). Therefore, they are not completely under the control of university presidents. 
Considering this, the somewhat weak effect observed also makes sense in an agency theory 
framework.  
 It is difficult to determine, however, if the results from Part II support predictions from 
agency theory or not. For instance, there was limited evidence that change in endowments led to 
changes in total compensation (i.e., an effect was detected prior to outlier removal, but was not 
observed after outliers were removed). If compensation is based on performance, one would 
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expect that this effect would be observed when focusing on the changes in these two variables. 
However, as noted in Part I, the effect of performance on university president compensation was 
only observed for private universities; therefore, it is possible that change in endowment does 
have a consistent effect on change in total compensation in private universities, but that the 
inclusion of public universities in this sample clouded the results.  
When examining the effect that changes in endowment had on the specific components of 
compensation, findings indicated that endowments had a consistent effect on merit pay, but not 
on the other components of compensation. This was also not expected. Merit pay results in 
permanent increases in base pay (Nyberg et al., 2016), and thus does not require continued 
commitment to reaching goals to reap the benefits of the increase. It was anticipated that changes 
in endowment would have a stronger effect on bonuses, as bonuses must be re-earned each year 
(Nyberg et al., 2016; Park & Sturman, 2016) and are, therefore, more likely to be effective at 
aligning the goals of university presidents to those of Board members. Yet, this effect was not 
observed, which would seem to contrast with expectations based on the concepts of goal 
alignment in agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). One potential explanation for this 
finding is that most university presidents did not receive a bonus (72% and 68% of the sample 
did not receive a bonus at Time 2 and Time 3, respectively). It is possible that those Boards 
providing bonuses did award them based on performance, but that this effect was not detected 
due to the overall lack of variance.  
 Both Parts I and II of this study are clear, however, in their support of the notion that non-
performance institutional characteristics related to university size/complexity influence 
university president compensation. Furthermore, these variables have a stronger and more 
consistent effect on total compensation and merit pay than does university performance. These 
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findings suggest support for predictions based on the managerialist view (e.g., Aoki, 1984; 
Herman, 1981). Recall that managerialism states that agency problems allow executives (in this 
case, university presidents) to be more entrenched (i.e., powerful) (Combs & Skill, 2003). These 
university presidents can use their power to influence the Board to base their compensation on 
university size or complexity, which are less risky (i.e., result in less volatility in compensation) 
than performance measures would be. Thus, based on this view, one would expect measures of 
size and complexity to have a stronger association with university president compensation than 
does university performance. Parts I and II of this study both found this to be the case, at least for 
university size, as measured by FTE enrollment.  
 Taken together, these results regarding the relations between university performance and 
university president compensation, as well as university size/complexity and university president 
compensation are consistent with findings from the for-profit executive compensation literature. 
The for-profit literature has also found that both organizational performance and organizational 
size/complexity affect CEO compensation and that variables related to size, in particular, have a 
greater effect on compensation than do university performance variables (Tosi et al., 2000). 
Thus, it does appear that at least some theories and findings from the for-profit literature can 
provide insight in nonprofit settings.  
 Part II of this study also has some specific implications related to its findings, or lack 
thereof. Specifically, contrary to predictions based on expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), no 
positive effect of university president compensation on future university performance was 
observed. In fact, the only observed statistically significant effect of university president 
compensation on university performance was negative, suggesting that increases in total 
compensation have a negative effect on future university performance. Although expectancy 
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theory was used as the basis for the hypothesis, it can also lend insight to why the hypothesis 
may not have been supported. Specifically, expectancy theory involves three perceptions which 
make up the potential motivating force of a behavior. These perceptions are expectancy, 
instrumentality, and valence (Bartol & Locke, 2000; Vroom, 1964). It is possible that these 
perceptions are generally weak for university presidents. First, even though fundraising enhances 
endowments and may be somewhat under the control of university presidents, they may feel that 
they, themselves, are not ultimately able to affect the value of endowments (as endowments are 
typically invested and thus subject to market forces; Association of Governing Boards of 
Universities and Colleges, 2019), leading to weak expectancy perceptions. Second, university 
presidents may not be aware of the effect that endowments have on their compensation, which 
would result in weak instrumentality perceptions. Third, the association between endowments 
and university president compensation may not be strong enough to incentivize engagement in 
behaviors that would result in increases in endowments (e.g., more fundraising), resulting in 
weak valence perceptions. 
 Of course, it may be that expectancy theory, which is typically drawn upon to explain 
motivation and performance at the non-executive level, is not applicable for the executive 
context. Indeed, given that endowments are not completely under the control of university 
presidents, it may be unreasonable to think that expectancy perceptions could ever be strong. 
Yet, if aligning performance to compensation does not result in future performance increases, 
and, in fact leads to future declines in performance, it becomes difficult to justify performance-
based compensation at the executive level and calls a main prediction of agency theory into 
question.  
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 Part II also explored if the effects of university performance on university president 
compensation and university president compensation on performance changed over time. 
Agency theory suggests that the university performance to university president compensation 
effect should remain stable over time, as it is necessary to continually ensure that the principal’s 
and agent’s goals are aligned (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). If this effect does remain stable, 
expectancy theory would suggest that the compensation to performance effect should either 
remain stable or increase over time because instrumentality perceptions would strengthen, 
resulting in stronger motivation (Vroom, 1964). Managerialism, however, suggests that as 
university presidents gain more power and become more entrenched, the effect of performance 
on compensation should decrease (Aoki, 1984; Combs & Skill, 2003; Herman, 1981). This 
would ultimately decrease instrumentality and valence perceptions and thus lead to weaker 
compensation to performance relations in the future. This would occur because the motivational 
force of engaging in performance-related behaviors would decrease as instrumentality and 
valence perceptions became weaker (Vroom, 1964). 
Only one statistically significant interaction between the relevant predictor and time was 
observed (out of 16; 6%). Specifically, the performance to bonus compensation effect did 
decrease at Time 2 as compared to Time 1. This finding could suggest support for managerialism 
(i.e., first year bonus was based on performance, second it was based on some other factor 
preferred by the presidents). However, as previously mentioned, most individuals did not receive 
bonuses, therefore, it is possible that these results are not really reflective of an underlying 
interaction. Thus, caution is warranted regarding this interpretation.  
The remaining non-statistically significant interactions could suggest support for agency 
theory. However, it is difficult to draw this conclusion as the lack of interaction effects may have 
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also been due to low statistical power. Furthermore, given that only one variable – merit pay – 
was determined to be affected by performance, non-statistically significant interactions for total 
compensation and deferred compensation, while not providing support for managerialism, can 
also not provide support for agency theory.  
 Part II also explored the potential for nonlinear effects of university performance on 
university president compensation. Specifically, a cubic relation was expected with inflection 
points representing minimum and maximum rewards. Minimum rewards were predicted due to 
risk considerations from agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and 
fairness considerations from equity theory (Adams, 1965). Maximum rewards were expected 
based on predictions from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and cardinal utility 
theory (Eaton & Rosen, 1983; Larrick, 1993) as well as empirical evidence (Mitra et al., 2015). 
In fact, prior research has found support for such a cubic relation for executive bonuses 
(Indjejikian & Nanda, 2002). However, the results in this study did not take the expected form. 
For instance, there did appear to be a quadratic effect of university performance on bonuses. 
However, this finding is likely due to most university presidents not receiving bonuses. The two 
cubic effects observed (on changes in total compensation and merit pay) also do not provide 
support for the expected effects. The plots do appear to show clusters around 14.6 and 15.4 for 
changes in total compensation, and 12.6 and 13.2 for merit pay, which could suggest a minimum 
and maximum award as predicted and displayed in Figure 2. However, it is important to 
remember that these numbers reflect the natural log transformation of changes in total 
compensation and merit pay. Thus, the plots show much less variance around these numbers than 
is observed in the non-transformed variables. The untransformed numbers are less likely to show 
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such clear minimum and maximum clusters. Taken together, these results suggest that, for this 
study, there was no support for the idea of minimum or maximum rewards.  
 Across both Parts I and II of this study, perhaps the most important implication is that 
still very little is known about the dynamics surrounding the relation between university 
performance and university president compensation. For instance, in Part I, endowment per FTE 
and FTE enrollment accounted for, at most, 8% of the variance in university president 
compensation. This means, that at least 92% of the variance in university presidents’ 
compensation remains unexplained. Furthermore, the lack of expected findings in Part II 
suggests that more nuanced explanations of the relation between university performance and 
university president compensation are no better at explaining the high levels of compensation 
received by university presidents than basic linear predictions. Taken together, this suggests that 
our current theories, or at least our empirical evaluations of them, are limited and thus inadequate 
at explaining the high levels of university president compensation; therefore, more research is 
needed. This will be addressed further in the limitations and future directions section. 
 Practical. From a practical standpoint, the most important findings were that increases in 
university president compensation appeared to have a nil or negative effect on university 
performance (as measured by endowments) and that none of the variables in either Parts I or II of 
this study did a particularly good job explaining the high levels of university president 
compensation. These findings have important implications for Boards and lawmakers.  
First, Boards should consider that the high compensation awarded to university presidents 
does not appear to be commensurate with the performance of these presidents. This is 
problematic as it feeds the continued controversy surrounding the high levels of compensation 
received by university presidents. It may also explain why university president compensation 
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does not lead to future positive effects on performance – the portion of compensation that is 
based upon performance is not large enough to be motivating. To combat these issues, Boards 
should develop compensation policies that increase the degree to which compensation is 
dependent upon reaching performance goals. Further, attaining these performance goals should 
be as much under the control of universities presidents as possible. For instance, fundraising may 
be more directly under the control of university presidents than endowments as endowments are 
subject to market forces and used to fund ongoing university projects and initiatives (Association 
of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, 2019). Boards should also consider making 
the process of university president performance evaluation and compensation determination 
more transparent. This may not only help to quell the controversy surrounding the high levels of 
pay received by university presidents, it may also provide clearer guidance to interested 
researchers and the public about how compensation decisions are made. These suggestions are 
particularly important for Boards of public universities in which compensation did not appear to 
be determined by university performance.  
Second, the results of this study suggest that laws limiting the amount of a public 
university president’s compensation that can come from public funds (e.g., Fla. Stat., 2017) may 
be justified. For public universities, university performance did not appear to influence university 
president compensation and no positive effects of compensation were observed on future 
university performance. Thus, it seems difficult to justify why large amounts of public funding 
would go to compensating university presidents, rather than to programs that would better serve 
students. Therefore, lawmakers in states without such regulations should consider adopting them. 
This suggestion is not directly applicable for private universities; however, it may still be useful 
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for decision makers at private universities to consider setting reasonable ranges in which 
university presidents can be compensated.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 As with all studies, this study had limitations. Limitations affecting the obtained results, 
as well as the interpretation of those results will be discussed in the following sections. 
Suggestions for how these results could be addressed in future research will also be provided.  
Four main sets of limitations may have influenced the obtained results – lack of statistical 
power, multicollinearity as well as practical and conceptual overlap in Part I, the specific 
operationalizations of variables used in the study, and the analytical approach utilized. Although 
power analyses indicated that there was enough power to detect the expected effects in the full 
sample of universities, the subsamples, particularly the public university subsample, may not 
have had a large enough sample size to detect the expected effects in Part I. This was likely to a 
be a greater issue for the OLS analyses, however, as the RCM analyses had double the amount of 
observations. That being said, in Part II, although the analyses were not separated by group and 
there were fewer predictors included in the models, there may still not have been enough 
statistical power to detect interaction effects. Therefore, future studies could expand the number 
of university presidents included in the sample. A large enough sample size would also allow 
private universities to be broken down into religious and non-religious private institutions, as 
suggested in the limitations and future research section of Study 1.  
Multicollinearity and conceptual overlap among university performance variables also 
represent potential limitations for Part I of this study. Although the vast majority of correlations 
between the university performance variables were below .80 (Field, 2012) and variance 
inflation factors (VIF) were all below 10 (Myers, 1990), all VIFs were also greater than 1 
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(Bowerman & O'Connell, 1990). This suggests that multicollinearity was present in Part I of this 
study. Furthermore, some of the variables also practically and conceptually overlapped with 
other included variables. For instance, although the correlations between fundraising and 
endowment only ranged from .392 to .421, these two variables may, in practice, overlap quite a 
bit. Increases in endowment are largely gained through fundraising and investment performance. 
As university presidents have little control over the investment performance of endowment 
funds, Boards are likely to tie university president more closely to endowment gains due to 
fundraising. Therefore, although not all of the money gained through fundraising may become 
part of a university’s endowment (e.g., it may be spent immediately, provided to a specific 
department), increases in endowment due to fundraising are likely completely captured by the 
fundraising variable. These issues are problematic as they can inflate standard errors, which 
affects statistical significance tests (Field, 2012). Furthermore, multicollinearity as well as 
practical and conceptual overlap can make it difficult to determine the relative importance of 
each predictor (Field, 2012). Therefore, to better determine the importance of each predictor of 
university president compensation, future research could employ relative weights analysis, which 
can better determine predictor importance for correlated variables (Tonidandel & LeBreton, 
2011). Future research could also leave out variables that are empirically, practically, or 
conceptually redundant. To attempt to address these problems present in Part I, Part II only 
included one university performance variable, thereby reducing these concerns. 
It is also possible that the specific operationalizations of university performance in this 
study did not include important measures of university performance that are used by Boards to 
determine compensation. As noted in Chapter 2, there have been many different 
operationalizations of university performance used in previous studies and there are additional 
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operationalizations, such as the diversity of the student body and post-graduation earnings, that 
Boards may consider. However, as there were already potential issues with multicollinearity, it 
was not plausible to evaluate more predictors in this study. Related to this issue is the possibility 
that universities do not make compensation dependent on the same university performance 
metrics, which would make it appear as though there was no effect of university performance 
when one does, in fact, exist. To attempt to mitigate the effects of this issue, the university 
performance metrics used in this study, particularly in Part II, were metrics that Boards claim to 
consider important. However, future research could address both of these limitations by 
considering other operationalizations of university performance and creating a weighted 
performance index based on what each university board claims to emphasize. This information is 
not easily available but can sometimes be derived from information in Board meeting minutes 
and other university sources.  
The data analytic techniques and approaches used in this study also have limits. For 
instance, RCM, just like OLS, assumes strict exogeneity. This assumption is violated (i.e., 
endogeneity is present) when one or more predictors is correlated with the error term at any time 
period. There are several reasons why this may occur. For instance, omitted variables can cause 
predictors to be correlated with the error term. This can lead to substantial bias in coefficient 
estimates and, thus, also in statistical significance tests (Greene, 2003; McNeish & Kelley, 2019; 
Woolridge, 2016). This bias makes it difficult to determine if the obtained results are actually 
reflective of the underlying effect. One potentially important variable that was omitted from 
many of the RCM analyses was a dummy code referring the specific timepoint. Although this 
variable was included in the interaction analyses in Part II (see Model 3 of Tables 18 to 33), it 
was not included in Models 1 or 2, or in any of the Part I analyses. Yet, this variable is likely to 
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be correlated with one or more of the predictors and the dependent variable, especially as some 
variables (e.g., endowment, compensation) tend to increase over time. In fact, when included as a 
predictor, the time variable was statistically significant in the majority of instances (i.e., 
endowment and many of the compensation components increased over time; see Model 3 in 
Tables 18, 20, and 26 – 33). Therefore, it is likely that its inclusion in Models 1 and 2 (as well as 
Models 4 and 5 and the Part I analyses) would have impacted the obtained results. Therefore, to 
attempt to address the omitted variable bias, future research should explicitly model this variable 
(i.e., the dummy code for timepoint) to determine the extent to which it influences the coefficient 
estimates of the other variables.  
Another source of endogeneity in this study has to do with the dynamics of the relation 
between university president compensation and university performance. To avoid violations of 
strict exogeneity, predictors cannot be influenced by prior levels of an examined outcome 
variables (Woolridge, 2016). In this study, however, that is exactly the type of dynamic 
expected. This study proposed that university performance affects subsequent university 
president compensation and that university president compensation affects subsequent university 
performance. Stated differently, it was expected that changes in performance would affect 
changes in compensation, that these changes in compensation would lead to changes in 
performance, and so on. Thus, clearly, predictors in either equation (i.e., performance, 
compensation) are influenced by prior levels of the relevant outcome (i.e., compensation, 
performance). This causes the error term in one equation (e.g., the prediction of university 
performance) to be correlated with future predictors in that equation (i.e., compensation). 
Ultimately, this has the same effect that the omitted variable problem does - coefficient estimates 
and statistical significance tests may be substantially biased (Woolridge, 2016). To address this 
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issue, future research could consider using instrument variables and two-stage least squares 
regression, which is a common technique to address exogeneity violations (e.g., Floyd, 2013; 
Woolridge, 2013). 
The specific approach to testing the hypotheses also has limitations. For instance, in Part 
I, several of the research questions involved determining if there were differences between public 
and private universities. To make these determinations, I looked to the statistical significance of 
the various predictors included in the analyses. This approach did suggest differences between 
public and private universities, however, comparing results of statistical significance tests can be 
misleading, especially when sample sizes are not equal. Therefore, to better assess if differences 
exist between public and private universities, future research should either examine whether 
institutional ownership (public or private) interacts with each independent variable to predict 
university president compensation. Such a test is termed a Chow test (Chow, 1960; Woolridge, 
2012). 
It is also possible that the specific lags that I used did not adequately reflect the 
complexity of the underlying relations. For instance, I examined the effect of university president 
compensation on university performance with a two-year lag (e.g., university president 
compensation at Time 1, university performance at Time 3). This two-year lag was used to allow 
time for policies a university president may have put into effect the year of their compensation 
increase to have an effect. However, it is possible that these effects take longer to go into effect, 
which would mean that a longer lag is necessary. Stated differently, university performance at 
Time 2 may be affected by university president compensation (and other variables) that occurred 
more than two years prior if the effects of compensation take longer than two years to be fully 
realized. To address this issue, future research should consider using more years of data as well 
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as analytical approaches that include lagged values of the dependent variable as predictors (e.g., 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel model). 
In addition, in this study, the university performance to university president 
compensation and university president compensation to university performance effects were 
examined separately. Thus, the causal inferences that can be made about any observed effects are 
limited. Given that few effects were actually observed in Part II, this may be a moot point; 
however, future research could use Bayesian estimation to better test the cross-lagged effect that 
was hypothesized and allow causal inferences (Schuurman, Ferrer, De Boer-Sonnenschein, & 
Hamaker, 2016).  
 It is also possible that the findings that were obtained in this study were not due to the 
theoretical explanation provided. Some could argue that the weak effect of university 
performance could be expected due to the intrinsic motivation of the university presidents (Bai, 
2014; Handy & Katz, 1998; Jobome, 2006). Recall that this argument states that nonprofit 
university presidents choose to work in a nonprofit setting and, thus, to receive lower 
compensation, because they are intrinsically motivated. If accurate, then it may not be necessary 
to incentivize performance because these presidents need no incentive. On its face, this argument 
may explain why there was no effect of university performance on university president 
compensation observed for public universities. However, one could also make the argument then 
that, if these presidents are intrinsically motivated, there is really no need to provide such high 
compensation and that this money would be better allocated toward student programs. 
Potentially more reasonable explanations for the lack of effect noted for public universities are 
low statistical power (discussed above) or that compensation is provided with no performance 
justification (at least not considering the variables used in this study). To explore these issues 
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further though, future researchers could survey university presidents at public and private 
universities to determine if there are substantive differences in the levels of intrinsic motivation. 
If the data could be obtained, it would also be interesting to determine if there are differences in 
intrinsic motivation between private university presidents at religious and non-religious 
institutions.  
Regarding the noted effect of non-performance institutional characteristics related to 
university size and complexity, one cannot be sure, based on the analyses in this study, if the 
relation between university size and university president compensation is due to entrenchment as 
predicted by managerialism (Aoki, 1984; Combs & Skill, 2003; Herman, 1981) or due to some 
other factor. To provide a better test of this, future research should examine how the relation 
between these variables and university president compensation evolves over time (and include 
more time periods than the two utilized in this study). If the relation increases over time, the 
entrenchment hypothesis would receive greater support. 
Conclusion 
 Part I of this study attempted to replicate the results of the systematic review. Part II 
examined additional hypotheses and research questions aimed at filling gaps that exist in the 
nonprofit educational context (as well as the for-profit context). Limitations notwithstanding, the 
results of this study do provide some insight on the dynamics of the relation between university 
performance and university president compensation. In fact, three overarching conclusions can 
be drawn. First, the effect of university performance on university president compensation 
appears to be weak (for private universities) or non-existent (for public universities). Second, 
university president compensation appears to have a negative effect, if any, on future university 
performance. Third, overall, the results indicated that current theories and empirical evaluations 
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cannot adequately explain how university president compensation is determined. Therefore, it 
appears that the continued controversy surrounding university president compensation is 
justified.    
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Table 1 
 
Predictors Examined in the Executive Compensation Literature 
Predictor Example 
operationalizations 
Theories/perspectives 
utilized 
Example studies 
Performance Accounting performance 
(e.g., return on equity, 
return on assets), market 
performance (e.g., stock 
performance, dividends) 
Agency theory Aggarwal and Samwick (2003), 
Boschen, Duru, Gordon, and Smith 
(2003), Garen (1994), Hartzell Jay and 
Starks Laura (2003), Leone, Wu, and 
Zimmerman (2006), Nyberg et al. 
(2010), Tosi et al. (2000)* 
CEO behavior Research and development 
intensity, invention 
resonance, science 
harvesting 
Agency theory Makri, Lane, and Gomez-Mejia (2006) 
Size and complexity Number of employees, 
total assets, sales  
Managerialism, human capital 
theory 
Boyd (1994), David, Kochhar, and 
Levitas (1998), Gerhart and Milkovich 
(1990), Gray and Cannella (1997), 
Ingham and Thompson (1995), Tosi et 
al. (2000)* 
CEO Personal 
characteristics 
Level of education, firm 
tenure, job tenure 
Human capital theory Agarwal (1981), Combs and Skill 
(2003), Gerhart and Milkovich (1990) 
CEO role characteristics Hierarchical rank in 
organization 
Tournament theory, social 
norms 
Lazear and Rosen (1981) 
Governance 
influences/failures 
CEO duality, tenure, Board 
size, Board independence 
Agency theory, Managerial 
power theory 
Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton 
(1998), Deutsch (2005)*, van Essen et 
al. (2015)* 
Labor market influences Industry pay level, ratio of 
external hires 
Neoclassical labor economic 
theory 
Fulmer (2009) 
Equity considerations Compensation of 
individuals on 
compensation committee 
Social comparison theory O'Reilly et al. (1988) 
* Denotes that the study is a meta-analysis. 
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Table 2 
 
Predictors Examined in the University President Compensation Literature 
Predictor Example 
operationalizations 
Theories/perspectives 
utilized 
Example studies 
University performance Endowment, alumni giving 
rate, graduation rate, 
student/faculty ratio, 
faculty salaries, ranking, 
acceptance rate 
Agency theory, organizational 
control theory,  
Bai (2014), Banker et al. (2009), 
O’Connell (2005), Pati and Lee 
(2016), Tang et al. (2000) 
University size and 
complexity 
Enrollment, expenditures, 
revenue, Carnegie 
classification 
Managerial power theory, 
theory of managerial 
capitalism, segmented labor 
market theory, functional 
theory of compensation 
Galle and Walker (2014), Gordon and 
Fischer (2014), Huang and Chen 
(2013), Pfeffer and Ross (1988) 
University president 
personal characteristics 
Gender, age, tenure, 
highest degree, area of 
study 
Human capital theory, supply-
side theory of wage 
determination, labor theory 
Banker et al. (2009), Bartlett and 
Sorokina (2005), Huang and Chen 
(2013), Sorokina (2003) 
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Table 3 
 
Performance Dimensions and Measures 
Performance (and dimensions) Sample Studies 
• Financial Performance  
• Alumni giving rate Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), Langbert (2006), Langbert & Fox (2013), 
Sorokina (2003) 
• Moody’s bond rating Bartlett & Sorokina (2005) 
• Cost efficiency Pati & Lee (2016) 
• Endowment Banker et al. (2009), Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), Cheng (2014), 
Ehrenberg et al. (2001), Huang & Chen (2013), Langbert (2006), 
Pati & Lee (2016), Saunders (2007) 
• Equity ratio17 Cheng (2014) 
• Fundraising/gifts 
• Government grants 
Bai (2014), Ehrenberg et al. (2001), Galle & Walker (2014), Pati & 
Lee (2016) 
Galle & Walker (2014) 
• Grants received Bai (2014) 
• Gross margin18 Langbert (2006) 
• Investment revenues/returns Bai (2014), Galle & Walker (2014) 
• Operating surplus Cheng (2014) 
• Other revenues (not from tuition, grants, 
private contributions, or investments) 
• Risk 
• Short-term financial risk 
• Total assets 
• Total liability 
Bai (2014) 
 
Bartlett & Sorokina (2005) 
Bartlett & Sorokina (2005) 
Galle & Walker (2014), Gordon & Fischer (2014) 
Galle & Walker (2014) 
• Academic and Research Performance  
• Graduation rate Gordon & Fischer (2014), (Langbert (2006), Pati & Lee (2016) 
 
17 Defined as net assets divided by total assets (Cheng, 2014) 
18 Defined as revenue minus expenses (Langbert, 2006). 
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Performance (and dimensions) Sample Studies 
• Retention rate Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), Cheng (2014), Langbert (2006), 
Langbert & Fox (2013), Sorokina (2003) 
• Academic and Research Quality  
• Academic support expenses Cheng (2014) 
• Faculty resource rank Langbert (2006) 
• Instructional and research expenses Cheng (2014), Gordon & Fischer (2014) 
• Research and development expenditures Ehrenberg et al. (2001) 
• Student/faculty ratio Langbert (2006), He & Callahan (2017) 
• Proportion of classes with < 20 students Langbert (2006), Langbert & Fox (2013) 
• Proportion of classes with > 50 students Langbert (2006) 
• Faculty Quality  
• Faculty salaries Bai (2014), Banker et al. (2009), Cheng (2014), Ehrenberg et al. 
(2001), Galle & Walker (2014), Monks (2004), O’Connell (2005), 
(Pati & Lee (2016), Saunders (2007) 
• Reputation  
• Number of applicants Cheng (2014) 
• Peer assessment score Langbert (2006), Langbert & Fox (2013) 
• Princeton review’s best colleges He & Callahan (2017) 
• Ranking Bai (2014), Huang & Chen (2013), Langbert (2006), Saunders 
(2007), Tang et al. (2000) 
• Selectivity  
• Acceptance rate Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), Cheng (2014), He & Callahan (2017), 
Langbert (2006), Langbert & Fox (2013) 
• Admission rating He & Callahan (2017) 
• Freshman in top of high school class Bartlett & Sorokina (2005) 
• Percentage of students who graduated in the 
top 10% of their high school class 
Parsons & Reintenga (2013) 
• SAT scores (including average SAT scores, 
25th percentile SAT, 75th percentile SAT, 
25th percentile SAT Math, 75th percentile 
Banker et al. (2009), Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), Cheng (2014), 
Ehrenberg et al. (2001), He & Callahan (2017), Huang & Chen 
(2013), Langbert (2006), Langbert & Fox (2013), Parsons & 
Reitenga, Sorokina (2003), Tang et al. (2000) 
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Performance (and dimensions) Sample Studies 
SAT Math, 25th percentile SAT Verbal, 
75th percentile SAT Verbal 
• Student quality He & Callahan (2017) 
• Other  
• Environmental sustainability score Pati & Lee (2016) 
• Social sustainability score 
• Student service expenses 
Pati & Lee (2016) 
Cheng (2014) 
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Table 4 
 
Non-performance Institutional Characteristics  
Institutional Characteristics (and dimensions) Studies 
• Size  
• Enrollment Bai (2014), Banker et al. (2009), Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), Cheng (2014), 
Ehrenberg et al. (2001), Galle & Walker (2014), He & Callahan (2017), 
Huang & Chen (2013), Langbert (2006), Langbert & Fox (2013), Monks 
(2004), O’Connell (2005), Parsons & Reintenga (2013), Saunders (2007), 
Tang et al. (2000) 
• Institutional support expenses 
• Administration expenditures 
Cheng (2014) 
Gordon & Fischer (2014) 
• Number of employees Cheng (2014), He & Callahan (2017), Tang et al. (2000) 
• Total expenditures 
• Other expenditures 
Langbert (2006), Tang et al. (2000) 
Gordon & Fischer (2014) 
• Total revenue Bai (2014), Huang & Chen (2013), Langbert (2006), Langbert & Fox (2013), 
Monks (2004) 
• Tuition revenue 
• Number of administrators 
Bai (2014), Banker et al. (2009), Saunders (2007), Tang et al. (2000) 
O’Connell (2005) 
• Complexity  
• Number of degree-granting 
programs 
Huang & Chen (2013) 
• Type of university/Carnegie 
classification 
Bai (2014), Banker et al. (2009), Huang & Chen (2013), He & Callahan 
(2017), Langbert (2006), Parsons & Reitenga (2013), Pfeffer & Ross (1988), 
Saunders (2007), Tang et al. (2000) 
• University tier Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), He & Callahan (2017), Sorokina (2003) 
• Other  
• % of aliens enrolled Cheng (2014) 
• % of students who receive 
financial aid 
Cheng (2014) 
• % of students who receive grant 
aid 
Cheng (2014) 
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Institutional Characteristics (and dimensions) Studies 
• Average graduate tuition Cheng (2014) 
• Geographic location Langbert (2006), Tang et al. (2000) 
• Member of the Council for 
Christian Colleges and 
Universities 
Saunders (2007) 
• Presence of business school Tang et al. (2000) 
• Presence of law school Tang et al. (2000) 
• Presence of medical school Tang et al. (2000) 
• Ratio of administrative staff Cheng (2014) 
• Ratio of instructional and research 
staff 
Cheng (2014) 
• Religious affiliation Galle & Walker (2014), Langbert (2006), Langbert & Fox (2013), Saunders 
(2007) 
• Size of surrounding community Langbert & Fox (2013) 
• Year the university was founded 
• Tuition cost 
• Tuition discount rate (what 
students actually pay for tuition) 
• Net tuition cost 
Langbert & Fox (2013), He & Callahan (2017), Tang et al. (2000) 
Gordon & Fischer (2014) 
Gordon & Fischer (2014) 
 
 
O’Connell (2005) 
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Table 5 
 
Human Capital and Personal Characteristics 
Personal Characteristics (and dimensions) Studies 
• Demographics  
• Age Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), Ehrenberg et al. (2001), He & Callahan (2017), 
Langbert & Fox (2013), Monks (2004) 
• Gender Banker et al. (2009), Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), Cheng (2014), Ehrenberg et 
al. (2001), He & Callahan (2017), Huang & Chen (2013), Langbert (2006), 
Langbert & Fox (2013), Monks (2004), O’Connell (2005), Pfeffer & Ross 
(1988), Saunders (2007), Sorokina (2003) 
• Marital status Monks (2004) 
• Race Cheng (2014) 
• Professional Experience  
• Field of highest degree Monks (2004) 
• J.D. degree holder Banker et al. (2009) 
• J.D., M.D., or other professional 
degree 
He & Callahan, (2017) 
• Law, business, or economics 
degree 
Bartlett & Sorkina (2005) 
• Past experience as a tenured 
professor 
Banker et al. (2009) 
• Past experience in educational 
administration 
Banker et al. (2009) 
• Ph.D. holder Cheng (2014) 
• Prior presidency Banker et al. (2009), Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), Cheng (2014), Ehrenberg et 
al. (2001), Monks (2004) 
• Tenure/Length of Experience  
• Aggregate experience Banker et al. (2009) 
• Job tenure Banker et al. (2009), Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), He & Callahan (2017), 
Langbert & Fox (2013), Monks (2004), Pati & Lee (2016), Sorokina (2003) 
• Number of working years Banker et al. (2009) 
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Personal Characteristics (and dimensions) Studies 
• Seniority Ehrenberg et al. (2001) 
• University tenure Banker et al. (2009) 
• Years of experience at prior 
presidency 
Ehrenberg et al. (2001) 
• Years on faculty before becoming 
president 
Monks (2004) 
• Other Personal Characteristics  
• Alumni status Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), Cheng (2014) 
• Hired from outside academia Monks (2004) 
• In their first year as president Cheng (2014), He & Callahan (2017) 
• In their last year as president Bartlett & Sorokina (2005) 
• Interim president Cheng (2014) 
• Internal hire Langbert & Fox (2013), Monks (2004), Pfeffer & Ross (1988) 
• Listed on Who’s Who Saunders (2007), Sorokina (2003) 
• Member of an external Board Monks (2004) 
• Member of clergy Ehrenberg et al. (2001) 
• Performance at past university Banker et al. (2009) 
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Table 6 
 
Search Strategy 
Database Keywords Additional Search Restrictions Results Returned 
ABI/INFORM Complete 
(“university” OR “college” OR 
“higher education”) AND 
“president” AND 
(“compensation” OR 
“salary” OR “salaries” OR 
“pay”) 
Results limited to journals, working 
papers, reports, dissertation, and 
conference papers 
58 
Academic Search Complete N/A 46 
Business Source Complete N/A 30 
Education Research Complete 
Results limited to journals and 
conference papers 
155 
ERIC N/A 275 
ProQuest Dissertations and Theses N/A 104 
PsycInfo N/A 24 
ScienceDirect N/A 11 
Google Scholar N/A ~1.5 million  
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Table 7  
 
Summary of the Results by Dimension for All Universities 
 
Dimension 
Total 
number 
of effect 
sizes 
Number of 
positive 
effect sizes 
Number of positive 
effect sizes that were 
statistically 
significant 
Number of 
negative effect 
sizes 
Number of 
negative effect 
sizes that were 
statistically 
significant 
Approximate magnitude 
of results based on 
standardized effect sizes 
Panel A: University Performance 
University Performance 81 57 (70%) 35 (67%)* 22 (27%) 8 (36%) weak positive  
Academic and Research 
Performance 
7  4 (57%) 1 (25%) 2 (29%) 0 (0%) weak positive 
Academic and Research 
Quality 
8 5 (63%) 3 (75%)* 3 (38%) 2 (67%) weak to moderate positive 
Faculty Quality 7 6 (86%) 5 (100%)* 1 (14%) 1 (100%) moderate to strong positive 
Financial Performance 27 17 (63%) 8 (53%)* 9 (33%) 3 (33%) nil to weak positive 
Reputation 9 8 (89%) 6 (75%) 1 (9%) 0 (0%) moderate positive 
Selectivity 18 14 (78%) 9 (69%)* 4 (22%) 1 (25%) weak positive 
Other 3 1 (33%) 1 (100%) 2 (67%) 1 (50%) nil to weak positive 
Panel B: Non-Performance Institutional Characteristics 
Non-Performance 
Institutional 
Characteristics Related to 
Size and Complexity  
60 47 (78%) 33 (73%)* 12 (20%) 5 (42%) weak to moderate positive 
Size 34 31 (91%) 25 (83%)* 2 (6%) 0 (0%) moderate positive 
Complexity 25 15 (60%) 7 (50%)* 10 (40%) 5 (50%) weak positive 
Other 25 9 (36%) 7 (78%) 16 (64%) 9 (56%) nil 
Religiously affiliated 6 0 (0%) NA 6 (100%) 6 (100%) weak to moderate negative 
Panel C: President Personal Characteristics 
Demographics       
Gender (male) 12 8 (67%) 3 (43%)* 4 (33%) 1 (25%) nil to weak positive 
Age 2 2 (100%) 1 (100%)* 0 (0%) NA weak positive 
Professional experience       
Prior presidency 6 6 (100%) 2 (40%)* 0 (0%) NA weak positive 
Tenure 13 10 (77%) 6 (75%)* 3 (23%) 0 (0%) nil to weak positive 
Other 11 5 (45%) 4 (80%) 6 (55%) 2 (40%)*  
Alumni status 2 1 (50%) 0 (0%) 1 (50%) 0 (0%) nil to weak positive 
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Note. *indicates the percentage is based on the number of effect sizes for which statistical significance information was available rather than the total number of 
effect sizes. 
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Table 8 
 
Summary of the Results by Dimension for Public Universities 
 
Dimension 
Total 
number of 
effect sizes 
Number of 
positive 
effect sizes 
Number of positive 
effect sizes that 
were statistically 
significant 
Number of 
negative 
effect sizes 
Number of 
negative effect 
sizes that were 
statistically 
significant 
Approximate magnitude of 
results based on standardized 
effect sizes 
Panel A: University Performance 
University Performance 30 18 (60 %) 11 (61%) 10 (30%) 3 (30%) nil to weak positive 
Academic and 
Research Performance 
3 1 (33%) 0 (0%) 1 (33%) 0 (0%) weak positive 
Academic and 
Research Quality 
4 2 (50%) 2 (100%) 2 (50%) 1 (50%) nil to weak positive 
Faculty Quality 2 1 (50%) 1 (100%) 1 (50%) 1 (100%) nil to weak positive 
Financial Performance  7 5 (71%) 3 (43%) 1 (14%) 0 (0%) weak negative to weak positive 
Reputation 5 4 (80%) 2 (50%) 1 (20%) 0 (0%) moderate positive 
Selectivity 8 5 (63%) 3 (60%) 3 (38%) 1 (33%) weak positive 
Other 1 0 (0%) NA 1 (100%) 0 (0%) nil 
Panel B: Non-Performance Institutional Characteristics 
Non-Performance 
Institutional 
Characteristics Related 
to Size and Complexity  
15 12 (80%) 8 (67%) 2 (13%) 0 (0%) moderate positive 
Size 11 9 (82%) 6 (67%) 1 (9%) 0 (0%) moderate positive 
Complexity 4 3 (75%) 2 (67%) 1 (25%) 0 (0%) moderate positive 
Other 9 2 (22%) 0 (0%) 7 (78%) 1 (14%) nil to weak negative 
Religiously affiliated  No relevant effect sizes 
Panel C: President Personal Characteristics 
Demographics       
Gender (male) 3 3 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) NA weak positive 
Age No relevant effect sizes 
Professional Experience       
Prior presidency 2 2 (100% 1 (50%) 0 (0%) NA weak positive 
Tenure 3 0 (0%) NA 3 (100%) 0 (0%) nil to weak negative 
Other 4 1 (25%) 1 (100%) 3 (75%) 1 (33%)  
Alumni status 1 0 (0%) NA 1 (100%) 0 (0%) nil 
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 Note. *indicates the percentage is based on the number of effect sizes for which statistical significance information was available rather than the total number of 
effect sizes.  
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Table 9 
 
Summary of the Results by Dimension for Private Universities 
Note. *indicates the percentage is based on the number of effect sizes for which statistical significance information was available rather than the total number of 
effect sizes.  
Dimension 
Total 
number of 
effect sizes 
Number of positive 
effect sizes 
Number of 
positive effect 
sizes that were 
statistically 
significant 
Number of 
negative effect 
sizes 
Number of 
negative effect 
sizes that were 
statistically 
significant 
Approximate magnitude 
of results based on 
standardized effect sizes 
Panel A: University Performance 
University Performance 39 29 (74%) 16 (67%)* 10 (26%) 4 (40%) weak positive 
Academic and Research 
Performance 
3 3 (100%) 1 (33%) 0 (0%) NA weak positive 
Academic and Research 
Quality 
2 1 (50%) NA* 1 (50%) 1 (100%) nil to weak positive 
Faculty Quality 4 4 (100%) 3 (100%)* 0 (0%) NA strong positive 
Financial Performance 16 8 (50%) 2 (33%)* 8 (50%) 3 (38%) nil to weak positive 
Reputation 4 4 (100%) 4 (100%) 0 (0%) NA moderate positive 
Selectivity 9 8 (89%) 5 (71%)* 1 (11%) 0 (0%) weak positive 
Other No relevant effect sizes 
Panel B: Non-Performance Institutional Characteristics 
Non-Performance 
Institutional 
Characteristics Related to 
Size and Complexity  
36 29 (81%) 19 (70%) 7 (19%) 3 (43%) moderate positive 
Size 20 19 (95%) 16 (89%)* 1 (5%) 0 (0%) moderate positive 
Complexity 16 10 (63%) 3 (33%)* 6 (38%) 3 (50%) moderate positive 
Other 13 7 (54%) 7 (100%) 6 (46%) 5 (83%) weak positive 
Religiously affiliated 5 0 (0%) NA 5 (100%) 4 (80%) weak to moderate negative 
Panel C: President Personal Characteristics 
Demographics       
Gender (male) 8 4 (50%) 2 (66%)* 4 (50%) 1 (25%) nil 
Age 2 2 (100%) 0 (0%)* 0 (0%) NA weak positive 
Professional experience       
Prior presidency 4 4 (100%) 1 (33%)* 0 (0%) NA weak positive 
Tenure 8 8 (100%) 4 (67%)* 0 (0%) NA weak positive 
Other       
Alumni status 1 1 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) NA weak positive 
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Table 10 
 
Operationalizations of Compensation in Prior Studies 
Article 
President 
Salary 
President 
Benefits 
President 
Salary + 
Benefits 
President 
Salary + Bonus 
Total Cash 
Compensation 
Total 
Compensation 
1. Bai (2014)     X1 X 
2. Banker et al. (2009) X2  X    
3. Bartlett and Sorokina (2005)     X3 X 
4. Cheng (2014)      X 
5. Ehrenberg et al. (2001) X      
6. Galle and Walker (2014)      X 
7. Gordon and Fischer (2014) 4       
8. He and Callahan (2017) X      
9. Huang and Chen (2013) X      
10. Hunt et al. (2019)      X 
11. Langbert (2006) X      
12. Langbert and Fox (2013)   X    
13. Monks (2007) X      
14. O'Connell (2005) X  X2    
15. Parsons and Reitenga (2014)   X5   X6 
16. Pati and Lee (2016)    X X7  
17. Pfeffer and Ross (1988) X      
18. Saunders (2007) X      
19. Sorokina (2003) X      
20. Tang et al. (1996)      X 
21. Tang et al. (2000)  X   X9 X 
22.Tang et al. (2004)  X   X9 X 
Sum 10 2 4 1 5 9 
Notes. 1Includes “all salaries, fees, bonuses, and severance payment” (Bai, 2014, p. 4); 2No results reported. The authors stated that they used this as a sensitivity 
analysis; 3Includes “all salaries, fees, bonuses, and severance payment” (Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005, p. 58); 4Compensation is never defined; 5Private university 
compensation was defined as salary plus benefits; 6Public university compensation included salary, benefits, deferred compensation, and bonuses; 7The authors 
specified that total compensation includes salary, bonus, and deferred compensation; 9The authors specified that this included salaries, fees, bonuses, and 
severance payments. 
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Table 11 
 
Study Variable Information 
Variable Description Data source Dimension 
Total Compensation Natural log of all compensation provided to the 
university president. Does not include deferred 
compensation, set aside, or retirement 
compensation 
CHE Compensation 
Change in Total Compensation Natural log of the difference between current year’s 
total compensation and previous year’s total 
compensation; also calculated as the percentage 
increase in total compensation from previous year 
CHE Compensation 
Merit Pay Natural log of the difference between current year’s 
base salary and previous year’s base salary; also 
calculated as a percentage of base salary  
CHE Compensation 
Bonus Natural log of bonuses and incentive compensation 
provided to university president; also calculated as 
a percentage of base salary 
CHE Compensation 
Deferred Compensation, Set Aside  Natural log of deferred compensation that is set 
aside for the university president to be paid out in 
future years; also calculated as a percentage of 
base salary 
CHE Compensation 
Endowment per FTE Natural log of the university’s endowment per FTE IPEDS UP: Financial 
performance 
Change in Endowment per FTE Natural log of the difference between current year’s 
endowment per FTE and previous year’s 
endowment per FTE 
IPEDS UP: Financial 
performance 
Fundraising Natural log of a university’s reported private gifts IPEDS UP: Financial 
performance 
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Variable Description Data source Dimension 
Three-year Cohort Default Rate The percentage of students in a cohort that default 
on certain Federal loans within three years of 
entering repayment; this metric was reverse scored 
in the analyses.  
College Scorecard UP: Academic and 
research 
performance 
Graduation Rate Percentage of cohort that graduates within 150% of 
the normal time. 
IPEDS UP: Academic and 
research 
performance 
Student to Faculty Ratio Total FTE students divided by total FTE faculty 
(excludes students and faculty exclusively 
associated with graduate and/or professional 
degree programs) 
IPEDS UP: Academic and 
research quality 
Average Faculty Salary Average full-time faculty salary earned per month  College Scorecard UP: Faculty 
quality 
U.S. News and World Report Ranking Coded as 0 = unranked, 1 = ranked USNWR UP: Reputation 
Acceptance Rate Number of admitted students divided by number of 
applicants; this metric was reverse scored in the 
analysis  
IPEDS UP: Selectivity 
SAT Average Average SAT equivalent score for all admitted 
students 
College Scorecard UP: Selectivity 
Enrollment Natural log of the university’s full-time equivalent 
(FTE) enrollment  
IPEDS NPIC: Size 
Carnegie Classification Coded as 0 = Baccalaureate/Associate’s universities 
or Associate’s colleges, 1 = Baccalaureate 
university, 2 = Master’s university, 3 = 
Doctoral/Professional university, 4 = Doctoral 
university – High research activity, 5 = Doctoral 
university – Very high research activity 
IPEDS NPIC: Complexity 
Religion Coded as 0 = not religious, 1 = religious IPEDS NPIC: Other 
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Variable Description Data source Dimension 
Institutional Ownership Coded as 0 = public, 1 = private CHE NPIC: Other 
Gender Gender of university president; coded as 0 = male, 1 
= female 
Web searches PC: Demographics 
Tenure University president’s tenure in months CHE PC: Tenure-related 
variables 
Ph.D. University president’s degree; coded as 0 = no Ph.D. 
or equivalent degree; 1 = completed Ph.D. or 
equivalent degree 
Web searches PC: Professional 
experience 
Prior Presidency If the university president had been a president at a 
different university previously, coded as 0 = no 
prior presidency, 1 = at least one prior presidency 
(interim presidencies were not counted) 
Web searches PC: Professional 
experience 
Non-compete Enforceability  Indicator of how legally enforceable a non-compete 
agreement is in the state the university resides in 
Germaise (2011); 
updated by Dr. 
Joseph Coombs 
Control variable 
University Density Number of other colleges/universities in a 
universities metropolitan statistical area 
Calculated using 
data from IPEDS 
Control variable 
Notes. CHE = Chronicle of Higher Education; IPEDS = Integrated Postsecondary Data System; NPIC = Non-performance 
institutional characteristics; PC = Personal characteristics; UP = University performance.  
  
212 
 
Table 12 
 
Correlation Table for the Full Sample for Part I 
 Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Total Compensation - T1a 12.91 .67             
2. Total Compensation - T2 a 12.97 .67 .937**            
3. Total Compensation - T3 a 13.03 .72 .939** .937**           
4. Endowment per FTE - T1 a 10.28 1.52 .239** .238** .237**          
5. Endowment per FTE - T2 a 10.40 1.52 .239** .239** .238** .999**         
6. Endowment per FTE - T3 a 10.42 1.59 .229** .230** .227** .945** .945**        
7. Fundraising - T1 a 15.79 3.01 .235** .230** .256** .397** .402** .392**       
8. Fundraising - T2 a 15.92 2.80 .233** .225** .252** .418** .421** .410** .929**      
9. Fundraising - T3 a 15.90 2.91 .218** .208** .235** .406** .409** .395** .882** .944**     
10. Graduation Rate - T1 63.97 17.32 .330** .327** .342** .702** .704** .677** .423** .435** .426**    
11. Graduation Rate - T2 64.50 17.15 .330** .327** .342** .696** .697** .667** .428** .438** .425** .976**   
12. Graduation Rate - T3 64.63 17.48 .336** .327** .343** .680** .682** .655** .425** .432** .416** .971** .976**  
13. Three-year Default Rate - T1b 93.67 4.27 .258** .242** .259** .516** .521** .502** .346** .355** .357** .790** .796** .794** 
14. Three-year Default Rate - T2 b 94.29 3.95 .257** .246** .264** .491** .494** .479** .350** .355** .352** .766** .772** .773** 
15. Three-year Default Rate - T3 b 95.28 3.46 .249** .237** .258** .512** .514** .495** .347** .361** .354** .785** .787** .788** 
16. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T1 13.97 4.38 -.103* -.108* -.092 -.713** -.709** -.694** -.292** -.317** -.337** -.522** -.521** -.507** 
17. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T2 13.66 4.18 -.093 -.100* -.077 -.703** -.699** -.686** -.287** -.317** -.338** -.500** -.503** -.488** 
18. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T3 13.59 4.21 -.110* -.108* -.086 -.714** -.712** -.693** -.296** -.318** -.345** -.521** -.517** -.510** 
19. Average Faculty Salary - T1 8405.85 2147.18 .491** .503** .513** .380** .384** .363** .367** .374** .359** .618** .617** .633** 
20. Average Faculty Salary - T2 8568.34 2201.33 .484** .498** .507** .379** .382** .361** .362** .368** .356** .625** .622** .638** 
21. Average Faculty Salary - T3 8751.14 2296.87 .487** .503** .516** .376** .379** .360** .352** .359** .337** .622** .623** .636** 
22. Average SAT Score - T1 1140.96 132.01 .434** .451** .443** .628** .629** .601** .425** .452** .426** .863** .862** .869** 
23. Average SAT Score - T2 1142.05 132.68 .430** .445** .439** .621** .622** .597** .430** .459** .433** .856** .859** .863** 
24. Average SAT Score - T3 1145.37 138.28 .461** .471** .462** .612** .613** .586** .430** .459** .434** .855** .859** .862** 
25. Acceptance Rate - T1 b 39.90 19.49 .345** .354** .348** .483** .483** .460** .232** .233** .206** .512** .493** .500** 
26. Acceptance Rate - T2 b 38.99 19.91 .333** .345** .340** .496** .496** .477** .284** .294** .266** .522** .507** .506** 
27. Acceptance Rate - T3 b 37.93 20.66 .326** .333** .337** .511** .510** .491** .279** .287** .267** .530** .513** .512** 
28. FTE Enrollment - T1 a 8.48 1.10 .309** .309** .332** -.386** -.381** -.374** .065 .050 .025 -.015 -.007 .016 
29. FTE Enrollment - T2 a 8.48 1.10 .312** .312** .335** -.386** -.381** -.374** .065 .051 .024 -.013 -.006 .016 
30. FTE Enrollment - T3 a 8.49 1.11 .314** .314** .337** -.384** -.379** -.373** .068 .054 .027 -.010 -.003 .019 
31. Tenure - T1 88.38 72.57 .056 .063 .045 .057 .053 .060 .016 .001 -.025 .021 .026 .038 
32. Tenure - T2 100.20 72.45 .058 .065 .046 .057 .053 .060 .016 .001 -.024 .024 .028 .040 
33. Tenure - T3 112.91 73.15 .058 .064 .047 .052 .048 .056 .014 -.001 -.026 .023 .028 .040 
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 Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
34. University Rank .22 .42 .361** .372** .394** .162** .164** .163** .310** .314** .308** .395** .393** .397** 
35. Carnegie Classification 2.49 1.51 .309** .312** .338** -.138** -.134** -.135** .152** .124* .090 .126* .134** .148** 
36. Religious  .39 .49 -.244** -.244** -.254** .144** .139** .144** .030 .049 .071 .014 .020 -.011 
37. Institutional Ownership .72 .45 .035 .048 .032 .562** .559** .552** .211** .243** .264** .362** .354** .327** 
38. Ph.D.  .75 .43 .015 .039 .066 .020 .020 .000 .019 .018 .014 .094 .086 .085 
39. Gender .19 .40 -.030 -.053 -.044 .093 .096 .093 -.014 -.029 -.073 .052 .045 .044 
40. Prior Presidency .14 .35 -.018 -.004 -.032 -.047 -.049 -.081 -.042 -.054 -.034 -.092 -.109* -.116* 
41. Enforceability Index 4.41 1.99 .042 .042 .031 .060 .055 .026 -.076 -.071 -.114* -.029 -.016 -.037 
42. University Density  55.69 83.62 .209** .236** .236** .072 .073 .074 .076 .095 .105* .192** .195** .203** 
Note. Ns range from 329 to 403; a indicates that the variable was logged; b indicates that the variable was reverse scored. 
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Table 12 (continued) 
 
Correlation Table for the Full Sample for Part I 
Variable 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
14. Three-year Default Rate - T2 .925**               
15. Three-year Default Rate - T3 .905** .925**              
16. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T1 -.427** -.426** -.433**             
17. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T2 -.415** -.406** -.410** .972**            
18. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T3 -.424** -.419** -.424** .961** .972**           
19. Average Faculty Salary - T1 .461** .449** .470** -.176** -.170** -.182**          
20. Average Faculty Salary - T2 .472** .455** .469** -.167** -.159** -.173** .976**         
21. Average Faculty Salary - T3 .458** .447** .463** -.165** -.152** -.164** .976** .980**        
22. Average SAT Score - T1 .680** .665** .695** -.402** -.382** -.386** .723** .725** .724**       
23. Average SAT Score - T2 .673** .662** .685** -.394** -.376** -.381** .732** .734** .731** .991**      
24. Average SAT Score - T3 .671** .657** .672** -.377** -.353** -.363** .740** .745** .740** .985** .991**     
25. Acceptance Rate - T1 b .274** .262** .286** -.332** -.331** -.332** .547** .531** .541** .605** .594** .592**    
26. Acceptance Rate - T2 b .287** .268** .290** -.351** -.349** -.349** .554** .542** .545** .619** .614** .618** .916**  
 
27. Acceptance Rate - T3 b .310** .274** .290** -.337** -.338** -.328** .564** .549** .555** .631** .626** .633** .891** .936**  
28. FTE Enrollment - T1 a -.048 -.055 -.049 .582** .588** .582** .457** .462** .470** .171** .180** .197** .043 .052 .064 
29. FTE Enrollment - T2 a -.047 -.053 -.047 .581** .589** .584** .458** .462** .470** .173** .183** .199** .046 .053 .067 
30. FTE Enrollment - T3 a -.045 -.051 -.044 .580** .588** .584** .460** .464** .472** .174** .183** .200** .048 .054 .070 
31. Tenure - T1 -.011 .029 .026 -.095 -.093 -.096 .006 .006 -.001 -.049 -.072 -.046 .047 .040 .048 
32. Tenure - T2 -.009 .030 .028 -.097 -.095 -.098* .008 .009 .001 -.048 -.071 -.043 .052 .045 .053 
33. Tenure - T3 -.007 .031 .027 -.088 -.084 -.087 .008 .009 .003 -.045 -.068 -.041 .046 .040 .048 
34. University Rank .255** .244** .261** .058 .074 .071 .623** .616** .625** .486** .493** .521** .259** .273** .305** 
35. Carnegie Classification .103* .094 .111* .349** .364** .358** .542** .542** .550** .234** .254** .285** .110* .111* .135** 
36. Religious  .047 .081 .072 -.283** -.281** -.272** -.358** -.355** -.352** -.162** -.177** -.186** -.157** -.154** -.168** 
37. Institutional Ownership .332** .370** .360** -.732** -.734** -.741** -.078 -.091 -.101* .160** .141** .122* .199** .204** .191** 
38. Ph.D.  .042 .013 .052 .054 .060 .077 .062 .068 .083 .066 .079 .074 .050 .006 .030 
39. Gender -.004 .044 .051 -.028 -.023 -.034 .030 .031 .052 .021 .023 .038 .082 .062 .082 
40. Prior Presidency -.134** -.141** -.134** .012 .006 -.002 -.044 -.043 -.043 -.093 -.092 -.103 .042 -.002 .021 
41. Enforceability Index -.047 -.047 -.055 -.066 -.041 -.052 -.132** -.145** -.127* -.014 -.010 .004 -.043 -.033 -.060 
42. University Density  .179** .197** .221** -.130** -.138** -.138** .383** .357** .358** .195** .187** .194** .242** .224** .209** 
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Table 12 (continued) 
 
Correlation Table for the Full Sample for Part I 
Variable 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 
28. FTE Enrollment - T1 a               
29. FTE Enrollment - T2 a .999**              
30. FTE Enrollment - T3 a .998** .999**             
31. Tenure - T1 -.059 -.061 -.059            
32. Tenure - T2 -.059 -.062 -.060 .997**           
33. Tenure - T3 -.049 -.051 -.049 .996** .993**          
34. University Rank .592** .595** .597** -.071 -.068 -.057         
35. Carnegie Classification .835** .837** .838** -.049 -.052 -.039 .728**        
36. Religious  -.432** -.431** -.430** .027 .029 .021 -.245** -.384**       
37. Institutional Ownership -.703** -.702** -.701** .170** .175** .157** -.302** -.596** .499**      
38. Ph.D.  .094 .095 .095 -.020 -.013 -.017 .057 .084 -.041 -.087     
39. Gender -.086 -.084 -.082 -.011 -.008 -.013 -.036 -.052 -.160** .026 .061    
40. Prior Presidency -.028 -.028 -.030 -.035 -.034 -.038 -.067 -.078 .049 .020 .037 -.058   
41. Enforceability Index -.037 -.034 -.032 -.058 -.061 -.057 -.072 -.034 .029 .038 .031 -.010 .011  
42. University Density  .070 .069 .070 .112* .115* .109* .130** .076 -.071 .150** -.014 .006 -.016 -.218** 
Note. Ns range from 329 to 403; a indicates that the variable was logged; b indicates that the variable was reverse scored. 
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Table 13 
 
Standardized Regression Coefficients for Part I 
  Time 1 to Time 2 Time 2 to Time 3 
Variables Full sample Private Public Full sample Private Public 
  β (p) β (p) β (p) β (p) β (p) β (p) 
Panel A: Including Outliers 
University Performance       
Endowment per FTE a .144 (.079) .171 (.125) -.002 (.988) .186 (.028) .252 (.042) -.045 (.698) 
Fundraising a -.017 (.749) .042 (.573) -.007 (.944) -.026 (.630) .029 (.816) .057 (.563) 
Three-year Default Rate b -.036 (.609) .015 (.844) -.270 (.050) .006 (.935) .051 (.518) -.118 (.365) 
Graduation Rate -.238 (.032) -.247 (.050) -.020 (.920) -.177 (.088) -.164 (.177) .105 (.597) 
Student-to-faculty Ratio .044 (.611) .064 (.373) -.025 (.794) .073 (.384) .069 (.331) .092 (.371) 
Average Faculty Salary .196 (.044) .211 (.102) -.135 (.316) .150 (.111) .112 (.364) -.067 (.631) 
University Rank .121 (.128) .235 (.043) .135 (.310) .109 (.155) .213 (.060) .087 (.521) 
Acceptance Rate b .023 (.702) -.014 (.858) -.030 (.754) .003 (.966) -.020 (.802) -.074 (.459) 
Average SAT Score .252 (.021) .192 (.147) .320 (.110) .143 (.191) .044 (.754) .065 (.744) 
Non-performance Institutional Characteristics     
FTE Enrollment a .442 (.001) .342 (.006) .343 (.006) .500 (.000) .430 (.001) .292 (.028) 
Carnegie Classification -.117 (.350) -.263 (.053) .329 (.005) -.057 (.634) -.207 (.112) .357 (.004) 
Religious  -.175 (.002) -.156 (.008) - -.203 (.000) -.183 (.002) - 
Institutional Ownership .390 (.000) - - .479 (.000) - - 
University President Personal Characteristics     
Gender -.066 (.142) -.075 (.161) .069 (.393) -.067 (.137) -.063 (.236) .029 (.726) 
Tenure .009 (.844) .026 (.619) -.051 (.515) -.027 (.541) -.014 (.790) -.028 (.726) 
Ph.D. .033 (.456) .022 (.674) .035 (.672) .056 (.197) .049 (.338) .006 (.946) 
Prior Presidency .032 (.466) .034 (.508) -.011 (.894) -.013 (.768) -.006 (.911) -.071 (.402) 
Control Variables       
Enforceability Index .066 (.157) .072 (.185) .156 (.094) .066 (.152) .070 (.195) .184 (.056) 
University Density .049 (.338) .053 (.393) .289 (.003) .070 (.157) .073 (.219) .266 (.006) 
Panel B: Excluding Outliers  
University Performance       
Endowment per FTE a .121 (.104) .146 (.093) .000 (.998) .132 (.080) .195 (.037) -.112 (.405) 
Fundraising a .027 (.671) .058 (.503) .042 (.662) .033 (.600) .159 (.084) .093 (.351) 
Three-year Default Rate b -.115 (.067) -.011 (.864) -.358 (.014) -.112 (.059) -.007 (.913) -.148 (.259) 
Graduation Rate -.256 (.008) -.285 (.004) .125 (.567) -.078 (.364) -.138 (.163) .145 (.466) 
Student-to-faculty Ratio .033 (.660) .057 (.292) -.074 (.446) .102 (.156) .088 (.108) .043 (.663) 
Average Faculty Salary .218 (.007) .278 (.003) -.145 (.294) .194 (.014) .107 (.278) -.078 (.575) 
University Rank .147 (.032) .292 (.001) .034 (.811) .087 (.177) .249 (.004) .021 (.879) 
Acceptance Rate -.060 (.251) -.094 (.110) -.053 (.582) -.085 (.085) -.107 (.083) -.097 (.321) 
Average SAT Score .364 (.000) .279 (.009) .335 (.099) .195 (.029) .115 (.301) .139 (.503) 
Non-performance Institutional Characteristics     
FTE Enrollment a .604 (.000) .407 (.000) .387 (.003) .597 (.000) .418 (.000) .331 (.014) 
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Carnegie Classification -.084 (.448) -.233 (.023) .320 (.016) .097 (.343) -.148 (.139) .374 (.006) 
Religious  -.170 (.000) -.141 (.002) - -.205 (.000) -.190 (.000) - 
Institutional Ownership .618 (.000) - - .774 (.000) - - 
University President Personal Characteristics     
Gender -.008 (.835) -.010 (.802) .071 (.409) -.032 (.388) .001 (.984) .048 (.596) 
Tenure .116 (.003) .166 (.000) -.113 (.165) .068 (.060) .128 (.002) -.081 (.322) 
Ph.D. .073 (.048) .084 (.027) .009 (.922) .060 (.092) .097 (.014) -.028 (.765) 
Prior Presidency .080 (.029) .085 (.027) -.014 (.863) .008 (.826) .032 (.421) -.072 (.407) 
Control Variables       
Enforceability Index .059 (.133) .045 (.263) .075 (.414) .082 (.029) .045 (.279) .104 (.273) 
University Density .111 (.011) .100 (.033) .275 (.008) .082 (.047) .149 (.002) .262 (.008) 
Note. Time 1 to Time 2 Ns: full sample = 352 (excluding outliers = 312); private universities = 254 (excluding 
outliers = 237); public universities = 98 (excluding outliers = 91); Time 2 to Time 3 Ns: full sample = 355 
(excluding outliers = 317); private universities = 256 (excluding outliers = 239); public universities = 99 (excluding 
outliers = 92).; a indicates that the variable was logged; b indicates that the variable was reverse scored.  
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Table 14 
 
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for Part I 
Variables Full Sample Private Public 
 estimate (SE) R
2 (CI) estimate (SE) R2 (CI) estimate (SE) R2 (CI) 
Panel A: Including Outliers 
University Performance       
Endowment per FTE a .116 (.034)** .024 (.051, .007) .173 (.057)** .021 (.052, .004) .012 (.023) .002 (.035, .000) 
Fundraising a -.003 (.009) .000 (.008, .000) .003 (.014) .000 (.010, .000) .001 (.006) .000 (.027, .000) 
Three-year Default Rate b .002 (.006) .000 (.008, .000) .003 (.008) .000 (.010, .000) -.002 (.007) .001 (.028, .000) 
Graduation Rate -.004 (.003) .002 (.015, .000) -.004 (.003) .002 (.017, .000) .002 (.003) .003 (.037, .000) 
Student-to-faculty Ratio .009 (.010) .001 (.012, .000) .021 (.015) .003 (.021, .000) .003 (.007) .001 (.030, .000) 
Average Faculty Salary .000 (.000) .003 (.017, .000) .000 (.000) .001 (.015, .000) .000 (.000) .000 (.026, .000) 
University Rank .124 (.118) .003 (.016, .000) .435 (.233) .013 (.039, .001) .040 (.069) .003 (.037, .000) 
Acceptance Rate b .000 (.001) .000 (.007, .000) .000 (.002) .000 (.010, .000) .000 (.001) .000 (.026, .000) 
Average SAT Score .001 (.000) .003 (.016, .000) .000 (.001) .001 (.014, .000) .000 (.000) .000 (.026, .000) 
Non-performance Institutional Characteristics     
FTE Enrollment a .305 (.066)** .045 (.079, .020) .387 (.091)** .048 (.090, .019) .145 (.060)* .046 (.118, .007) 
Carnegie Classification -.020 (.051) .000 (.009, .000) -.127 (.078) .009 (.033, .000) .126 (.041)** .081 (.164, .024) 
Religious  -.263 (.075)** .031 (.006, .011) -.262 (.087)** .031 (.067, .008)   
Institutional Ownership .579 (.127)** .045 (.079, .020)     
University President Personal Characteristics     
Gender -.122 (.075) .007 (.025, .000) -.132 (.100) .007 (.028, .000) .024 (.056) .002 (.032, .000) 
Tenure .001 (.000) .004 (.018, .000) .001 (.001) .003 (.021, .000) .000 (.000) .004 (.039, .000) 
Ph.D. .062 (.068) .002 (.015, .000) .041 (.086) .001 (.014, .000) .030 (.061) .002 (.034, .000) 
Prior Presidency .036 (.082) .001 (.009, .000) .040 (.107) .001 (.012, .000) -.046 (.067) .004 (.042, .000) 
Control Variables       
Enforceability Index .024 (.015) .007 (.024, .000) .028 (.020) .007 (.029, .000) .028 (.012)* .052 (.125, .009) 
University Density .001 (.000) .008 (.026, .000) .001 (.000) .007 (.029, .000) .001 (.000)** .072 (.153, .019) 
Panel B: Excluding Outliers 
University Performance       
Endowment per FTE a .134 (.031)** .035 (.066, .013) .196 (.048)** .028 (.063, .006) .019 (.022) .007 (.049, .000) 
Fundraising a .003 (.007) .000 (.008, .000) .006 (.009) .000 (.011, .000) -.001 (.005) .001 (.029, .000) 
Three-year Default Rate b .003 (.004) .000 (.008, .000) .000 (.005) .000 (.010, .000) -.002 (.006) .000 (.028, .000) 
Graduation Rate -.002 (.002) .000 (.009, .000) -.001 (.002) .000 (.011, .000) .000 (.003) .000 (.027, .000) 
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Student-to-faculty Ratio .006 (.007) .001 (.010, .000) .019 (.011) .003 (.020, .000) .000 (.006) .000 (.026, .000) 
Average Faculty Salary .000 (.000)* .003 (.017, .000) .000 (.000) .001 (.016, .000) .000 (.000) .004 (.040, .000) 
University Rank .064 (.116) .001 (.011, .000) .351 (.237) .008 (.032, .000) .050 (.067) .005 (.045, .000) 
Acceptance Rate b .000 (.001) .000 (.008, .000) -.001 (.001) .001 (.013, .000) .000 (.001) .000 (.026, .000) 
Average SAT Score .000 (.000) .001 (.012, .000) .000 (.000) .000 (.012, .000) .000 (.000) .001 (.031, .000) 
Non-performance Institutional Characteristics     
FTE Enrollment a .298 (.061)** .045 (.080, .020) .399 (.084)** .052 (.096, .021) .136 (.056)* .048 (.122, .007) 
Carnegie Classification -.035 (.050) .001 (.012, .000) -.132 (.077) .010 (.035, .000) .100 (.040)* .059 (.137, .011) 
Religious  -.262 (.074)** .032 (.062, .011) -.265 (.087)* .033 (.070, .009)   
Institutional Ownership .402 (.123)** .022 (.049, .006)     
University President Personal Characteristics     
Gender -.105 (.074) .006 (.022, .000) -.119 (.101) .006 (.026, .000) .006 (.055) .000 (.027, .000) 
Tenure .001 (.000)* .012 (.034, .001) .001 (.000) .008 (.032, .000) .000 (.000) .011 (.059, .000) 
Ph.D. .028 (.067) .000 (.010, .000) .009 (.087) .000 (.010, .000) .054 (.059) .008 (.053, .000) 
Prior Presidency .042 (.082) .001 (.011, .000) .044 (.108) .001 (.013, .000) -.040 (.065) .004 (.042, .000) 
Control Variables       
Enforceability Index .023 (.015) .007 (.025, .000) .027 (.020) .007 (.030, .000) .027 (.011)* .053 (.129, .009) 
University Density .001 (.000)* .010 (.030, .001) .001 (.000) .008 (.032, .000) .001 (.000)* .057 (.134, .010) 
Note. Ns: full sample = 705 (excluding outliers = 679); private universities = 507 (excluding outliers = 488); public universities = 198 
(excluding outliers = 190); *indicates p < .05; **indicates p < .01; a indicates that the variable was logged; b indicates that the variable was 
reverse scored; all depicted models account for autocorrelation. 
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Table 15 
 
Correlation Table for Private and Public Universities for Part I 
Variable 
M 
(Private/Public) 
SD 
(Private/Public) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Total Compensation - T1 a 12.93/12.87 .76/.37 - .803** .773** .492** .490** .410** .227* .192* .143 .537** .536** .543** 
2. Total Compensation - T2 a 12.99/12.91 .77/.30 .949** - .914** .535** .530** .438** .253** .210* .140 .604** .620** .619** 
3. Total Compensation - T3 a 13.04/12.99 .82/.35 .953** .939** - .479** .476** .398** .292** .252** .198* .550** .563** .558** 
4. Endowment per FTE - T1 a 1.81/8.91 1.18/1.45 .234** .233** .248** - .999** .829** .305** .275** .258** .669** .683** .672** 
5. Endowment per FTE - T2 a 1.93/9.03 1.18/1.46 .235** .235** .250** .998** - .827** .316** .281** .263** .670** .686** .674** 
6. Endowment per FTE - T3 a 1.96/9.01 1.16/1.69 .242** .243** .256** .988** .990** - .279** .249** .224* .573** .581** .581** 
7. Fundraising - T1 a 16.18/14.77 1.63/4.95 .389** .379** .417** .479** .480** .491** - .972** .911** .334** .346** .346** 
8. Fundraising - T2 a 16.34/14.82 1.32/4.71 .455** .437** .484** .598** .600** .610** .745** - .943** .290** .304** .304** 
9. Fundraising - T3 a 16.38/14.66 1.32/4.89 .463** .442** .486** .558** .560** .570** .742** .928** - .270** .277** .268** 
10. Graduation Rate - T1 67.88/53.93 14.92/19 .324** .320** .353** .633** .635** .644** .535** .676** .679** - .993** .987** 
11. Graduation Rate - T2 68.28/54.8 14.88/18.77 .323** .316** .348** .617** .616** .623** .536** .668** .670** .959** - .993** 
12. Graduation Rate - T3 68.19/55.49 15.58/18.81 .324** .312** .345** .613** .614** .620** .539** .661** .666** .956** .962** - 
13. Three-year Default Rate - T1 b 94.56/91.41 3.71/4.76 .229** .220** .246** .351** .357** .368** .305** .399** .418** .716** .728** .736** 
14. Three-year Default Rate - T2 b 95.2/91.95 3.33/4.45 .240** .229** .258** .282** .287** .296** .312** .389** .406** .691** .703** .716** 
15. Three-year Default Rate - T3 b 96.06/93.3 2.78/4.17 .227** .212** .248** .333** .337** .340** .319** .417** .435** .727** .735** .754** 
16. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T1 11.97/19.1 2.78/3.47 -.133* -.122* -.123* -.634** -.628** -.621** -.343** -.421** -.396** -.468** -.483** -.496** 
17. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T2 11.74/18.58 2.73/3.11 -.120* -.113 -.104 -.616** -.612** -.606** -.317** -.402** -.376** -.437** -.462** -.472** 
18. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T3 11.64/18.58 2.73/3.06 -.134* -.120* -.114 -.620** -.617** -.612** -.317** -.401** -.380** -.457** -.466** -.493** 
19. Average Faculty Salary - T1 8301.17/8674.50 2308.32/1642.45 .501** .515** .524** .534** .538** .537** .614** .740** .737** .708** .700** .707** 
20. Average Faculty Salary - T2 8443.99/8887.45 2368.81/1664.71 .496** .511** .520** .542** .546** .545** .618** .742** .742** .723** .713** .722** 
21. Average Faculty Salary - T3 8606.98/9121.11 2473.96/1717.77 .502** .518** .531** .544** .547** .545** .618** .746** .732** .720** .716** .717** 
22. Average SAT Score - T1 1154.22/1107.46 138.89/106.24 .446** .463** .460** .693** .694** .700** .621** .789** .773** .879** .870** .877** 
23. Average SAT Score - T2 1153.77/1112.11 14.36/105.50 .439** .452** .453** .688** .689** .698** .612** .787** .773** .879** .876** .876** 
24. Average SAT Score - T3 1156.37/1119.44 146.78/112.27 .474** .482** .479** .685** .686** .696** .609** .792** .782** .874** .874** .874** 
25. Acceptance Rate - T1 b 42.22/33.40 19.85/16.91 .384** .388** .394** .610** .612** .617** .575** .656** .654** .559** .530** .528** 
26. Acceptance Rate - T2 b 41.43/32.21 2.5/16.45 .363** .370** .376** .607** .610** .634** .549** .651** .641** .567** .542** .532** 
27. Acceptance Rate - T3 b 40.29/31.34 21.35/17.02 .357** .359** .374** .619** .620** .642** .566** .667** .663** .559** .533** .521** 
28. FTE Enrollment - T1 a 8.00/9.72 .85/.58 .455** .477** .491** -.123* -.119* -.093 .431** .543** .569** .308** .307** .307** 
29. FTE Enrollment - T2 a 8.00/9.72 .85/.58 .459** .480** .493** -.126* -.123* -.098 .430** .543** .568** .306** .303** .302** 
30. FTE Enrollment - T3 a 8.00/9.73 .86/.59 .461** .482** .495** -.124* -.122* -.098 .431** .545** .569** .308** .304** .302** 
31. Tenure - T1 96.07/68.64 77.01/55.26 .049 .061 .039 -.087 -.094 -.096 .020 -.011 -.058 -.059 -.056 -.029 
32. Tenure - T2 108.1/79.91 77.06/54.19 .049 .061 .039 -.087 -.094 -.096 .020 -.012 -.059 -.060 -.056 -.029 
33. Tenure - T3 12.07/94.51 77.01/58.57 .049 .061 .039 -.087 -.094 -.096 .020 -.011 -.058 -.059 -.056 -.029 
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Variable 
M 
(Private/Public) 
SD 
(Private/Public) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
34. University Ranked .14/.42 .35/.50 .430** .451** .481** .335** .334** .334** .585** .715** .709** .437** .428** .423** 
35. Carnegie Classification 1.93/3.93 1.18/1.28 .388** .415** .437** .100 .100 .105 .493** .624** .620** .298** .300** .293** 
36. Religious  .54/.00 .50/.00 -.316** -.318** -.323** -.237** -.245** -.245** -.188** -.207** -.181** -.264** -.246** -.265** 
37. Ph.D.  .73/.81 .44/.39 .002 .023 .051 .122* .124* .115 .035 .039 .041 .124* .107 .103 
38. Gender .20/.18 .4/.38 -.057 -.075 -.059 .096 .100 .098 .000 -.022 -.068 .032 .032 .024 
39. Prior Presidency .15/.13 .36/.34 .017 .028 .003 -.010 -.015 -.016 .016 -.004 .030 -.066 -.085 -.083 
40. Enforceability Index 4.46/4.29 1.98/2.03 .016 .016 .003 -.016 -.021 -.030 -.048 -.009 -.047 -.039 -.021 -.058 
41. University Density  63.51/35.62 91.05/56.03 .208** .229** .233** -.025 -.023 -.026 .098 .152** .180** .171** .173** .187** 
Note. Private university correlations are below the diagonal; public university correlations are above the diagonal; Ns for private universities range from 231 to 
290; Ns for public universities range from 98 to 113; a indicates that the variable was logged; b indicates that the variable was reverse scored. 
  
222 
 
Table 15 (cont.) 
 
Correlation Table for Private and Public Universities for Part I 
Variable 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
1. Total Compensation - T1 a .494** .461** .475** -.070 -.038 -.122 .485** .469** .455** .432** .423** .413** .178 .196* 
2. Total Compensation - T2 a .499** .502** .530** -.096 -.046 -.095 .537** .531** .520** .497** .502** .488** .208* .247* 
3. Total Compensation - T3 a .486** .486** .513** -.044 .020 -.021 .519** .506** .501** .442** .440** .429** .112 .156 
4. Endowment per FTE - T1 a .538** .502** .498** -.371** -.333** -.379** .506** .517** .530** .542** .549** .557** .016 .049 
5. Endowment per FTE - T2 a .542** .504** .499** -.367** -.332** -.380** .508** .519** .532** .542** .548** .556** .013 .045 
6. Endowment per FTE - T3 a .457** .430** .426** -.357** -.335** -.350** .450** .457** .481** .470** .488** .485** .011 .017 
7. Fundraising - T1 a .340** .330** .312** -.147 -.151 -.179 .364** .356** .333** .331** .364** .369** -.152 -.030 
8. Fundraising - T2 a .301** .292** .283** -.130 -.141 -.146 .345** .337** .316** .322** .353** .359** -.146 -.033 
9. Fundraising - T3 a .289** .269** .256** -.165 -.185 -.202* .336** .333** .300** .292** .322** .330** -.195 -.019 
10. Graduation Rate - T1 .835** .790** .793** -.303** -.253** -.309** .749** .760** .780** .846** .829** .841** .261** .279** 
11. Graduation Rate - T2 .834** .790** .790** -.293** -.241** -.297** .752** .759** .781** .859** .844** .851** .269** .287** 
12. Graduation Rate - T3 .826** .787** .779** -.279** -.228* -.289** .746** .750** .778** .855** .842** .845** .303** .315** 
13. Three-year Default Rate - T1 b - .947** .920** -.286** -.238* -.295** .679** .680** .680** .765** .740** .747** .104 .124 
14. Three-year Default Rate - T2 b .894** - .962** -.250** -.191* -.250** .671** .671** .671** .758** .738** .734** .130 .166 
15. Three-year Default Rate - T3 b .877** .878** - -.244** -.194* -.231* .665** .664** .658** .778** .757** .753** .176 .222* 
16. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T1 -.286** -.243** -.284** - .920** .901** -.276** -.275** -.310** -.248* -.263** -.254* .009 -.018 
17. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T2 -.285** -.227** -.258** .953** - .930** -.272** -.257** -.283** -.202* -.227* -.217* -.026 -.031 
18. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T3 -.273** -.223** -.267** .923** .943** - -.286** -.279** -.293** -.212* -.246* -.229* -.010 -.018 
19. Average Faculty Salary - T1 .485** .486** .526** -.380** -.364** -.391** - .981** .969** .684** .671** .703** .317** .390** 
20. Average Faculty Salary - T2 .509** .504** .533** -.381** -.367** -.393** .975** - .972** .688** .670** .712** .287** .363** 
21. Average Faculty Salary - T3 .496** .500** .536** -.381** -.360** -.386** .977** .981** - .714** .694** .729** .336** .385** 
22. Average SAT Score - T1 .647** .629** .667** -.539** -.506** -.498** .770** .777** .773** - .987** .982** .311** .376** 
23. Average SAT Score - T2 .651** .637** .666** -.540** -.506** -.498** .778** .786** .780** .991** - .986** .292** .373** 
24. Average SAT Score - T3 .645** .633** .647** -.536** -.491** -.498** .779** .788** .781** .986** .993** - .264** .362** 
25. Acceptance Rate - T1 b .277** .246** .270** -.409** -.383** -.386** .642** .632** .637** .663** .654** .665** - .881** 
26. Acceptance Rate - T2 b .285** .240** .257** -.428** -.407** -.406** .633** .627** .629** .660** .656** .669** .920** - 
27. Acceptance Rate - T3 b .314** .259** .270** -.425** -.403** -.388** .630** .621** .623** .671** .666** .680** .899** .938** 
28. FTE Enrollment - T1 a .227** .281** .269** .128* .127* .114 .584** .576** .581** .425** .412** .408** .311** .314** 
29. FTE Enrollment - T2 a .222** .276** .264** .132* .135* .124* .582** .573** .578** .428** .413** .408** .312** .314** 
30. FTE Enrollment - T3 a .224** .276** .266** .130* .135* .126* .582** .573** .578** .429** .415** .409** .314** .315** 
31. Tenure - T1 -.098 -.056 -.062 .033 .018 .023 .029 .030 .023 -.082 -.101 -.083 .043 .022 
32. Tenure - T2 -.098 -.056 -.062 .034 .019 .023 .029 .030 .023 -.083 -.102 -.083 .043 .021 
33. Tenure - T3 -.098 -.056 -.062 .033 .018 .023 .029 .030 .023 -.082 -.101 -.083 .043 .022 
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Variable 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
34. University Ranked .257** .288** .296** -.229** -.206** -.208** .656** .643** .646** .547** .555** .569** .456** .467** 
35. Carnegie Classification .218** .257** .258** -.106 -.102 -.096 .633** .618** .624** .440** .452** .465** .387** .392** 
36. Religious  -.185** -.166** -.181** .175** .178** .204** -.404** -.391** -.381** -.323** -.328** -.339** -.332** -.329** 
37. Ph.D.  .066 .031 .064 -.054 -.042 -.008 .043 .047 .063 .111 .123* .108 .107 .064 
38. Gender -.013 .047 .084 -.048 -.042 -.051 .030 .024 .047 .007 .007 .013 .074 .064 
39. Prior Presidency -.112 -.111 -.112 .008 .025 .009 .001 .003 .005 -.058 -.052 -.064 .054 .017 
40. Enforceability Index -.060 -.074 -.104 -.078 -.077 -.085 -.123* -.131* -.116* -.030 -.025 .007 -.057 -.035 
41. University Density  .156** .173** .207** -.016 -.016 -.032 .400** .378** .381** .182** .175** .185** .194** .171** 
Note. Private university correlations are below the diagonal; public university correlations are above the diagonal; Ns for private universities range from 231 to 
290; Ns for public universities range from 98 to 113; a indicates that the variable was logged; b indicates that the variable was reverse scored. 
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Table 15 (cont.) 
 
Correlation Table for Private and Public Universities for Part I 
Variable 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 
1. Total Compensation - T1 a .169 .596** .605** .609** .066 .077 .084 .422** .629** - .117 .106 -.218* .175 .200* 
2. Total Compensation - T2 a .205* .614** .619** .628** .021 .031 .041 .489** .681** - .203* .071 -.236* .214* .292** 
3. Total Compensation - T3 a .136 .624** .628** .636** .049 .063 .072 .439** .657** - .205* .030 -.271** .196* .258** 
4. Endowment per FTE - T1 a .112 .438** .447** .456** .067 .055 .073 .542** .674** - -.013 .100 -.203* .187* .022 
5. Endowment per FTE - T2 a .110 .442** .451** .459** .070 .058 .075 .541** .678** - -.015 .101 -.196* .178 .025 
6. Endowment per FTE - T3 a .078 .324** .335** .342** .091 .081 .096 .509** .594** - -.056 .096 -.287** .078 .036 
7. Fundraising - T1 a -.002 .347** .348** .358** -.082 -.086 -.076 .333** .327** - .056 -.043 -.118 -.142 .008 
8. Fundraising - T2 a .003 .318** .318** .327** -.102 -.105 -.094 .326** .257** - .059 -.060 -.126 -.164 .005 
9. Fundraising - T3 a -.032 .267** .266** .274** -.138 -.144 -.126 .341** .219* - .052 -.126 -.108 -.231* .000 
10. Graduation Rate - T1 .346** .569** .589** .601** -.008 -.002 .018 .757** .758** - .168 .075 -.196* -.060 .111 
11. Graduation Rate - T2 .359** .580** .600** .611** .011 .014 .038 .756** .764** - .173 .055 -.211* -.050 .119 
12. Graduation Rate - T3 .385** .590** .609** .620** .007 .010 .031 .747** .766** - .164 .070 -.234* -.040 .121 
13. Three-year Default Rate - T1 b .145 .460** .479** .485** -.008 -.005 .022 .593** .734** - .101 -.016 -.232* -.069 .112 
14. Three-year Default Rate - T2 b .149 .443** .463** .473** .013 .010 .036 .556** .720** - .092 .017 -.257** -.050 .128 
15. Three-year Default Rate - T3 b .196* .473** .493** .503** .015 .017 .034 .562** .728** - .150 -.023 -.227* -.024 .162 
16. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T1 .009 .195* .181 .179 .079 .091 .062 -.283** -.264** - .079 .061 .110 -.014 -.084 
17. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T2 -.032 .230* .222* .222* .143 .155 .135 -.269** -.205* - .089 .079 .045 .105 -.141 
18. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T3 .001 .184 .176 .175 .120 .131 .109 -.292** -.279** - .090 .049 .046 .072 -.074 
19. Average Faculty Salary - T1 .451** .478** .489** .503** -.028 -.011 -.015 .675** .613** - .107 .042 -.210* -.157 .409** 
20. Average Faculty Salary - T2 .421** .490** .500** .512** -.020 -.003 -.007 .670** .630** - .115 .071 -.211* -.191* .367** 
21. Average Faculty Salary - T3 .462** .479** .490** .502** -.017 .000 -.002 .692** .623** - .127 .087 -.224* -.157 .370** 
22. Average SAT Score - T1 .401** .410** .425** .429** -.055 -.051 -.023 .715** .642** - -.015 .057 -.262** .020 .153 
23. Average SAT Score - T2 .395** .398** .412** .414** -.076 -.071 -.044 .706** .636** - -.007 .067 -.275** .020 .148 
24. Average SAT Score - T3 .393** .408** .422** .426** -.013 .006 .019 .716** .661** - .024 .105 -.283** -.014 .153 
25. Acceptance Rate - T1 b -.837** .092 .107 .113 -.107 -.084 -.090 .137 .098 - -.066 .092 -.034 -.032 .365** 
26. Acceptance Rate - T2 b -.915** .141 .149 .153 -.056 -.034 -.037 .172 .098 - -.117 .035 -.121 -.052 .375** 
27. Acceptance Rate - T3 b  .137 .146 .152 -.063 -.041 -.046 .233
* .138 - -.056 .074 -.106 -.111 .377** 
28. FTE Enrollment - T1 a .320** - .997** .995** .104 .131 .110 .446** .592** - .313** .091 -.159 .042 .059 
29. FTE Enrollment - T2 a .323** .999** - .999** .094 .121 .102 .458** .605** - .318** .096 -.160 .049 .058 
30. FTE Enrollment - T3 a .326** .996** .999** - .091 .118 .099 .471** .617** - .316** .092 -.159 .049 .066 
31. Tenure - T1 .036 .084 .081 .085 - .982** .977** -.068 .102 - -.086 -.034 -.136 .043 -.040 
32. Tenure - T2 .036 .083 .080 .084 1.000** - .962** -.051 .104 - -.048 -.026 -.134 .033 -.032 
33. Tenure - T3 .036 .084 .081 .085 1.000** 1.000** - -.028 .115 - -.072 -.041 -.142 .046 -.043 
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Variable 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 
34. University Ranking .485** .643** .645** .644** -.004 -.004 -.004 - .497** - .042 .024 -.178 -.142 .147 
35. Carnegie Classification .408** .784** .785** .784** .056 .056 .056 .853** - - .206* .026 -.285** .032 .090 
36. Religious -.339** -.143* -.143* -.141* -.074 -.074 -.074 -.152** -.151* - - - - - - 
37. Ph.D.  .077 -.016 -.015 -.013 .014 .014 .014 .029 -.020 .004 - .102 .120 .114 -.039 
38. Gender .081 -.144* -.142* -.136* -.010 -.010 -.010 -.059 -.075 -.232** .051 - .024 .002 -.151 
39. Prior Presidency .043 .016 .016 .012 -.013 -.014 -.013 -.006 -.002 .053 .012 -.087 - -.057 -.023 
40. Enforceability Index -.053 -.031 -.027 -.024 -.097 -.098 -.097 -.021 -.034 .014 .007 -.016 .036 - -.045 
41. University Density  .154** .281** .278** .278** .111 .112 .111 .216** .245** -.182** .007 .037 -.019 -.277** - 
 Note. Private university correlations are below the diagonal; public university correlations are above the diagonal; Ns for private universities range from 231 to 
290; Ns for public universities range from 98 to 113; a indicates that the variable was logged; b indicates that the variable was reverse scored. 
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Table 16 
 
R-square Change when Category of Variables is Entered Last into the Model for Part I 
  Time 1 to Time 2 Time 2 to Time 3 
Variables Full sample Private Public Full sample Private Public 
  ΔR2 (p) ΔR2 (p) ΔR2 (p) ΔR2 (p) ΔR2 (p) ΔR2 (p) 
(a) Including outliers  
University performance .075 (.000) .096 (.000) .048 (.442) .052 (.001) .075 (.001) .020 (.939) 
University Size and 
Complexity .025 (.001) .022 (.015) .147 (.000) .038 (.000) .030 (.003) .141 (.000) 
University President 
Personal 
Characteristics .006 (.504) .007 (.577) .009 (.798) .007 (.409) .006 (.685) .006 (.915) 
(b) Excluding outliers  
University performance .103 (.000) .128 (.000) .064 (.269) .060 (.000) .099 (.000) .024 (.908) 
University Size and 
Complexity .037 (.000) .027 (.000) .143 (.000) .049 (.000) .026 (.000) .143 (.000) 
University President 
Personal 
Characteristics .022 (.002) .038 (.000) .017 (.544) .008 (.145) .025 (.003) .013 (.721) 
Note. Time 1 to Time 2 Ns: full sample = 352 (excluding outliers = 312); private universities = 254 (excluding 
outliers = 237); public universities = 98 (excluding outliers = 91); Time 2 to Time 3 Ns: full sample = 355 
(excluding outliers = 317); private universities = 256 (excluding outliers = 239); public universities = 99 (excluding 
outliers = 92).  
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Table 17  
Correlation Matrix for Part II 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Change Total Compensation - T1 15.54 0.81           
2. Change Total Compensation - T2 14.56 0.75 -.017          
3. Change Total Compensation - T3 15.27 0.78 -.008 -.086         
4. Relative Change Total Compensation - T1 0.83 0.99 .043 -.005 -.005        
5. Relative Change Total Compensation - T2 0.73 0.14 -.001 .233** -.500** .037       
6. Relative Change Total Compensation - T3 0.73 0.13 .002 -.040 .298** .004 -.390**      
7. Merit Pay - T1 12.32 0.69 .004 -.035 .007 .086 .014 .027     
8. Merit Pay - T2 12.45 0.64 -.017 -.026 .003 .135** .059 .014 -.248**    
9. Merit Pay - T3 12.99 0.66 -.011 -.007 .003 .002 -.011 .042 .000 -.044   
10. Relative Merit Pay - T1 0.96 1.61 .013 .006 -.007 .483** .025 -.016 .188** .054 .004  
11. Relative Merit Pay - T2 0.77 0.80 .004 .002 .004 .008 .023 -.020 -.691** .109* -.017 -.021 
12. Relative Merit Pay - T3 0.74 0.59 -.013 .002 .004 -.007 -.004 .000 .016 -.980** .103* .002 
13. Bonus - T1 2.94 4.91 -.093 -.109* -.094 -.045 -.046 .078 .046 .033 .034 -.004 
14. Bonus - T2 3.12 5.00 -.093 -.095 -.093 -.052 .042 .029 .041 -.090 .043 -.009 
15. Bonus - T3 3.38 5.17 -.086 -.095 -.081 -.061 -.003 .206** .024 .050 .031 -.057 
16. Relative Bonus - T1 0.05 0.11 -.080 -.229** -.277** -.032 .055 .005 .042 .036 .029 -.037 
17. Relative Bonus - T2 0.08 0.63 -.079 -.023 -.044 -.043 .022 -.018 .030 -.966** .041 -.047 
18. Relative Bonus - T3 0.06 0.14 -.052 -.099* -.265** -.045 .116* .218** .032 .039 .024 -.059 
19. Deferred Compensation - T1 8.28 4.50 -.059 -.014 -.049 -.051 .038 .144** .116* -.001 .100* .035 
20. Deferred Compensation - T2 8.34 4.45 -.058 -.022 -.008 -.022 -.036 .129* .124* -.005 .099* .047 
21. Deferred Compensation - T3 8.33 4.48 -.058 -.021 -.013 -.095 -.018 .071 .015 -.001 .100* .000 
22. Relative Deferred Compensation - T1 0.14 0.62 -.032 .015 -.050 -.031 .163** -.001 .006 .006 .010 -.019 
23. Relative Deferred Compensation - T2 0.13 0.46 -.178** .004 .015 -.039 -.025 .053 .058 -.952** .048 -.048 
24. Relative Deferred Compensation - T3 0.11 0.13 -.157** .013 .033 -.050 -.045 .125* .033 .014 .043 -.057 
25. Change Endowment per FTE - T1 7.39 0.54 -.100 .015 .004 -.022 .042 -.055 .014 .014 .060 -.023 
26. Change Endowment per FTE - T2 9.29 0.90 .015 -.051 .030 -.018 .046 .058 .013 .037 .020 .028 
27. Change Endowment per FTE - T3 11.55 0.60 -.003 .019 -.003 .006 .002 -.020 -.003 .001 -.003 .008 
28. Change Endowment per FTE - T4 12.78 0.65 -.004 -.004 -.003 -.001 .008 .008 -.044 .001 -.003 .001 
29. Change FTE Enrollment - T1 8.19 0.42 .001 -.018 -.011 .016 -.002 -.033 .003 -.005 .003 .005 
30. Change FTE Enrollment - T2 9.87 0.50 -.003 -.005 -.006 .008 .000 -.013 .007 .002 -.014 .008 
31. Change FTE Enrollment - T3 7.08 0.29 -.021 -.032 -.052 -.054 .051 -.066 .006 .003 -.030 -.051 
32. Change FTE Enrollment - T4 7.89 0.44 -.017 -.040 -.010 .002 .004 .017 -.020 -.003 .247** -.002 
228 
 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
33. Religious 0.40 0.49 .044 .031 .035 .042 -.003 -.086 -.077 -.065 .031 .000 
34. Institutional Ownership 0.73 0.44 -.029 -.023 -.031 .038 .037 -.021 -.019 -.026 .083 .073 
35. Enforceability Index 4.43 2.00 .038 .039 -.043 .105* .010 -.014 .030 -.069 -.069 .058 
36. University Density 40471.22 27103.51 .057 .010 .003 .006 -.013 -.023 -.018 -.122* .024 .032 
Note. Ns range from 395 to 369; all variables were logged except for religion, institutional ownership, enforceability index, and university density; * indicate p < 
.05, ** indicates p < .01. 
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Table 17 (cont.) 
Correlation Matrix for Part II 
Variable 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
12. Relative Merit Pay - T3 -.090            
13. Bonus - T1 -.044 -.027           
14. Bonus - T2 -.052 .099* .777**          
15. Bonus - T3 -.045 -.032 .684** .714**         
16. Relative Bonus - T1 -.032 -.019 .810** .669** .601**        
17. Relative Bonus - T2 -.054 .981** .082 .230** .073 .118*       
18. Relative Bonus - T3 -.032 -.023 .519** .516** .764** .666** .092      
19. Deferred Compensation - T1 -.134** .021 .143** .097 .085 .129* .026 .139**     
20. Deferred Compensation - T2 -.138** .018 .182** .149** .108* .142** .028 .114* .772**    
21. Deferred Compensation - T3 -.060 .020 .132** .127* .087 .108* .027 .109* .739** .802**   
22. Relative Deferred Compensation - T1 -.017 -.009 -.010 -.014 -.013 .006 -.008 .021 .164** .006 -.002  
23. Relative Deferred Compensation - T2 -.065 .962** -.005 .116* -.006 -.007 .955** .011 .130** .163** .131** .021 
24. Relative Deferred Compensation - T3 -.052 -.026 .077 .072 .088 .055 -.017 .118* .433** .485** .569** .107* 
25. Change Endowment per FTE - T1 -.012 .001 .094 .127* .043 .044 .012 .037 -.081 -.046 -.063 -.009 
26. Change Endowment per FTE - T2 .005 -.023 -.030 -.029 -.035 -.019 -.027 .015 .225** .230** .237** .019 
27. Change Endowment per FTE - T3 .006 -.006 .021 .019 .021 .018 .001 .011 -.018 -.020 -.021 .000 
28. Change Endowment per FTE - T4 .007 .003 .033 .034 .037 .027 .007 .025 -.032 -.034 -.033 .006 
29. Change FTE Enrollment - T1 -.004 .003 -.080 -.064 -.063 -.020 -.003 -.034 -.048 -.047 -.034 -.002 
30. Change FTE Enrollment - T2 .004 -.003 .032 -.071 -.066 .026 .002 .007 .089 -.038 -.038 .011 
31. Change FTE Enrollment - T3 -.020 .007 -.003 .049 .101* .012 .009 .094 -.159** -.091 -.065 -.004 
32. Change FTE Enrollment - T4 .000 .017 .058 .077 .073 .052 .010 .053 -.007 .109* -.002 .014 
33. Religious Orientation .084 .059 -.053 -.106* -.125* -.063 .046 -.097 .127* .127* .110* .049 
34. Institutional Ownership .037 .033 .096 -.008 -.021 .095 .034 .060 .510** .454** .484** .066 
35. Enforceability Index -.004 .056 .067 .136** .068 .092 .088 .093 .000 -.002 -.023 -.036 
36. University Density -.022 .113* -.123* -.083 -.141** -.117* .089 -.109* -.007 -.031 -.067 -.019 
Note. Ns range from 395 to 369; all variables were logged except for religion, institutional ownership, enforceability index, and university density.  
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Table 17 (cont.) 
Correlation Matrix for Part II 
Variable 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 
24. Relative Deferred Compensation - T3 .195**             
25. Change Endowment per FTE - T1 -.007 -.039            
26. Change Endowment per FTE - T2 .011 .152** -.028           
27. Change Endowment per FTE - T3 -.002 -.002 .003 -.190**          
28. Change Endowment per FTE - T4 .005 .007 .008 -.088 -.030         
29. Change FTE Enrollment - T1 .003 .019 -.042 -.029 .002 -.002        
30. Change FTE Enrollment - T2 -.002 -.016 -.021 .032 -.001 -.004 .001       
31. Change FTE Enrollment - T3 .002 .019 .142** -.046 -.007 .002 .043 -.126*      
32. Change FTE Enrollment - T4 .023 .062 .044 .036 -.011 -.001 -.062 -.070 .228**    
33. Religious  .045 -.060 .010 -.088 .047 .049 .021 .039 -.147** -.074   
 
34. Institutional Ownership .057 .146** -.142** .263** -.022 -.041 -.060 .079 -.248** -.055 .489**  
 
35. Enforceability Index .056 -.040 -.024 -.023 .108* .018 -.045 .036 -.067 .014 .023 .026 
 
36. University Density .083 -.094 .003 .062 .006 .022 .045 .001 -.024 -.030 .081 .042 .028 
Note. Ns range from 395 to 369; all variables were logged except for religion, institutional ownership, enforceability index, and university density.  
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Table 18  
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Δ Endowment on Δ Total Compensation 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) 
Panel A: Including Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment .311 (.030)** .199 (.040)** -.024 (.059) .189 (.041)** .109 (.048)* 
Institutional Ownership .097 (.069) -.136 (.069)* -.115 (.070) -.155 (.070)** -.122 (.071) 
Religious    .086 (.062) .116 (.062) .106 (.062) .127 (.063)* .103 (.063) 
Enforceability Index -.001 (.013) .000 (.013) -.001 (.013) .001 (.013) .001 (.013) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Δ Endowment per FTE  .134 (.032)** .005 (.072) .142 (.033)** .264 (.050)** 
Time   .705 (.140)**   
Time* Δ Endowment per 
FTE   .039 (.086)   
Δ Endowment per FTE2    .010 (.007) -.027 (.014) 
Δ Endowment per FTE3     -.007 (.002)** 
Log Likelihood -922.913 -914.360 -901.146 -913.350 -908.024 
Δ Log Likelihood 59.655** a 8.553** b 13.214** c 1.010 c 5.326** d 
Panel B: Excluding Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment .416 (.005)** .409 (.006)** -.003 (.005) .189 (.041)** .133 (.008)* 
Institutional Ownership .018 (.005)** .016 (.005)** .010 (.005)* -.155 (.070)* .002 (.010) 
Religious -.006 (.005) -.005 (.005) -.006 (.004) .127 (.063)* -.008 (.009) 
Enforceability Index -.001 (.001) -.001 (.001) -.001 (.001) .001 (.013) .000 (.002) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Δ Endowment per FTE  .007 (.003) .005 (.006) .142 (.033)** .216 (.009)* 
Time   .710 (.013)**   
Time* Δ Endowment per 
FTE   -.002 (.007)   
Δ Endowment per FTE2    .010 (.007) -.029 (.002)* 
Δ Endowment per FTE3     -.007 (.000)* 
Note.  N = 789 before outlier removal and ranged from 783 to 785 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; ** 
indicates p < .01; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates model was compared to 
Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2, d indicates that model was compared to Model 4; log 
likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because models with different Ns 
are not comparable; unstandardized estimates are shown; level 1 variables (FTE Enrollment and Endowment per 
FTE) were grand mean centered; all depicted models account for autocorrelation; Endowment per FTE, FTE 
enrollment, and total compensation were logged; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Δ Total 
Compensation were logged; Δ = ‘change in’.  
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Table 19 
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Δ Endowment on Relative Δ Total Compensation 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) 
Panel A: Including Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment .001 (.006) -.005 (.007) -.003 (.010) -.006 (.007) -.009 (.008) 
Institutional Ownership .012 (.010) .010 (.010) .010 (.010) .000 (.002) .000 (.002) 
Religious -.017 (.009) -.015 (.009) -.015 (.009) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Enforceability Index .000 (.002) .000 (.002) .000 (.002) .007 (.010) .009 (.010) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) -.014 (.009) -.015 (.009) 
Δ Endowment per FTE  .008 (.005) .008 (.012) .009 (.005) .013 (.008) 
Time   -.006 (.024)   
Time* Δ Endowment per 
FTE   .001 (.014)   
Δ Endowment per FTE2    .001 (.001) .000 (.002) 
Δ Endowment per FTE3     .000 (.000) 
Log Likelihood 480.091 481.155 481.192 481.818 482.053 
Δ Log Likelihood 34.388** a 1.064 b 0.037 c 0.663 c 0.235 d 
Panel B: Excluding Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment -.002 (.003) -.006 (.004) -.006 (.006) -.007 (.004) -.009 (.005) 
Institutional Ownership -.006 (.006) -.007 (.006) -.005 (.006) -.009 (.006) -.008 (.006) 
Religious -.006 (.005) -.004 (.005) -.006 (.006) -.003 (.005) -.004 (.006) 
Enforceability Index -.001 (.001) -.001 (.001) -.001 (.001) -.001 (.001) -.002 (.001) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Δ Endowment per FTE  .005 (.003) .016 (.007)* .007 (.003)* .011 (.005)* 
Time   -.006 (.014)   
Time* Δ Endowment per 
FTE   -.014 (.008)   
Δ Endowment per FTE2    .001 (.001) -.001 (.001) 
Δ Endowment per FTE3         .000 (.000) 
Note.  N = 789 before outlier removal and ranged from 756 to 757 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; ** 
indicates p < .01; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates model was compared to 
Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2, d indicates that model was compared to Model 4; log 
likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because models with different Ns 
are not comparable; unstandardized estimates are shown; level 1 variables (FTE Enrollment and Endowment per 
FTE) were grand mean centered; all depicted models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE 
Enrollment, and Relative Δ Total Compensation were logged; Δ = ‘change in’.      
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Table 20 
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Δ Endowment on Merit Pay 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) 
Panel A: Including Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment .242 (.025)** .164 (.034)** -.012 (.050) .159 (.035)** .096 (.041)** 
Institutional Ownership .074 (.059) .048 (.059) .075 (.061) .039 (.060) .065 (.061) 
Religious -.054 (.054) -.033 (.054) -.047 (.054) -.028 (.054) -.047 (.054) 
Enforceability Index -.022 (.011) -.021 (.011) -.022 (.011) -.021 (.011) -.021 (.011) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Δ Endowment per FTE  .091 (.027)** .028 (.062) .095 (.028)** .191 (.042)** 
Time   .532 (.119)**   
Time* Δ Endowment per 
FTE   -.023 (.073)   
Δ Endowment per FTE2    .005 (.006) -.025 (.012)* 
Δ Endowment per FTE3     -.006 (.002)** 
Log Likelihood -791.625 -786.087 -774.7041 -785.818 -781.253 
Δ Log Likelihood 50.983**a 5.538**b 11.383**c 0.269c 4.565**d 
Panel B: Excluding Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment .322 (.005)** .227 (.008)** -.010 (.008) .222 (.008)** .097 (.008)** 
Institutional Ownership .016 (.009) .007 (.011) .009 (.009) .000 (.011) .001 (.011) 
Religious -.012 (.008) -.008 (.010) -.011 (.008) -.004 (.010) -.012 (.010) 
Enforceability Index -.001 (.002) .000 (.002) -.002 (.002) .000 (.002) -.001 (.002) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Δ Endowment per FTE  .053 (.006)** .009 (.010) .056 (.006)** .182 (.009)** 
Time   .546 (.019)*   
Time* Δ Endowment per 
FTE   -.002 (.012)   
Δ Endowment per FTE2    .003 (.001)** -.023 (.002)** 
Δ Endowment per FTE3         -.005 (.000)** 
Note.  N = 789 before outlier removal and ranged from 785 to 786 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; ** 
indicates p < .01; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates model was compared to 
Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2, d indicates that model was compared to Model 4; log 
likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because models with different Ns 
are not comparable; unstandardized estimates are shown; level 1 variables (FTE Enrollment and Endowment per 
FTE) were grand mean centered; all depicted models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE 
Enrollment, and Merit Pay were logged; Δ = ‘change in’.      
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Table 21 
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Δ Endowment on Merit Pay as a Percentage of Base Salary 
 Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) 
Panel A: Including Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment -.015 (.027) -.006 (.037) -.009 (.054) -.004 (.037) .004 (.044) 
Institutional Ownership -.001 (.062) .002 (.063) .001 (.065) .005 (.064) .001 (.065) 
Religious .101 (.056) .099 (.056) .099 (.057) .097 (.057) .100 (.057) 
Enforceability Index .007 (.012) .007 (.012) .007 (.012) .007 (.012) .007 (.012) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Δ Endowment per FTE  -.011 (.029) -.018 (.067) -.013 (.030) -.025 (.045) 
Time   .013 (.129)   
Time* Δ Endowment per 
FTE   .008 (.079)   
Δ Endowment per FTE2    -.001 (.007) .003 (.012) 
Δ Endowment per FTE3     .001 (.002) 
Log Likelihood -838.193 -838.116 -838.108 -838.093 -838.021 
Δ Log Likelihood 4.470 a .077 b .008 c .024 c .072 d 
Panel B: Excluding Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment -.003 (.003) -.004 (.004) -.003 (.005) -.004 (.004) -.004 (.004) 
Institutional Ownership -.001 (.006) -.001 (.006) -.002 (.006) -.002 (.006) -.002 (.006) 
Religious -.001 (.006) -.001 (.006) -.001 (.006) -.001 (.006) -.001 (.006) 
Enforceability Index -.002 (.001) -.002 (.001) -.002 (.001) -.002 (.001) -.002 (.001) 
University Density  .000 (.000)  .000 (.000)  .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Δ Endowment per FTE   .002 (.003)  .001 (.007) .002 (.003) .001 (.005) 
Time   -.002 (.013)   
Time* Δ Endowment per 
FTE    .001 (.008)   
Δ Endowment per FTE2     .000 (.001)  .000 (.001) 
Δ Endowment per FTE3          .000 (.000) 
Note.  N = 789 before outlier removal and 785 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01; a 
indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates model was compared to Model 1; c indicates 
that model was compared to Model 2, d indicates that model was compared to Model 4; log likelihood values and 
change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because models with different cases are not 
comparable; unstandardized estimates are shown; level 1 variables (FTE Enrollment and Endowment per FTE) were 
grand mean centered; all depicted models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, 
and Relative Merit Pay were logged; Δ = ‘change in’.       
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Table 22 
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Δ Endowment on Bonuses 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) 
Panel A: Including Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment .104 (.107) -.090 (.176) -.161 (.275) -.024 (.178) -.182 (.222) 
Institutional Ownership .610 (.603) .551 (.604) .771 (.607) .676 (.607) .731 (.607) 
Religious -1.408 (.546)* -1.361 (.546)* -1.489 (.546)** -1.434 (.547)** -1.475 (.547)** 
Enforceability Index .269 (.116)* .271 (.116)* .271 (.116)* .266 (.116)* .265 (.116)* 
University Density .000 (.000)* .000 (.000)* .000 (.000)* .000 (.000)* .000 (.000)* 
Δ Endowment per FTE  .201 (.145) .936 (.335)** .153 (.146) .362 (.228) 
Time   -.235 (.619)   
Time* Δ Endowment per 
FTE   -1.066 (.396)**   
Δ Endowment per FTE2    -.069 (.033)* -.133 (.063)* 
Δ Endowment per FTE3     -.012 (.010) 
Log Likelihood -2253.644 -2252.680 -2248.937 -2250.458 -2249.746 
Δ Log Likelihood 9.350** a .964 b 3.743* c 2.222* c -.712 d 
Panel B: Excluding Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment .045 (.051) .039 (.076) -.007 (.131) -.005 (.087) .021 (.104) 
Institutional Ownership .694 (.626) .644 (.626) .948 (.624) .866 (.626) .811 (.626) 
Religious -1.550 (.566)** -1.451 (.566)* -1.680 (.563)** -1.631 (.566)** -1.577 (.565)** 
Enforceability Index .286 (.122)* .277 (.122)* .295 (.121)* .280 (.122)* .282 (.122)* 
University Density .000 (.000)* .000 (.000)* .000 (.000)* .000 (.000)* .000 (.000)** 
Δ Endowment per FTE  .022 (.064) .879 (.168)** .102 (.071) .084 (.107) 
Time   -.589 (.299)*   
Time* Δ Endowment per 
FTE   -.965 (.198)**   
Δ Endowment per FTE2    -.067 (.016)** -.056 (.029) 
Δ Endowment per FTE3         .002 (.005) 
Note.  N = 789 before outlier removal and ranges from 735 to 738 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; ** 
indicates p < .01; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates model was compared to 
Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2, d indicates that model was compared to Model 4; log 
likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because models with different Ns 
are not comparable; unstandardized estimates are shown; level 1 variables (FTE Enrollment and Endowment per 
FTE) were grand mean centered; all depicted models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE 
Enrollment, and Bonuses were logged; Δ = ‘change in’.          
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Table 23 
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Δ Endowment on Bonuses as a Percentage of Base Salary 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) 
Panel A: Including Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment -.009 (.017) -.010 (.024) -.001 (.035) -.009 (.024) -.008 (.028) 
Institutional Ownership .032 (.043) .032 (.043) .035 (.045) .033 (.044) .017 (.008)* 
Religious -.003 (.039) -.003 (.039) -.005 (.040) -.003 (.039) .000 (.000) 
Enforceability Index .017 (.008)* .017 (.008)* .017 (.008)* .017 (.008)* .033 (.045) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) -.003 (.040) 
Δ Endowment per FTE  .000 (.019) .019 (.044) .000 (.019) -.001 (.030) 
Time   -.034 (.083)   
Time* Δ Endowment per 
FTE   -.022 (.052)   
Δ Endowment per FTE2    -.001 (.004) -.001 (.008) 
Δ Endowment per FTE3     .000 (.001) 
Log Likelihood -500.709 -500.709 -500.575 -500.692 -500.692 
Δ Log Likelihood 3.330 a .000 b 0.134 c 0.017c .000 d 
Panel B: Excluding Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment .006 (.003)* .001 (.005) .002 (.007) .002 (.005) -.002 (.006) 
Institutional Ownership .033 (.014)* .031 (.014)* .035 (.015)* .032 (.014)* .034 (.015)* 
Religious -.037 (.013)** -.036 (.013)** -.038 (.013)** -.036 (.013)** -.037 (.013)** 
Enforceability Index .007 (.003)** .007 (.003)** .007 (.003)** .007 (.003)** .007 (.003)** 
University Density .000 (.000)* .000 (.000)* .000 (.000)* .000 (.000)* .000 (.000)* 
Δ Endowment per FTE  .006 (.004) .021 (.009)* .005 (.004) .010 (.006) 
Time   -.012 (.016)   
Time* Δ Endowment per 
FTE   -.020 (.010)   
Δ Endowment per FTE2    -.001 (.001) -.002 (.002) 
Δ Endowment per FTE3         .000 (.000) 
Note.  N = 789 before outlier removal and 788 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01; a 
indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates model was compared to Model 1; c indicates 
that model was compared to Model 2, d indicates that model was compared to Model 4; log likelihood values and 
change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because models with different case are not comparable; 
unstandardized estimates are shown; level 1 variables (FTE Enrollment and Endowment per FTE) were grand mean 
centered; all depicted models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Relative 
Bonuses were logged; Δ = ‘change in’. 
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Table 24 
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Δ Endowment on Deferred Compensation  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) 
Panel A: Including Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment -.038 (.077) -.182 (.128) -.168 (.201) -.200 (.130) -.234 (.163) 
Institutional Ownership 5.496 (.477)** 5.452 (.477)** 5.454 (.481)** 5.418 (.478)** 5.430 (.480)** 
Religious -1.277 (.431)** -1.242 (.431)** -1.243 (.433)** -1.222 (.432)** -1.230 (.432)** 
Enforceability Index -.043 (.092) -.042 (.092) -.042 (.092) -.040 (.092) -.040 (.092) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Δ Endowment per FTE  .148 (.106) .165 (.246) .161 (.107) .207 (.168) 
Time   -.045 (.453)   
Time* Δ Endowment per 
FTE   -.015 (.290)   
Δ Endowment per FTE2    .019 (.024) .005 (.046) 
Δ Endowment per FTE3     -.003 (.007) 
Log Likelihood -2031.444 -2030.455 -2030.449 -2030.145 -2030.083 
Δ Log Likelihood 61.711** a .989 b .006 c .310 c .062d 
Panel B: Excluding Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment .015 (.012) -.029 (.020) -.032 (.031) -.030 (.020) -.035 (.026) 
Institutional Ownership 5.814 (.506)** 5.800 (.506)** 5.811 (.507)** 5.798 (.506)** 5.799 (.507)** 
Religious -1.316 (.443)** -1.305 (.443)** -1.312 (.443)** -1.303 (.443)** -1.304 (.443)** 
Enforceability Index -.013 (.096) -.013 (.096) -.013 (.096) -.013 (.096) -.013 (.096) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Δ Endowment per FTE  .044 (.016)** .084 (.039)* .045 (.017)** .051 (.026) 
Time   -.015 (.070)   
Time* Δ Endowment per 
FTE   -.057 (.045)   
Δ Endowment per FTE2    .001 (.004) .000 (.007) 
Δ Endowment per FTE3         .000 (.001) 
Note.  N = 789 before outlier removal and 738 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01; a 
indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates model was compared to Model 1; c indicates 
that model was compared to Model 2, d indicates that model was compared to Model 4; log likelihood values and 
change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because models with different case are not comparable; 
unstandardized estimates are shown; level 1 variables (FTE Enrollment and Endowment per FTE) were grand mean 
centered; all depicted models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Deferred 
Compensation were logged; Δ = ‘change in’. 
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Table 25 
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Δ Endowment on Deferred Compensation as a Percentage of 
Base Salary 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) 
Panel A: Including Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment -.011 (.012) -.015 (.017) -.003 (.026) -.017 (.018) -.011 (.021) 
Institutional Ownership .057 (.033) .056 (.033) .051 (.034) .053 (.034) .050 (.034) 
Religious -.014 (.030) -.013 (.030) -.010 (.030) -.011 (.030) -.009 (.030) 
Enforceability Index .005 (.006) .005 (.006) .005 (.006) .005 (.006) .005 (.006) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Δ Endowment per FTE  .005 (.014) .001 (.032) .006 (.014) -.003 (.022) 
Time   -.033 (.061)   
Time* Δ Endowment per 
FTE   .014 (.038)   
Δ Endowment per FTE2    .002 (.003) .004 (.006) 
Δ Endowment per FTE3     .000 (.001) 
Log Likelihood -260.034 -259.978 -259.684 -259.841 -259.705 
Δ Log Likelihood 2.868 a .056 b .294 c .137 c .135 d 
Panel B: Excluding Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment -.002 (.002) -.006 (.003)* -.002 (.005) -.007 (.003)* -.005 (.004) 
Institutional Ownership .056 (.014)** .055 (.014)** .055 (.015)** .054 (.015)** .053 (.015)** 
Religious -.038 (.013)** -.037 (.013)** -.037 (.013)** -.036 (.013)** -.036 (.013)** 
Enforceability Index -.002 (.003) -.002 (.003) -.002 (.003) -.002 (.003) -.002 (.003) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Δ Endowment per FTE  .005 (.002) .010 (.005) .005 (.002) .002 (.004) 
Time   -.013 (.010)   
Time* Δ Endowment per 
FTE   -.004 (.006)   
Δ Endowment per FTE2    .000 (.001) .001 (.001) 
Δ Endowment per FTE3         .000 (.000) 
Note.  N = 789 before outlier removal and 785 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01; a 
indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates model was compared to Model 1; c indicates 
that model was compared to Model 2, d indicates that model was compared to Model 4; log likelihood values and 
change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because models with different cases are not 
comparable; unstandardized estimates are shown; level 1 variables (FTE Enrollment and Endowment per FTE) were 
grand mean centered; all depicted models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, 
and Relative Deferred Compensation were logged; Δ = ‘change in’. 
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Table 26 
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Δ Total Compensation on Endowment 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) 
Panel A: Including Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment .739 (.051)** .638 (.054)** -.007 (.061) 
Institutional Ownership -.064 (.067) -.090 (.067) -.109 (.059) 
Religious .135 (.059)* .150 (.059)* .106 (.052)* 
Enforceability Index .022 (.013) .024 (.013) .019 (.011) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Δ Total Compensation  -.187 (.032)** -.010 (.041) 
Time   1.224 (.074)** 
Time* Δ Total Compensation   .000 (.059) 
Log Likelihood -863.962 -847.300 -729.120 
Δ Log Likelihood 122.194**a 16.662** b 118.180 c 
Panel B: Excluding Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment 1.207 (.021)** .198 (.023)** -.008 (.007) 
Institutional Ownership .109 (.030)** .020 (.014) -.014 (.008) 
Religious .031 (.026) .006 (.012) .016 (.007)* 
Enforceability Index .006 (.006) .001 (.003) -.001 (.001) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Δ Total Compensation  -1.036 (.022)** -.001 (.005) 
Time   1.242 (.009)** 
Time* Δ Total Compensation     -.002 (.007) 
Note.  N = 762 before outlier removal and ranged from 755 to 758 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; ** 
indicates p < .01; log likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because 
models with different Ns are not comparable; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates 
model was compared to Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2; unstandardized coefficients are 
shown; level 1 variables (Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment) were grand mean centered; all depicted 
models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Δ Total Compensation were 
logged; Δ = ‘change in’.   
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Table 27 
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Relative Δ Total Compensation on Δ Endowment 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) 
Panel A: Including Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment .739 (.051)** .737 (.051)** -.007 (.061) 
Institutional Ownership -.064 (.067) -.063 (.067) -.108 (.059) 
Religious .135 (.059)* .135 (.059)* .106 (.052)* 
Enforceability Index .022 (.013) .022 (.013) .019 (.011) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Δ Relative Total Compensation   -.021 (.039) -.001 (.034) 
Time   1.236 (.069)** 
Time* Δ Relative Total 
Compensation   .049 (.225) 
Log Likelihood -863.962 -863.823 -729.148 
Δ Log Likelihood 122.194** a .139 b 134.675** c 
Panel B: Excluding Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment 1.207 (.021)** 1.207 (.022)** -.008 (.007) 
Institutional Ownership .109 (.030)** .109 (.030)** -.014 (.008) 
Religious .031 (.026) .031 (.026) .016 (.007)* 
Enforceability Index .006 (.006) .006 (.006) -.001 (.001) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Δ Relative Total Compensation   .002 (.015) .000 (.004) 
Time   1.244 (.008)** 
Time* Δ Relative Total 
Compensation     -.007 (.027) 
Note.  N = 762 before outlier removal and ranged from 755 to 758 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; ** 
indicates p < .01; log likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because 
models with different Ns are not comparable; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates 
model was compared to Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2; unstandardized coefficients are 
shown; level 1 variables (Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment) were grand mean centered; all depicted 
models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Δ Relative Total Compensation 
were logged; Δ = ‘change in’. 
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Table 28 
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Merit Pay on Δ Endowment 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) 
Panel A: Including Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment .739 (.051)** .738 (.051)** -.007 (.061) 
Institutional Ownership -.064 (.067) -.065 (.067) -.108 (.059) 
Religious .135 (.059)* .139 (.059)* .106 (.052)* 
Enforceability Index .022 (.013) .022 (.013) .019 (.011) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Merit Pay  .042 (.041) -.001 (.048) 
Time   1.233 (.068)** 
Time*Merit Pay   .011 (.069) 
Log Likelihood -863.962 -863.447 -729.153 
Δ Log Likelihood 122.194** a .515 b 134.295 c 
Panel B: Excluding Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment 1.207 (.021)** 1.205 (.022)* -.008 (.007) 
Institutional Ownership .109 (.030)** .108 (.030)** -.014 (.008) 
Religious .031 (.026) .033 (.026) .016 (.007)* 
Enforceability Index .006 (.006) .006 (.006) -.001 (.001) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Merit Pay  .017 (.016) -.004 (.006) 
Time   1.245 (.008)** 
Time*Merit Pay     .004 (.008) 
Note.  N = 762 before outlier removal and ranged from 755 to 758 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; ** 
indicates p < .01; log likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because 
models with different Ns are not comparable; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates 
model was compared to Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2; unstandardized coefficients are 
shown; level 1 variables (Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment) were grand mean centered; all depicted 
models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Merit Pay were logged; Δ = 
‘change in’. 
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Table 29 
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Merit Pay as a Percentage of Base Salary on Δ Endowment 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) 
Panel A: Including Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment .739 (.051)** .738 (.051)* -.006 (.061) 
Institutional Ownership -.064 (.067) -.063 (.067) -.108 (.059) 
Religious .135 (.059)* .135 (.059)** .106 (.052)* 
Enforceability Index .022 (.013) .022 (.013) .019 (.011) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Merit Pay - Relative  -.008 (.022) .004 (.021) 
Time   1.234 (.068)** 
Time*Merit Pay - Relative   -.001 (.045) 
Log Likelihood -863.962 -863.893 -729.153 
Δ Log Likelihood 122.194** a 0.069 b 134.74 c 
Panel B: Excluding Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment 1.207 (.021)** 1.207 (.022)** -.008 (.007) 
Institutional Ownership .109 (.030)** .109 (.030)** -.014 (.008) 
Religious .031 (.026) .031 (.026) .016 (.007)* 
Enforceability Index .006 (.006) .006 (.006) -.001 (.001) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Merit Pay - Relative  .000 (.008) .001 (.002) 
Time   1.244 (.008)** 
Time*Merit Pay - Relative     .000 (.005) 
Note.  N = 762 before outlier removal and ranged from 755 to 758 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; ** 
indicates p < .01; log likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because 
models with different Ns are not comparable; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates 
model was compared to Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2; unstandardized coefficients are 
shown; level 1 variables (Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment) were grand mean centered; all depicted 
models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Relative Merit Pay were 
logged; Δ = ‘change in’. 
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Table 30 
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Bonuses on Δ Endowment 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) 
Panel A: Including Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment .737 (.050)** .735 (.050)** -.009 (.060) 
Institutional Ownership -.040 (.063) -.043 (.064) -.110 (.057) 
Religious .131 (.057)* .134 (.057)* .109 (.051)* 
Enforceability Index .020 (.012) .020 (.012) .018 (.011) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Bonus  .002 (.005) .004 (.006) 
Time   1.236 (.066)** 
Time*Bonus   .001 (.009) 
Log Likelihood -883.060 -882.942 -740.460 
Δ Log Likelihood 129.867 a 0.118 b 142.481** c 
Panel B: Excluding Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment 1.202 (.021)** 1.202 (.021)** -.008 (.007) 
Institutional Ownership .120 (.029)** .122 (.029)** -.012 (.007) 
Religious .030 (.026) .028 (.026) .015 (.007)* 
Enforceability Index .005 (.006) .006 (.006) -.001 (.001) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Bonus  -.002 (.002) .000 (.001) 
Time   1.245 (.008)** 
Time*Bonus     .001 (.001) 
Note.  N = 788 before outlier removal and ranged from 781 to 784 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; ** 
indicates p < .01; log likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because 
models with different Ns are not comparable; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates 
model was compared to Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2; unstandardized coefficients are 
shown; level 1 variables (Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment) were grand mean centered; all depicted 
models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Bonuses were logged; Δ = 
‘change in’. 
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Table 31 
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Bonuses as a Percentage of Base Salary on Δ Endowment 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) 
Panel A: Including Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment .737 (.050)** .737 (.050)** -.006 (.060) 
Institutional Ownership -.040 (.063) -.041 (.063) -.107 (.058) 
Religious .131 (.057)* .131 (.057)* .106 (.052)* 
Enforceability Index .020 (.012) .020 (.012) .018 (.011) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Bonus - Relative  .013 (.058) .147 (.298) 
Time   1.232 (.066)** 
Time*Bonus - Relative   -.148 (.302) 
Log Likelihood -883.060 -883.033 -741.124 
Δ Log Likelihood 129.867** a .027b 141.909** c 
Panel B: Excluding Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment 1.202 (.021)** 1.202 (.021)** -.007 (.008) 
Institutional Ownership .120 (.029)** .120 (.029)** -.018 (.009)* 
Religious .030 (.026) .030 (.026) .021 (.008)** 
Enforceability Index .005 (.006) .005 (.006) .001 (.002) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Bonus - Relative  .003 (.023) -.004 (.042) 
Time   1.242 (.009)** 
Time*Bonus - Relative     .004 (.042) 
Note.  N = 788 before outlier removal and ranged from 781 to 785 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; ** 
indicates p < .01; log likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because 
models with different Ns are not comparable; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates 
model was compared to Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2; unstandardized coefficients are 
shown; level 1 variables (Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment) were grand mean centered; all depicted 
models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Relative Bonuses were logged; 
Δ = ‘change in’. 
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Table 32 
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Deferred Compensation on Δ Endowment 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) 
Panel A: Including Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment .737 (.050)** .739 (.050)** -.004 (.060) 
Institutional Ownership -.040 (.063) -.016 (.073) -.104 (.065) 
Religious .131 (.057)* .126 (.058)* .104 (.052)* 
Enforceability Index .020 (.012) .020 (.012) .019 (.011) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Deferred Compensation   -.004 (.006) .001 (.008) 
Time   1.232 (.067)** 
Time*Deferred Compensation   -.003 (.010) 
Log Likelihood -883.060 -882.836 -740.874 
Δ Log Likelihood 129.867** a .224 b 141.962** c 
Panel B: Excluding Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment 1.202 (.021)** 1.202 (.021)** -.006 (.007) 
Institutional Ownership .120 (.029)** .123 (.033)** -.011 (.008) 
Religious .030 (.026) .029 (.026) .015 (.007)* 
Enforceability Index .005 (.006) .005 (.006) -.001 (.001) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Deferred Compensation  -.001 (.003) .000 (.001) 
Time   1.244 (.008)** 
Time*Deferred Compensation      -.002 (.001) 
Note.  N = 788 before outlier removal and ranged from 781 to 784 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; ** 
indicates p < .01; log likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because 
models with different Ns are not comparable; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates 
model was compared to Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2; unstandardized coefficients are 
shown; level 1 variables (Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment) were grand mean centered; all depicted 
models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Deferred Compensation were 
logged; Δ = ‘change in’. 
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Table 33 
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Deferred Compensation as a Percentage of Base Salary on Δ 
Endowment 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE) 
Panel A: Including Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment .737 (.050)** .737 (.050)** -.006 (.060) 
Institutional Ownership -.040 (.063) -.039 (.063) -.105 (.057) 
Religious .131 (.057)* .131 (.057)* .104 (.051)* 
Enforceability Index .020 (.012) .020 (.012) .019 (.011) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Deferred Compensation - Relative  -.013 (.048) .003 (.051) 
Time   1.234 (.066)** 
Time*Deferred Compensation - Relative   -.002 (.085) 
Log Likelihood -883.060 -883.025 -740.918 
Change in Log Likelihood 129.867** a 0.035 b 142.107** c 
Panel B: Excluding Outliers 
Δ FTE Enrollment 1.202 (.021)** 1.202 (.021)** -.008 (.007) 
Institutional Ownership .120 (.029)** .121 (.029)** -.013 (.007) 
Religious .030 (.026) .030 (.026) .016 (.006)** 
Enforceability Index .005 (.006) .005 (.006) -.001 (.001) 
University Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Deferred Compensation - Relative  -.012 (.019) -.003 (.006) 
Time   1.245 (.008)** 
Time*Deferred Compensation - Relative     .001 (.010) 
Note.  N = 788 before outlier removal and ranged from 781 to 784 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; ** 
indicates p < .01; log likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because 
models with different Ns are not comparable; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates 
model was compared to Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2; unstandardized coefficients are 
shown; level 1 variables (Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment) were grand mean centered; all depicted 
models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Relative Deferred 
Compensation were logged; Δ = ‘change in’.  
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Figure 1  
 
Chapter 2 Proposed Model 
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Figure 2 
 
Proposed Relation Between Performance and Compensation 
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Figure 3 
 
Adaptation of Figure 1 from Indjejikian and Nanda (2002)
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Figure 4 
 
PRISMA diagram 
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Figure 5 
Plot of the Δ Endowment by Time Interaction on Bonuses  
 
Panel A: Including Outliers  Panel B: Excluding Outliers 
  
  
Note. Red lines represent the effect of Δ Endowment at Time 1 on Bonus at Time 2; Blue lines represent the effects of Δ Endowment 
at Time 2 on Bonus at Time 3.  
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Figure 6 
Plot of the Linear and Nonlinear Effects of Δ Endowment on Δ Total Compensation 
 
Panel A: Including Outliers Panel B: Excluding Outliers  
  
 
 
 
 
Legend 
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Figure 7 
Plot of the Linear and Nonlinear Effects of Δ Endowment on Merit Pay  
 
Panel A: Including Outliers Panel B: Excluding Outliers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend  
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Figure 8 
Plot of the Quadratic Effect of Δ Endowment on Bonuses 
Panel A: Including Outliers Panel B: Excluding Outliers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend  
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